Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability?

Experimental Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 253-272

  Meidinger, Claude ^a   Rulliere, Jean Louis ^b   Villeval, Marie Claire ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

^b GATE Lyon Saint Etienne   (France)

Author keywords

Compensation; Experiments; Free riding; Peer pressure; Teamwork

Indexed keywords

EID: 3843116630     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026221318302     Document Type: Article

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