The policy preferences of the US federal reserve

Journal of Applied Econometrics

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 55-77

  Dennis, Richard ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644810374     PISSN: 08837252     EISSN: 10991255     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jae.808     Document Type: Article

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