Credence attributes, voluntary organizations, and social pressure

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 95, Issue 11-12, 2011, Pages 1331-1338

  Baron, David P ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Credence goods; Credence organizations; Social pressure; Voluntary provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 81055140492     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.07.005     Document Type: Article

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