Pure and Bayes-Nash price of anarchy for generalized second price auction

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 735-744

  Leme, Renato Paes ^a   Tardos, Éva ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; GSP; Price of anarchy; Sponsored search auction

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTERS;

COMBINATORIAL STRUCTURES; COMBINATORIAL TECHNIQUES; FULL INFORMATIONS; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRICE OF STABILITY; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SECOND-PRICE AUCTION; SPONSORED SEARCH AUCTIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 78751494222     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2010.75     Document Type: Conference Paper

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