Philosophy of language

Philosophy of Language

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Soames, Scott ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 83155171027     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (190)

1. Adams, Robert (1974), "Theories of Actuality," Noûs 8: 211-31.
2. Bach, Kent (1987), Thought and Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Bach, Kent (1994), "Conversational Impliciture," Mind and Language 9: 124-62.
4. Bach, Kent (1999), "The Myth of Conventional Implicature," Linguistics and Philosophy 22: 367-421.
5. Bach, Kent (2000), "Quantification, Qualification, and Context," Mind and Language 15: 262-83.
6. Bach, Kent (2005), "Context ex Machina," in Szabo (2005).
7. Barker, Chris (1995), Possessive Descriptions, Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
8. Barker, Chris (2008), "Possessives and Relational Nouns," in Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger, and Paul Portner, eds., Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning, Berlin: de Gruyter.
9. Barwise, Jon, and John Perry (1983), Situation Semantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Beaney, Michael (1996), Making Sense, London: Duckworth.
11. Bennett, Jonathan (2003), A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
12. Berger, Alan (2002), Terms and Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
13. Burgess, John (1998), "Quinus ab omni naevo vindicatus," in Ali Kazmi, ed., Meaning and Reference, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement, vol. 23, 25-65.
14. Burgess, John (1999), "Which Modal Logic Is the Right One?" Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40: 81-93; reprinted in Burgess, Mathematics, Models, and Modality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
15. Burgess, John (2009), Philosophical Logic, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
16. Cappelen, Herman, and Ernest Lepore (2005), Insensitive Semantics, Oxford: Blackwell.
17. Carnap, Rudolf (1936), "Wahrheit und Bewährung," Acts du Congres International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris; trans. as "Truth and Confirmation," in H. Feigl and W. S. Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949.
18. Carnap, Rudolf (1942), Introduction to Semantics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
19. Carnap, Rudolf (1947), Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; second, expanded edition, 1956.
20. Carnap, Rudolf (1949), "Truth and Confirmation," in H. Feigl and W. S. Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
21. Carnap, Rudolf (1963), "Intellectual Autobiography," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
22. Carston, Robyn (1988), "Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-Theoretic Semantics," in R. M. Kempson. ed., Mental Representations: The Interface between Language and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
23. Carston, Robyn (2002), Thoughts and Utterances, Blackwell: Oxford.
24. Chalmers, David (2002), "On Sense and Intension," in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 16: 135-82.
25. Chomsky, Noam (1965), Aspects of a Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
26. Church, Alonzo (1944), Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
27. Church, Alonzo (1954), "Intentional Isomorphism and the Identity of Belief," Philosophical Studies 5: 65-73.
28. Davidson, Donald (1967), "Truth and Meaning," Synthese 17: 304-23; reprinted in Davidson (2001).
29. Davidson, Donald (1970), "Semantics for Natural Language," Bruno Visentini et al., ed., Linguaggi nella società e nella tecnica, Milan: Edizioni di Comunità; reprinted in Davidson (2001).
30. Davidson, Donald (1976), "Reply to Foster," in Gareth Evans and John McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 33-41; reprinted in Davidson (2001).
31. Davidson, Donald (1977), "Reality without Reference," Dialectica 31: 247-53; reprinted in Davidson (2001).
32. Davidson, Donald (1990), "The Structure and Content of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 87: 279-328.
33. Davidson, Donald (2001), Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
34. Donnellan, Keith (1966), "Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Review 75: 281-304.
35. Donnellan, Keith (1977), "The Contingent Apriori and Rigid Designators." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: 12-27.
36. Donnellan, Keith (1978), "Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora," in Peter Cole, ed., Syntax and Semantics, 9: Pragmatics, New York: Academic Press; reprinted in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (1979).
37. Dowty, Robert, Robert Wall, and Stanley Peters (1981), Introduction to Montague Semantics, Dordrecht: Reidel.
38. Dummett, Michael (1973), Frege's Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth.
39. Edgington, Dorothy (2004), "Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight," in P. Dowe and P. Noordhof, eds., Causation and Counterfactuals, London: Routledge.
40. Etchemendy, John (1988), "Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence," Journal of Symbolic Logic 53: 51-79.
