Toward a revival of religion and religious clashes?

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 305-332

  Ellingsen, Tanja ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 32144439090     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546550590929192     Document Type: Article

References (102)

1. Max Weber's book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) is probably the most famous articulation of a relationship between culture (religion) and national development in his examination of the rise of European capitalism.
2. See Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples against the State: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994): 347-77;
3. Lawrence E. Harrison, 'Foreword' in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000): i-vii.
4. See i.e., David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965),
5. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Collier, 1962).
6. See for instance, Ali A. Mazrui, Cultural Forces in World Politics (New York: Heineman, 1990)
7. and Gurr, "People against the state," as well as his book Peoples Versus States, Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).
8. See also the work of David Carment, "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory," Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 2, (1993): 137-150;
9. also his work Wars in the Midst of Peace, with Patrick James, "Ethnic Conflict at the International Level: An Appraisal of Theories and Evidence," in ed. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh University Press, 1997): 32-59.
10. Errol A. Henderson and Tanja Ellingsen's articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution:
11. Errol A. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity States, and the Onset of War 1820-1989," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 2 (1997): 649-68;
12. Tanja Ellingsen, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 2 (2000): 228-49.
13. See also the work by Jonathan Fox, "Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethno-Religious Conflict," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 6, no. 2 (2000); 1-23;
14. "Religious Causes of International Intervention," International Politics 38, no. 4 (2001); 515-32.
15. Two other valuable studies are Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 29-54;
16. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.
17. For more information about the relationship between religion and conflict, see Jonathan Fox and Josephine Squires, "Threats to Primal Identities: A Comparison of Nationalism and Religion as Impacts on Ethnic Protest and Rebellion," Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (2001): 87-102;
18. Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late 20th Century: A General Theory (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).
19. See also Ken R. Dark, ed., Religion and International Relations (New York, Palgrave, 2000).
20. One of the most famous studies is Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49;
21. later transformed into a book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
22. Also famous is the article by Benjamin Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," Atlantic Monthly 269, no. 3 (1992): 53-65.
23. This article is available electronically at http://www.theatlantic.com/ politics/foreign/barberf.htm and was also transformed into a book, Jihad versus McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1997).
24. See also Peter Berger, ed. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion in World Politics (Los Angeles: William B. Eerdmans, 1999);
25. Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence," Comparative Studies in Religion and Society 13 (Berkeley: California Press, 2000).
26. Again see Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious conflict.
27. Examples of these arguments are found in Bell, The End of Ideology;
28. Charles Kerr et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management in Economic Growth (London: Heineman, 1962),
29. Marshall McLuhan's Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).
30. For more information, see Jeff Haynes, Religion in Third World Politics (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner 1994).
31. See also Fox, Ethnoreligious conflict.
32. David Harvey in his book The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Black well, 1980), 350-52.
33. See Peter Beyer, Religion and Globalization (London: Sage, 1994), 9.
34. Ibid, Peter Beyer, Religion and Globalization, 10, and 133.
35. See Karel Dobbelaere, "Towards an Integrated Perspective on the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of Secularization," Sociology of Religion 60, no. 3 (1999): 229-47;
36. Yves Lambert, "Religion in Modernity as a New Axial Age: Secularization or New Religious Forms," Sociology of Religion 60, no. 3 (1999): 303-33.
37. Again this argument is found in Haynes, Religion.
38. For some of the classical studies of this, see Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University, 1939);
39. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970),
40. Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors within Politics: 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, no. 3 (1972): 249-71.
41. See Huntington, Remaking, 58-78
42. for more details. See also Haynes; Religion, and Jeff Haynes, Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World (New York: Palgrave, 1999).
43. This argument is mentioned by a number of studies besides Huntington "Clash of Civilizations," and Huntington, Remaking.
44. Examples are the work of Martin E. Marty and Scott R. Appleby, Fundamentalism Comprehended (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995);
45. Barber, "Jihad Vs. McWorld; Barber, How Globalism;
46. Giles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World, Trans. Alan Braley (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
47. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," 66.
48. This argument is found in Scott M. Thomas, Religion and International Conflict, in Religion and International Relations, ed. Ken R. Dark (New York: Palgrove, 2002).
49. Similar arguments are also found in Anson Shupe, "The Stubborn Persistence of Religion in the Global Arena," in Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World, ed. Emilie Sahliyeh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990): 71-98.
50. The WVS is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political change. It builds on the European Values Surveys, first carried out in 1981 when they included twenty-two independent countries. A second wave of surveys was completed in 1990-91 (forty-three countries), a third wave was carried out in 1995-97 (fifty-three countries), and a fourth wave took place in 1999-2001 (sixty-five countries). As the fourth wave was not yet fully released at the time of writing I only have data for the first three waves. For more information on each of the variables see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
51. I also reran these analyses looking at the twenty-eight countries included in waves two and three of the WVS and found the same pattern - to some extent even stronger (not reported here). Thus, the results seem to hold when including additional non-Western countries into the analyses.
52. For countries where I did have information from 1981 or 1990, but not for 1996, the information was interpolated in order to include as many countries as possible. In this way I ended up with an N = 63.
53. The "Other" category refers to the Philippines.
54. For information on the effects of globalization in different cultures, see David Dollar and Paul Collier, Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy (Washington DC: Oxford University Press, 2001).
55. The minimum value on the national level of religiosity in the Western civilizations is.232 (Czech Republic) while the maximum value is.827 (United States).
