Agency performance and executive pay in government: An empirical test

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 31-54

  Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær ^a   Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegaard ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84555186864     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: 14779803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mur039     Document Type: Article

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