Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples

Progress in Brain Research

Volumn 168, Issue , 2007, Pages

  Metzinger, Thomas ^a,b  

^a JOHANNES GUTENBERG UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b FRANKFURT INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES   (Germany)

Author keywords

agency; consciousness; evolution of tool use; first person perspective; out of body experience; ownership; phantom limbs; phenomenal transparency; robotics; rubber hand illusion; self consciousness; self model

Indexed keywords

BRAIN; CONSCIOUSNESS; DEPERSONALIZATION; DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS; EMPIRICAL RESEARCH; EPISTEMOLOGY; EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING; FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT; GESTALT THERAPY; HUMAN; INFORMATION PROCESSING; MACHINE LEARNING; MANIA; MENTAL CAPACITY; MODEL; MOTOR CORTEX; MULTIPLE PERSONALITY; MYSTICISM; NEUROPSYCHOLOGY; NONHUMAN; PERCEPTION; PHENOMENOLOGY; PLASTICITY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROPRIOCEPTION; REVIEW; SCHIZOPHRENIA; SELF CONCEPT; SENSORIMOTOR INTEGRATION; SIMULATION;

EID: 37249094184     PISSN: 00796123     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0079-6123(07)68018-2     Document Type: Review

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