56. I.e., Ronald Inglehart, "Changing Values, Economic Development and Political Change," International Social Science Journal 1,007 (1995) 379-404;
57. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);
58. Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values," American Sociological Review 65, no. 1 (2000): 19-51;
59. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Islam & the West: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis, John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Faculty Research Papers Series, RWP02-015, 2002.
60. Again, see Inglehart, "Changing values";
61. Inglehart and Baker, "Modernization."
62. The data is obtained from the Polity IV data by Monty G. Marshall, and Keith Jaggers, (2003). Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2002. Dataset Users Manual. Data and codebook is available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm
63. While I use the five different variables above as my dependent variables in the cross tabulations, for the multivariate analysis I only use one dependent variable which I have called "Level of National Religiosity." This variable is a composite measure of each of the five different variables in the crosstabulations. This variable was constructed by first transforming each of the five variables into national measures, adding the number of respondents within each of the variable's values multiplied with the value signified, then divided by total number of respondents multiplied by the total number of values. Once transformed into national measures, I then added the country's score on each of the five variables and divided it by the number of variables (5). For instance, if 137 of the 989 respondents in France found religion very important (value 4), 283 found it rather important (value 3), 274 found it not very important (value 2), and 289 did not find it important at all (value 1), the calculation is: Σ,[137 × 3 + 283 × 2 + 274 × 1 + 289 × 0]/[989 × 4] which is.420. This way I ended up with a composite measure of the level of national religiosity which varies on a scale from 0-1, where 1 is the highest possible level of national religiosity. The composite measure had a mean correlation of.907, and a Crombach's α of 952, which indicates a reliable index.
64. See Thomas, "International Conflict," 4.
65. Examples of this perspective are found in Clifford Geertz, Old Societies and New States (New York: Basic Books, 1963);
66. Harold Isaacs, "Basic Group Identity: Idols of the Tribe," Ethnicity 1 (1975) 15-41;
67. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986);
68. Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993);
69. Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
70. Isaacs, "Basic Group Identity," 38.
71. Civilizations are mainly defined by religion. As a result, Huntington divides the world into eight possible civilizations: Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, and Japanese.
72. Huntington, "Clash of Civilization," 27.
73. See David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 5.
74. Lake and Rothchild, International Spread, 6.
75. See, for instance, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: New Left Books, 1983);
76. Virginia Dominguez, People as Subject, People as Object: Selfhood and Peoplehood in Contemporary Israel (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989);
77. Rogers Brubacker, "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe," Daedalus, 3, no.1 (1995): 107-32.
78. This view is reflected in Thomas, "International Conflict," 4.
79. See i.e., Huntington, Remaking, 28.
80. Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 6th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
81. I.e., Huntington, "Clash of Civilization," and Huntington, Remaking.
82. Also see Juergensmeyer, "Mind of God".
83. The dataset differs between four types of armed conflict: (1) extra-systemic, (2) interstate, (3) intrastate, and (4) intrastate with foreign intervention. Here I only investigate intrastate armed conflict. Originally the data included only the post-cold war years, but it has recently been dated back to 1946 (Nils Petter Gleditsch et.al. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 [2002]: 615-37)
84. and includes data for all member states of the international system as defined by Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward for the period 1946-2002, in "A Revised List of Independent States Since 1816," International Interactions 25, no. 2 (1999): 393-413.
85. The criterion is either that the state (1) has a population ≥250,000/or diplomatic connections to two major powers or (2) is a member of the United Nations (UN) during the period. The Uppsala Conflict database also distinguishes between major armed conflict (resulting in 1,000 battle deaths or more per year) intermediate armed conflict (resulting in at least 25 battle-deaths per year and 1,000 battle-deaths or more throughout the duration of the conflict) and minor armed conflict (with a minimum of 25 annual battle-deaths, but less than 1,000 battle-deaths during the duration of the conflict). In this analysis I define an armed conflict as an armed conflict resulting in 25 battle-related deaths or more within a year. See Håvard Strand, Lars Wilhelmsen, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, (2003). Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook; http://www.prio.no/page/Project_detail//9244/42133.html
86. See Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict."
87. Each country may have numerous conflicts going on within the same year. See Strand, Wihelmsen, and Gleditsch, Armed Conflict Dataset.
88. The second largest religious group had to be 5 percent or more of the total population for the country to be considered split between religious denominations.
89. See Ellingsen (2000) (note 4), Hegre et al., "Towards a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War 1816-1992," American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 33-48;
90. Fearon and Laitin (2003) (note 4); Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington DC: Oxford University Press, 2003).
91. See, for instance, Terry Bosswell and William Dixon, "Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross-National Analysis," American Sociological Review 45, no. 4 (1990): 540-59;
92. Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, "Cross National Variation in Political Violence. A Rational Action Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 6 (1990): 624-51.
93. World Development Indicators CD-ROM, 2003.
94. I.e., Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers.
95. For more information about the arguments, see Ibid. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, http://www.worldbank.org/research/ conflict/papers.
96. Also see Indra de Soysa, "Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 4 (2002): 395-416.
97. See i.e., Fearon and Laitin 2003 (note 6), Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, "The Geography of Civil War," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 4 (2002): 417-33.
98. The data for the Penn World Tables 6.1 was collected by Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Tables Version 6.1., Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP, 2002).
99. See the article by Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable," American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998): 1260-88.
100. In model 2B the population is not significant at the.05 level, however.
101. Although the size of the coefficients might seem small, these variables are continuous variables and thus the decrease in risk of conflict going from being a poor to being a rich country is much higher than going from a country with religious differences to one without.
102. I also ran models with conflict in the previous year, and interaction terms between this variable and the others seem to support these findings. Due to space limitations these models are not reported here.