Market structure, tariff lobbying and the free-rider problem

Public Choice

Volumn 106, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 203-220

  Pecorino, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035580674     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005257428424     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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