41. [Fara], Delia Graff (2001), "Descriptions as Predicates," Philosophical Studies 102: 1-42.
42. Field, Hartry (1972), "Tarski's Theory of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 69: 347-75.
43. Foster, John (1976), "Meaning and Truth Theory," in Gareth Evans and John Mc-Dowell, eds., Truth and Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
44. Frege, Gottlob (1879), Begriffsschrift, Halle: Louis Nebert; trans. by S. Bauer-Mengelberg, in J. van Heijenoort, ed., From Frege to Gödel, Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1967.
45. Frege, Gottlob (1891), "Function und Begriff," address given to the Jenaische Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft, January 9, 1891, Jena; trans. by Peter Geach as "Function and Concept," in Geach and Black (1970).
46. Frege, Gottlob (1892a), "Uber Sinn and Bedeutung," Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25-50; trans. by Max Black as "On Sense and Reference," in Geach and Black (1970).
47. Frege, Gottlob (1892b), "On Concept and Object," first published in the Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16, 192-205; trans. by Peter Geach, in Geach and Black (1970).
48. Frege, Gottlob (1893, 1903), Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. 1, 1893; vol. 2, 1903, Jena; trans. by M. Furth as The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964.
49. Frege, Gottlob (1918), "Der Gedanke," Beitrage zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 1; trans. by A. Quinton and M. Quinton as "The Thought," Mind 65 (1956): 289-311.
50. French, Peter, Theordore Uehling, and Howard Wettstein, eds. (1979), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
51. Geach, Peter, and Max Black (1970), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell.
52. Gomez-Torrente, Mario (1996), "Tarski on Logical Consequence," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37: 125-51.
53. Goodman, Nelson (1947), "The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals," Journal of Philosophy 44: 113-28.
54. Goodman, Nelson (1955), Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
55. Grice, Paul (1967), "Logic and Conversation," William James lectures at Harvard University; reprinted in Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
56. Harman, Gilbert (1972), "Deep Structure as Logical Form," in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel.
57. Harman, Gilbert (1977), "How to Use Propositions," American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 173-76.
58. Harper, W. L., R. Stalnaker, and G. Pearce (1981), If's, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981.
59. Hawthorne, John, and David Manley (forthcoming), The Reference Book.
60. Heim, Irene (1982), The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
61. Higginbotham, James (1992), "Truth and Understanding," Philosophical Studies 65: 3-16.
62. Jackson, Frank (1987), Conditionals, Oxford: Blackwell.
63. Jackson, Frank (1998a), From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
64. Jackson, Frank (1998b), "Reference and Description Revisited," Philosophical Perspectives 12: 201-18.
65. Jeshion, Robin (2001), "Acquaintanceless De Re Belief," in M. J. O'Rourke, et al., eds., Truth and Meaning: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, New York: Seven Bridges Press.
66. Kamp, Hans (1981), "A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation," in J.A.G. Groenendijk, T.M.V. Janssen, and M.B.J. Stokhof, eds., Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Mathematical Centre Tracts 135, Amsterdam.
67. Kamp, Hans (1995), Discourse Representation Theory," in J. Verschueren, J.-O. Östman, and J. Blommaert, eds., Handbook of Pragmatics, Amsterdam: Benjamins.
68. Kaplan, David (1968), "Quantifying In," Synthese 19: 178-214.
69. Kaplan, David (1970), "What Is Russell's Theory of Descriptions?" in Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck, eds., Physics, Logic, and History, New York: Plenum; reprinted in David F. Pears, ed., Bertrand Russell: A Collection of Critical Essays, New York: Anchor Books, 1972.
70. Kaplan, David (1986), "Opacity," in Lewis E. Hahn and Paul A. Schilpp, eds., The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, La Salle, IL: Open Court.
71. Kaplan, David (1989a), "Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals," in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press.
72. Kaplan, David (1989b), "Afterthoughts," in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press.
73. King, Jeffrey C. (2001), Complex Demonstratives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
74. King, Jeffrey C. (2007), The Nature and Structure of Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
75. King, Jeffrey C. (2008), "Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses, and Direct Reference," Philosophical Review 117: 99-117.
