International environmental agreements as evolutionary games

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 251-269

  McGinty, Matthew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MILWAUKEE   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary games; Externalities; International environmental agreements; Transfers

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; PARETO PRINCIPLE; POLLUTION CONTROL;

BASIN OF ATTRACTION; EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUMS; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; EXTERNALITIES; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; KYOTO TREATY; TRANSFERS;

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS;

ABATEMENT COST; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; GAME THEORY;

EID: 77950460914     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-009-9314-4     Document Type: Article

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