Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 251-286

  Lane, Timothy ^a  

^a NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Disownership; Levels of explanation; Mental ownership; Mineness; Minimal self; Principle of confounded expectations; Self relatedness; Self specificity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862132247     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4     Document Type: Article

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