76. King, Jeffrey C., and Jason Stanley (2005), "Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Role of Semantic Content," in Szabo (2005).
77. Kment, Boris (2006), "Counterfactuals and Explanation," Mind 115: 261-310.
78. Kripke, Saul (1958), "A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic 24: 1-14.
79. Kripke, Saul (1963a), "Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic," Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 9: 67-96.
80. Kripke, Saul (1963b), "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," Acta Philosophica Fennica 16: 83-94.
81. Kripke, Saul (1972), "Naming and Necessity," in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht: Reidel; reissued as Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
82. Kripke, Saul (1979a), "A Puzzle about Belief," in A. Margalit, ed., Meaning and Use, Dordrecht: Reidel.
83. Kripke, Saul (1979b), "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (1979).
84. Kripke, Saul (2005), "Russell's Notion of Scope," Mind 114: 1005-1037.
85. Kripke, Saul (2008), "Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference," Theoria 74: 181-218.
86. Kroon, Frederick (1987), "Causal Descriptivism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 1-17.
87. Larson, Richard, and Gabriel Segal (1995), Knowledge of Language, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
88. Lepore, Ernest, and Kirk Ludwig (2007), Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality, New York: Oxford University Press.
89. Lepore, Ernest, and Kirk Ludwig (2009), Donald Davidson's Truth-Theoretic Semantics, New York: Oxford University Press.
90. Lewis, David (1973a), Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
91. Lewis, David (1973b), "Causation," Journal of Philosophy 70: 556-67.
92. Lewis, David (1979), "Possible Worlds," in Loux (1979).
93. Lewis, David (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.
94. Lewis, David (1997), "Naming the Colors," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 325-42.
95. Lewis, David (2000), "Causation as Influence," Journal of Philosophy 97: 182-97.
96. Lewis, David (2001), The Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
97. Lewis, David (2004), "Causation as Influence," in J. Collins, E. Hall, and L. Paul, eds., Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
98. Lewis, C. I., and C. H. Langford (1932), Symbolic Logic, New York: Dover.
99. Loux, Michael J., ed. (1979), The Possible and the Actual, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
100. Montague, Richard (1970), "English as a Formal Language," in Bruno Visentini et al., eds., Linguaggi nella società e nella tecnica, Milan: Edizioni di Comunità; reprinted in Thomason (1974).
101. Montague, Richard (1973), "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English," in J. Hintikka and J. Moravcsik, eds., Approaches to Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel; reprinted in Thomason (1974).
102. Neale, Stephen (1990), Descriptions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
103. Neale, Stephen (1993), "Grammatical Form, Logical Form, and Incomplete Symbols," in A. D. Irvine and G. A. Wedeking, eds., Russell and Analytic Philosophy, Toronto: Toronto University Press.
104. Neale, Stephen (2000a), "On Being Explicit," Mind and Language 15: 284-94.
105. Neale, Stephen (2000b), "On a Milestone of Empiricism," in P. Kotatko and A. Orenstein, eds., Knowledge, Language, and Logic: Questions for Quine, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
106. Neale, Stephen (2005), "Pragmatism and Binding," in Szabo (2005).
107. Nolan, Daniel (1997), "Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 535-73.
108. Partee, Barbara (2004), Compositionality in Formal Semantics: Selected Papers, Oxford: Blackwell.
109. Perry, John (1977), "Frege on Demonstratives," Philosophical Review 86: 474-97.
110. Putnam, Hilary (1970), "Is Semantics Possible?" Metaphilosophy 1: 187-201; reprinted in Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
111. Putnam, Hilary (1973), "Explanation and Reference," in G. Pearce and P. Maynard, eds., Conceptual Change, Dordrecht: Reidel; reprinted in Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
112. Putnam, Hilary (1975), "The Meaning of 'Meaning', " in K. Gunderson, ed., Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; reprinted in Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
113. Quine, W. V. (1943), "Notes on Existence and Necessity," Journal of Philosophy 40: 113-27.
114. Quine, W. V. (1947), "The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic," Journal of Symbolic Logic 12: 43-48.
