Capital structure and corporate governance quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

International Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 208-221

  Jiraporn, Pornsit ^a,b   Kim, Jang Chul ^c   Kim, Young Sang ^c   Kitsabunnarat, Pattanaporn ^d  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY   (Thailand)

^c NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY   (Thailand)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Capital structure; Corporate governance; Leverage

Indexed keywords

EID: 81355149360     PISSN: 10590560     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2011.10.014     Document Type: Article

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