Do conventions need to be common knowledge?

Topoi

Volumn 27, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 17-27

  Binmore, Ken ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Common knowledge; Conventions; Game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 47949112218     PISSN: 01677411     EISSN: 15728749     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9033-4     Document Type: Article

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