Securing private property: Formal versus informal institutions

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 537-572

  Williamson, Claudia R ^a   Kerekes, Carrie B ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FLORIDA GULF COAST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861642005     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/658493     Document Type: Article

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