Do religious factors impact armed conflict? Empirical evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 23, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 752-779

  Basedau, Matthias ^a   Strüver, Georg ^a   Vüllers, Johannes ^a   Wegenast, Tim ^a,b  

^a GIGA GERMAN INSTITUTE OF GLOBAL AND AREA STUDIES   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Armed conflict; Mobilization; Religion; Sub saharan Africa

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858779667     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: 15561836     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.619240     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. If not indicated otherwise, "Africa" denotes the 48 countries of "sub-Saharan Africa" (that is, excluding North Africa).
2. Jeffrey Dixon, "What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings," International Studies Review 11, no. 4 (2009): 707-735
3. Ha°vard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 508-535
4. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90
5. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 1, Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005)
6. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicolas Sambanis, "Why are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict," Journal of African Economics 9, no. 3 (2000): 224-269.
7. We define "armed conflict" according to the definition by UCDP=PRIO. Such a conflict is a contested incompatibility that has created at least 25 battle-related deaths (see Table A1).
8. As religious armed conflict we conceptualize all such conflicts in which either the conflict parties significantly differ by their religious affiliation (e.g., in Côte d'Ivoire between Muslims and Christians) or in which the warring factions have an incompatibility regarding religious ideas such as the role of religion in the state. The latter regularly includes religious extremism
9. e.g., the conflict in Northern Nigeria see also "data and empirical strategy" and Table A1.
10. According to findings by Basedau et al., in 23 out of 48 sub-Saharan countries religion is connected to conflict in one form or other.
11. See Matthias Basedau, Georg Strüver, and Johannes Vüllers, "Cutting Bread or Cutting Throats? - Findings from a New Database on Religion, Violence and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2008," GIGA Working Papers, no. 159 (Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2011).
12. This is much higher than the religious conflict prevalence found by Svensson and Croissant et al.
13. See Isak Svensson, "Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (2007): 930-949
14. and Aurel Croissant, Uwe Wagschal, Nicolas Schwank, and Christoph Trinn, Kultur und Konflikt in globaler Perspektive. Die kulturellen Dimensionen des Konfliktgeschehens 1945-2007 [Culture and Conflict from a Global Perspective. The Cultural Dimensions of Conflict, 1945-2007]. (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann- Stiftung, 2010).
15. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2010), Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Belief_and_Practices/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf (accessed August 10, 2010)
16. Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar, "Religion and Politics: Taking African Epistemologies Seriously," Journal of Modern African Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 385-401.
17. E.g. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)
18. Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State from Christian Militias to al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
19. This article focuses on the religion-conflict link. Looking at the peace dimension is certainly commendable but beyond the scope of this paper.
20. See Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)
21. Daniel Philpott, "Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion," American Political Science Review 101, no. 3 (2007): 505-525.
22. Matthias Basedau and Alexander De Juan, "The Ambivalence of the Sacred in Africa: The Impact of Religion in Sub-Saharan Civil Conflicts," GIGA Working Papers, no. 70 (Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2008).
23. As argued by, for instance, Gerrie Ter Haar, "Religion: Source of Conflict or Resource for Peace?," in Gerrie Ter Harr and James Busuttil (eds.), Bridge or Barrier: Religion, Violence, and Visions for Peace (Leiden: Brill, 2005): 3-34.
24. Matthias Basedau, "Religion und Gewaltkonflikt im subsaharischen Afrika. Zur Rolle religiöser Faktoren in Benin und der Elfenbeinküste" [Religion and Violent Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the Role of Religious Factors in Benin and Ivory Coast] in Margit Bussmann, Andreas Hasenclever, and Gerald Schneider (eds.), Identität, Institutionen und Ökonomie. Ursachen innenpolitischer Gewalt [Identity, Institutions, and Economy. Causes of Intrastate Violence] PVS-Sonderheft 43 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009): 150-177
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26. Jeffrey Seul, "Ours is the Way of God: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 5 (1999): 565
27. Frances Stewart, "Religion versus Ethnicity as a Source of Mobilisation: Are There Differences?," MICROCON Research Working Paper, 18 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, 2009).
