Why propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 267-276

  Soames, Scott ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Mudd Hall of Philosophy ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Propositions; Semantic contents; Semantics; Truth supporting circumstances

Indexed keywords

EID: 42949168977     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-007-9069-8     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Philosophical Topics, vol. XV, 1987, 47-87.
2. The argument is also given in Soames (1989), "Direct Reference and Propositional Attitudes," in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, (New York: Oxford University Press).
3. Jon Barwise and John Perry (1983), Situations and Attitudes. (Cambridge: MIT Press).
4. In the argument, Com is understood as presupposing that... α... β... and... α... α... have the same grammatical structure. This assumption is defended in Soames (1987), "Substitutivity," in J. J. Thomson (ed.), On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright. Cambridge: MIT Press.
5. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23, 1994, 1-34.;
6. reprinted as "among the ten best articles to appear in print in 1994," The Philosophers' Annual, XVII, 1996.
7. Since the semantic contents of names do not vary with contexts, relativization to context is here suppressed.
8. This is a summary of the argument Edelberg gives on pages 8 and 9.