How does law affect finance? An examination of equity tunneling in Bulgaria

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 96, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 155-173

  Atanasov, Vladimir ^a   Black, Bernard ^b   Ciccotello, Conrad ^c   Gyoshev, Stanley ^d  

^a The College of William Mary Mason School of Business Department of Finance   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Controlling shareholder; Dilution; Emerging markets; Equity tunneling; Freezeout; Preemptive rights; Securities law

Indexed keywords

EID: 77049083811     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.12.005     Document Type: Article

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