Complex ownership and capital structure

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 701-716

  Paligorova, Teodora ^a   Xu, Zhaoxia ^b  

^a BANK OF CANADA   (Canada)

^b POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital structure; Multiple shareholders; Pyramids

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861451234     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.05.001     Document Type: Article

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