How is the equilibrium of continuous strategy game different from that of discrete strategy game?

BioSystems

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 88-94

  Zhong, Weicai ^a   Kokubo, Satoshi ^b   Tanimoto, Jun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

^b KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Continuous strategy; Evolutionary dynamics; Finite population; Fixation probability; Prisoner's dilemma; Spatial structure

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; INTERPOLATION; NETWORK ANALYSIS; PRISONER DILEMMA; PROBABILITY; RECIPROCITY; SPATIAL ANALYSIS;

ARTICLE; COMPARATIVE STUDY; CONTINUOUS STRATEGY GAME; COOPERATION; DISCRETE STRATEGY GAME; GAME; PRISONER;

EID: 84856078092     PISSN: 03032647     EISSN: 18728324     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2011.10.001     Document Type: Article

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