Conflict, sticks and carrots: War increases prosocial punishments and rewards

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 279, Issue 1727, 2012, Pages 219-223

  Gneezy, Ayelet ^a   Fessler, Daniel M T ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Intergroup conflict; Punishment; Reward

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL HISTORY; WAR; WILLINGNESS TO PAY;

ISRAEL;

EID: 82955240697     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2011.0805     Document Type: Article

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