Contracting and coordination under asymmetric production cost information

Production and Operations Management

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 345-360

  Çakanyildirim, Metin ^a   Feng, Qi ^b   Gan, Xianghua ^c   Sethi, Suresh P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

adverse selection; contracting; demand uncertainty; supply chain efficiency; type dependent reservation profit

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859014650     PISSN: 10591478     EISSN: 19375956     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2011.01258.x     Document Type: Review

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