BitTorrent is an auction: Analyzing and improving bittorrent's incentives

Computer Communication Review

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 243-254

  Levin, Dave ^a   Lacurts, Katrina ^a   Spring, Neil ^a   Bhattacharjee, Bobby ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Bittorrent; Incentive systems; Proportional share; Tit for tat

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; BITTORRENT; INCENTIVE SYSTEMS; PROPORTIONAL SHARE; TIT-FOR-TAT;

COMMERCE; CONVOLUTIONAL CODES;

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 65249172430     PISSN: 01464833     EISSN: 01464833     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1402946.1402987     Document Type: Conference Paper

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