Learning in multilateral trade negotiations: Some results from simulation for developing countries

Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 145-174

  Dupont, Cédric ^a   Beverelli, Cosimo ^a   Pézard, Stéphanie ^a  

^a GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858512591     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511491610.005     Document Type: Chapter

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