28. E.g. Isak Svensson and Emily Harding, "How Holy Wars End: Exploring the Termination Patterns of Conflict with Religious Dimensions in Asia," Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 2 (2011): 135
29. Michael C. Horowitz, "Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading," International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 167-172.
30. E.g. Paul N. Anderson, "Religion and Violence: From Pawn to Scapegoat," in Harold Ellens (ed.), The Destructive Power of Religion: Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004): 265-283
31. Monica Duffy Toft, "Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War," International Security 31, no. 4 (2007): 97-131
32. Isak Svensson, "Fighting with Faith" (see note 4 above).
33. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 845-877
34. Alexander De Juan, "A Pact with the Devil? - Elite Alliances as Bases of Violent Religious Conflicts," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 12 (2009): 1120-1135.
35. Toft argues it the other way around: political elites will tender religious bids, if religious legitimacy seems to be rational to secure their own survival
36. Monica Duffy Toft, "Getting Religion?" 102-107 (see note 13).
37. This also emphasizes the role of political leaders for the process of religious charging of a conflict. Another approach argues that successful mobilization requires that both sides-conflict party and religious actor-must have interest in it
38. Alexander De Juan, "A Pact with the Devil?" see note 14 above
39. But in both approaches it is necessary that religious leaders convince their believers of their religious interpretations- which is likelier under specific (non-)religious conditions such as credibility of religious leaders or problematic inter-religious relations.
40. E.g. Nikki R. Keddie, "The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do 'Fundamentalisms' appear," Comparative Studies in Society and History 40, no. 4 (1998): 696-723
41. Andreas Hasenclever and Alexander De Juan, "Grasping the Impact of Religious Traditions on Political Conflicts: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Perspectives," Friedens-Warte: Journal of International Peace and Organization 82, no. 2-3 (2007): 21-24.
42. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations see note 6 above
43. Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict," in Pavlos Hatzopolous and Fabio Petito (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 109-110.
44. E.g. Bruce M. Russet, John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence," Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5 (2000): 583-608
45. Andrej Tusicisny, "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?," Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 4 (2004): 485-498.
46. E.g. Aurel Croissant, Uwe Wagschal, Nicolas Schwank, and Uwe Trinn, "Kultur und Konflik," see note 4 above
47. José G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil War," American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 796-816
48. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" see note 2 above
49. Tanja Ellingsen, "Colourful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 2 (2000): 228-249.
50. Michael C. Horowitz, "Long Time Going" (see note 12 above), 167-172
51. Isak Svensson, "Fighting with Faith" (see note 4 above)
52. Monica Duffy Toft, "Getting Religion?" see note 13 above
53. Susanna Pearce, "Religious Rage: A Quantitative Analysis of the Intensity of Religious Conflicts," Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 3 (2005): 333-352
54. Tanja Ellingsen, "Toward a Revival of Religion and Religious Clashes?," Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 3 (2005): 305-332.
55. Asaf Moghadam, A Global Resurgence of Religion?, Working Paper 03-03 (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs: Harvard University, 2003)
56. Jonathan Fox, "The Increasing Role of Religion in State Failure: 1960 to 2004," Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 3 (2007): 395-414.
57. Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contest and al-Qaeda's Struggle for Sacred Authority," International Review of Social History 49 (2004): 159-177
58. Jonathan Fox, "The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno-Religious Minorities," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 3 (1999): 289-307.
59. Matthias Basedau and Alexander De Juan, "The Ambivalence of the Sacred in Africa" (see note 8 above), 6.
60. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2010), Tolerance and Tension see note 5 above
61. Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar, "Religion and Politics" see note 5 above
62. John F. McCauley and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Religious Faith and Democracy: Evidence from the Afrobarometer Surveys, Afrobarometer Working Papers 113 (Ghana: Afrobarometer, 2009).