115. Quine, W. V. (1951), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Philosophical Review 60: 20-43.
116. Quine, W. V. (1953), "Reference and Modality," in From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
117. Quine, W. V. (1960), Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
118. Recanati, F. (1989), "The Pragmatics of What Is Said," Mind and Language 4: 97-120.
119. Recanati, F. (1993), Direct Reference, Oxford: Blackwell.
120. Richard, Mark (1993), "Articulated Terms," Philosophical Perspectives 7: 207-30.
121. Rosen, Gideon (1990), "Modal Fictionalism," Mind 99: 327-52.
122. Russell, Bertrand (1903), Principles of Mathematics, New York: Norton.
123. Russell, Bertrand (1905), "On Denoting," Mind 14: 479-93.
124. Russell, Bertrand (1910-11), "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11: 108-28.
125. Sainsbury, Mark (1979), Russell, London: Routledge.
126. Salmon, Nathan (1981), Reference and Essence, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
127. Salmon, Nathan (1982), "Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Studies 42: 37-45.
128. Salmon, Nathan (1984), Frege's Puzzle, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
129. Salmon, Nathan (1987), "Existence," in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 1: 49-108.
130. Salmon, Nathan (1988), "How to Measure the Standard Metre," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88: 193-217.
131. Salmon, Nathan (1989), "On the Logic of What Might Have Been," Philosophical Review 98: 3-34.
132. Salmon, Nathan (1998), "Nonexistence," Noûs 32: 277-319.
133. Salmon, Nathan (2002), "Demonstrating and Necessity," Philosophical Review 111: 497-537.
134. Salmon, Nathan (2005), "On Designating," Mind 114, 1069-1133.
135. Salmon, Nathan (2006), "A Theory of Bondage," Philosophical Review 15: 415-48.
136. Salmon, Nathan (2008), "That F," Philosophical Studies 141: 263-80.
137. Saul, Jennifer (2002), "What Is Said and Psychological Reality: Grice's Project and Relevance Theorists' Criticisms," Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 347-72.
138. Schaffer, Jonathan (2004), "Counterfactuals, Causal Independence and Conceptual Circularity," Analysis 64: 299-309.
139. Searle, John (1983), Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
140. Soames, Scott (1984), "What Is a Theory of Truth?" Journal of Philosophy 81: 411-29; reprinted in Soames (2009b).
141. Soames, Scott (1986), "Incomplete Definite Descriptions," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27: 349-75; reprinted in Soames (2009a).
142. Soames, Scott (1987), "Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content," Philosophical Topics 15: 44-87; reprinted in Soames (2009b).
143. Soames, Scott (1989), "Semantics and Semantic Competence," Philosophical Perspectives 3: 575-96; reprinted in Soames (2009a).
144. Soames, Scott (1992), "Truth, Meaning, and Understanding," Philosophical Studies 65: 17-35; reprinted in Soames (2009a).
145. Soames, Scott (1994a), "Attitudes and Anaphora," in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 8: 251-72; reprinted in Soames (2009b).
146. Soames, Scott (1994b), "Donnellan's Referential/Attributive Distinction," Philosophical Studies 73: 149-68; reprinted in Soames (2009a).
147. Soames, Scott (1999a), Understanding Truth, New York: Oxford University Press.
148. Soames, Scott (1999b), "The Indeterminacy of Translation and the Inscrutability of Reference," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29: 321-70.
149. Soames, Scott (2002), Beyond Rigidity, New York: Oxford University Press.
150. Soames, Scott (2003a), Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1: The Dawn of Analysis, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
151. Soames, Scott (2003b), Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2: The Age of Meaning, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
152. Soames, Scott (2003c), "Understanding Deflationism," in John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman, eds., Philosophical Perspectives 17: 369-83; reprinted in Soames (2009b).
153. Soames, Scott (2005a), Reference and Description, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
154. Soames, Scott (2005b), "Why Incomplete Descriptions Do Not Defeat Russell's Theory of Descriptions," Teorema 24: 7-30; reprinted in Soames (2009a).
155. Soames, Scott (2005c), "Beyond Rigidity: Reply to McKinsey," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35: 169-78.
