Spreading order: Religion, cooperative niche construction, and risky coordination problems

Biology and Philosophy

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 1-27

  Bulbulia, Joseph ^a  

^a VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Culture; Evolution; Niche construction; Religion; Stag hunt

Indexed keywords

ADAPTATION; COGNITION; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; MODELING; NICHE; RELIGION;

EID: 81855221785     PISSN: 01693867     EISSN: 15728404     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10539-011-9295-x     Document Type: Article

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