Costly punishment prevails in inter group conflict

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 278, Issue 1723, 2011, Pages 3428-3436

  Sääksvuori, Lauri ^a,b   Mappes, Tapio ^c   Puurtinen, Mikael ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ   (Finland)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Group conflict; Public goods; Punishment

Indexed keywords

AGGRESSION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; INTERSPECIFIC COMPETITION; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 80053932373     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2011.0252     Document Type: Article

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