156. Soames, Scott (2005d), "Naming and Asserting," in Szabo (2005); reprinted in Soames (2009a).
157. Soames, Scott (2006), "The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary Aposteriori," in Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, eds., Philosophical Issues 16: 288-309; reprinted in Soames (2009b).
158. Soames, Scott (2007a), "Actually," in Mark Kalderon, ed., Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 81, 251-77; reprinted in Soames (2009b).
159. Soames, Scott (2007b), "The Substance and Significance of the Dispute over Two-Dimensionalism," Philosophical Books 48: 34-49.
160. Soames, Scott (2008a), "Truth and Meaning: In Perspective," in Peter French and Howard Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32: 1-19; reprinted in Soames (2009a).
161. Soames, Scott (2008b), "Why Propositions Can't Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances," Journal of Philosophical Logic 37: 267-76; reprinted in Soames (2009b).
162. Soames, Scott (2008c), "Drawing the Line Between Meaning and Implicature-and Relating Both to Assertion," Noûs 42: 529-54; reprinted in Soames (2009a).
163. Soames, Scott (2009a), Philosophical Essays, vol. 1: Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
164. Soames, Scott (2009b), Philosophical Essays, vol. 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
165. Soames, Scott (2009c), "The Gap between Meaning and Assertion: Why What We Literally Say Often Differs from What Our Words Literally Mean," in Soames (2009a).
166. Soames, Scott (2010), What Is Meaning? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
167. Soames, Scott (forthcoming a), "Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility: Two Routes to the Necessary Aposteriori," in Alan Berger and Saul Kripke, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
168. Soames, Scott (forthcoming b), "What Are Natural Kinds?" Philosophical Topics 35: 329-42, 2007.
169. Soames, Scott (forthcoming c), "Propositions," in Delia Fara Graff and Gillian Russell, eds., Companion to the Philosophy of Language, New York: Routledge.
170. Sosa, Ernest (1970), "Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re," Journal of Philosophy 67: 883-96.
171. Sperber, Dan, and Deirdre Wilson (1986), Relevance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
172. Stalnaker, Robert (1968), "A Theory of Conditionals," in Studies in Logical Theory, American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, no. 2, Oxford: Blackwell; reprinted in Harper, Stalnaker, and Pearce (1981).
173. Stalnaker, Robert (1975), "Indicative Conditionals," Philosophia 5: 269-86.
174. Stalnaker, Robert (1976), "Possible Worlds," Noûs 10: 65-75; reprinted in Loux (1979).
175. Stalnaker, Robert (1981a), "A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle," in Harper, Stalnaker, and Pearce (1981).
176. Stalnaker, Robert (1981b), cc," Synthese 49: 129-51; reprinted in Stalnaker (1999).
177. Stalnaker, Robert (1984), Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
178. Stalnaker, Robert (1999), Context and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
179. Stalnaker, Robert, and Richmond Thomason (1973), "A Semantic Theory of Adverbs," Linguistic Inquiry 4: 195-220.
180. Stanley, Jason (2000), "Context and Logical Form," Linguistics and Philosophy 23: 391-434.
181. Stanley, Jason (2002), "Making it Articulated," Mind and Language 17: 149-68.
182. Stanley, Jason, and Zoltan Gendler Szabo (2000), "On Quantifier Domain Restriction," Mind and Language 15: 219-61.
183. Szabo, Zoltan Gendler (2005), Semantics versus Pragmatics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
184. Tarski, Alfred (1935), "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen," Studia Philosophica, vol. 1, 261-405; trans. as "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," in Woodger (1956), 152-278.
185. Tarski, Alfred (1936), "Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung," Acts du Congres International de Philosophie Scientifique, 7 (Actualites Scientifiques et Industrielles, 394), Paris, 1-11; trans. as "On the Concept of Logical Consequence," in Woodger (1956), 409-20.
186. Tarski, Alfred (1944), "The Semantic Conception of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4: 341-76.
187. Tarski, Alfred (1969), "Truth and Proof," Scientific American, June, 63-67.
188. Thomason, Richmond (1974), ed., Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
189. Wettstein, Howard (1981), "Demonstrative Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Studies 40: 241-57.
190. Woodger, J. H. (1956), Truth, Semantics, Metamathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press; second edition, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.