Self-Consciousness

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 456-467

  Bermúdez, José Luis ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Direct awareness; Metaphysics; Misidentification; Self consciousness; Substantivalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862128031     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470751466.ch37     Document Type: Chapter

References (32)

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