63. Matthias Basedau, Georg Strüver, and Johannes Vüllers, "Cutting Bread or Cutting Throats " see note 4 above.
64. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War (see note 2 above)
65. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicolas Sambanis, "Why are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa?" (see note 2 above)
66. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 13-28.
67. Jeffrey Haynes, "Religion in African Civil Wars," in Manfred Brocker and Mathias Hildebrandt (eds.), Unfriedliche Religionen? Das politische Gewalt- und Konfliktpotenzial von Religionen [Violent Religion? The Potential of Religions for Political Violence and Conflict] (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005): 277-294.
68. Matthias Basedau and Johannes Vüllers, "Religion als Konfliktfaktor? Eine systematische Erhebung religiöser Gewaltdimensionen im subsaharischen Afrika" [Religion as Conflict Risk? A Systematic Overview on the Violent Dimensions of Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa], Friedens-Warte, Journal of International Peace and Organization 83, nos. 1-2 (2010): 39-62.
69. See also Frances Stewart, "Religion versus" (see note 11 above)
70. E.g. Johannes Harnischfeger, Demokratisierung und Islamisches Recht. Der Scharia-Konflikt in Nigeria [Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia-Conflict in Nigeria] (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2006)
71. Roy Love, "Religion, Ideology and Conflict in Africa," Review of African Political Economy 33, no. 110 (2006): 619-634.
72. Matthias Basedau and Johannes Vüllers, "Religion als Konfliktfaktor?" (see note 29 above), 53-55.
73. Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 29-54
74. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil War" (see note 19 above)
75. Tanja Ellingsen, "Colourful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?" (see note 19 above).
76. Frances Stewart, "Religion versus Ethnicity as a Source of Mobilisation" (see note 11 above).
77. Andrew J. Slack and Roy R. Doyon, "Population Dynamics and Susceptibility for Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (2001): 139-161.
78. E.g. Jeffrey Seul, "Ours is the Way of God" see note 11 above.
79. Ted R. Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2000)
80. Jonathan Fox, Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 Through the New Millennium (Oxford: Lexington, 2004a): 90-93.
81. E.g. Monica Duffy Toft, "Getting Religion?" (see note 13 above), 97
82. Isak Svensson, "Fighting with Faith" (see note 4 above), 936-937.
83. Eritrea became an independent state in 1993 (before: 47 states).
84. Usually, these are new conflicts. However, we also count new episodes of armed conflicts as onset if the conflict remained under 25 battle deaths for at least one year.
85. See Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 615-637
86. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1946-2008," Journal of Peace Research 46, No. 4 (2009): 577-587.
87. Following the suggestion made by Hegre and Sambanis, ongoing conflict years are coded as 0s instead of dropping them from the sample, as multiple conflicts happening in the same country are not uncommon
88. Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset" (see note 2 above), 523.
89. Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, "Fractionalization," Journal of Economic Growth 8, no. 2 (2003): 155-194.
90. We have recalculated the values for all sub-Saharan countries on the basis of data provided by the World Christian Database
91. see José G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil War" (see note 19 above).
92. Please note that this kind of parallel identity differs from differences in religious identities between the conflict parties. Here, we deal with overlaps of religious and ethnic=social identities in society, but not with overlaps of religious identities and the support base=members of the conflict parties.
93. The coding is based on data on the inter-religious structure provided by the World Christian Database. Due to the fact that the share of African Traditionalists (ATR) does not exceed 50.5% in any country, no variable on ATR dominance is coded (see also Table A2 in the Annex).
94. Jonathan Fox, The Religion and State Project, Version 1 (2004b), http:// www-thearda.com/ras/downloads (accessed December 9, 2010).
95. In total, we coded six "combined variables": polarization75 & discrimination, polarization75 & tensions, dominance & discrimination, dominance & tensions, overlap & discrimination, overlap & tensions. Polarization75 is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a state is considered religiously polarized or not. It equals "1" if the country's religious polarization value exceeds the sample's 75th percentile. An overview of all the variables employed in this study is given in Table A1 of the Annex. Table A2 reports descriptive statistics.
96. Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset" (see note 2 above)
97. Jeffrey Dixon, "What Causes Civil Wars?" (see note 2 above).
98. Although oil exports are frequently mentioned as a robust correlate of civil war, we do not employ it as a control for three reasons. First, we had to limit the number of controls. Second, according to the sensitivity analysis by Hegre and Sambanis, oil does not belong to the highly robust correlates of civil war
99. which we use; Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset" (see note 2 above, 533).
100. Finally, our own pre-testing did not find oil to be robustly connected to civil war in Africa.
101. See Keith Jaggers and Monty G. Marshall, Polity 4 Project - Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007, Dataset Users' Manual, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2007.pdf (accessed February 18, 2009).
102. From Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset" (see note 2 above).
103. Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable," American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998): 1260-1288.
104. Likelihood Ratio Tests of the reported specification against several different nested models revealed that the applied full models have a proper specification. In addition, a stepwise inclusion of all independent variables as well as the variance inflated factor (VIF) indicated that the reported findings are unlikely to be driven by multi-collinearity.
105. In addition to the logit estimations, "rare-event logit models" as suggested by King and Zeng were equally performed for all models presented in this paper. The authors show that when binary dependent variables measure the occurrence of "rare events," standard logit or probit estimations may produce biased coefficients
106. Gary King and Langche Zeng, "Explaining Rare Events in International Relations," International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 693-715).
107. Interestingly, the overlap of religion and social stratum (religious-social overlap) does not produce significant results.
108. Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray, "Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 2 (2008): 163-182.
109. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
110. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 50 (Oxford University Press, 1998): 563-573
111. Tanja Ellingsen, "Colourful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?" (see note 19 above).
112. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
113. Further variables on the religious structure such as change of (religious) demography, the inter-religious structure (islam, christ, atr), and overlap of religious and regional boundaries (religious-regional overlap, religious-social overlap)-not reported here due to space constraints- were considered by our estimations.
114. The majority does not reach statistical significance. Noteworthy exceptions are parallel religious and regional boundaries increasing the risk of religious conflict (significant at the 10% level). ATR percentage share show negative and significant results as well and, expressed in odds ratio, reduce the risk of armed conflict and religious armed conflict by 5% and 6%, respectively.
115. We further tested the effect of religious discrimination against minority religions (minority discrimination), and escalation by religious actors and=or institutions (religious calls for violence). None of them reached statistical significance.
116. We further tested the combined effects of several structural variables (such as fractionalization and demographic change) with other politicized variables (such as discrimination, tensions, and calls for violence). None of them reached statistical significance and are not reported due to space constraints.
117. We should also keep in mind that the explained variance of the models is relatively low with Pseudo R2's often remaining below 0.1.
118. For religious conflict onset (2), an armed conflict with religious incompatibility, the following variables proved significant: religious-ethnic overlap (positive, 5% level), demographic change (negative, 10%), tensions (positive, 1%), religious calls for violence (positive, 5%). Positive significant results were also returned for the following combinations (all at the 5% level): tensions & religious-ethnic overlap, tensions & polarization, polarization & discrimination, polarization & religious calls for violence.
119. For religious conflict onset (2), an armed conflict with religious incompatibility, the following variables proved significant: religious-ethnic overlap (positive, 5% level), demographic change (negative, 10%), tensions (positive, 1%), religious calls for violence (positive, 5%). Positive significant results were also returned for the following combinations (all at the 5% level): tensions & religious-ethnic overlap, tensions & polarization, polarization & discrimination, polarization & religious calls for violence.
120. Ragnhild Nordås, Identity Polarization and Conflict: State building in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, Paper prepared for the Conference Polarization and Conflict, Gaillac 7-9 June 2007.