Applying intelligence to the reflexes: Embodied skills and habits between dreyfus and descartes

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 78-103

  Sutton, John ^a   McIlwain, Doris ^a   Christensen, Wayne ^b   Geeves, Andrew ^a  

^a MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b KONRAD LORENZ INSTITUTE FOR ETHOLOGY   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80054753938     PISSN: 00071773     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2011.11006732     Document Type: Article

References (155)

1. Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Response to McDowell', Inquiry, no. 50(2007), 371-377, p. 374
2. referring to Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (New York: Noonday Press, 1957), 8-49.
3. Dreyfus, 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental', Inquiry, no. 50(2007), 352-365, p. 353.
4. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow:The Psychology of Optimal Experience (London and New York: Harper Perennial, 1990), especially 30-33, 49-54, 72-77.
5. Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain? S. Rand, trans, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 5.
6. Sian L. Beilock, Sarah A. Wierenga, and Thomas H. Carr, 'Expertise, Attention, and Memory in Sensorimotor Skill Execution', Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, no. 55(2002), 211-40, p. 1236.
7. Sean Müller & Bruce Abemethy, 'Skill Learning from an Expertise Perspective: issues and implications for practice and coaching in cricket', in J. Dosil (ed), The Sport Psychologist's Handbook (Chichester John Wiley, 2006), 245-261;
8. John Sutton, 'Batting, Habit, and Memory: The Embodied Mind and the Nature of Skill', Sport in Society, no. 10(2007), 763-786.
9. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963 [first published 1949]), pp. 41-50, 126-130. But for a sophisticated recent taxonomy in which habits are again deliberately yoked to innate propensities
10. see Tamar Szabo Gendler, 'Alief in Action (and Reaction) ', Mind & Language, no. 23(2008), 552-585.
11. Nathan Brett, 'Human Habits', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, no. 11(1981), 357-376;
12. Edward Casey, 'The Ghost of Embodiment: On Bodily Habitudes and Schemata', in D. Welton (ed.), Body and Flesh (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 207-225;
13. Bill Pollard, 'Explaining Actions with Habits', American Philosophical Quarterly, no. 43(2006), 57-68;
14. Nancy Snow, 'Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, no. 9(2006), 545-561;
15. Ezio di Nucci, Mind Out of Action (Saarbriicken: VDM Verlag, 2008);
16. Clare Carlisle, 'Between Freedom and Necessity: Felix Ravaisson on Habit and the Moral Life', Inquiry, no. 53(2010), 123-145.
17. For Carlisle, 'a person's habit - her posture, her walk, her gestures, the incline of her head; in short, the way she holds herself - may be what most approximates to her essence': 'Creatures of Habit: The Problem and the Practice of Liberation', Continental Philosophy Review, no. 38(2006), 19-39, p. 22.
18. Indeed, the terms of this debate reinforce the unfortunate implication that 'mindedness' or 'mindfulness' is some relatively unified domain. In contrast, we suggest that there are independent anthropological, historical, and conceptual grounds to deny that 'mind' or 'mindedness' is a useful category in such contexts. See for example Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-specific Configurations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992);
19. Paul S. Macdonald, History of the Concept of Mind: Speculations about Soul, Mind and Spirit from Homer to Hume (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003);
20. Amelie Rorty, Mind in Action (Boston: Beacon, 1988), especially 5;
21. Ian Hunter, 'Mind Games and Body Techniques', Southern Review: Literary and Interdisciplinary Essays, no. 26(1993), 172-185.
22. Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World together again (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), 165.
23. Susan Hurley, Consciousness in Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 2.
24. F. C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 201-2.
25. Compare Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, 'Kinesthetic Memory', Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, no. 7(2003), 69-92, at 71
26. 'A kinetic dynamics unfolds that is at once both familiar and yet quintessentially tailored kinetically to the particular situation at hand' (the essay is reprinted in Sheets-Johnstone, The Corporeal Turn (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009), 253-277).
27. Lynne Rudder Baker, review of The Body in Mind by Mark Rowlands, Mind, no. 109(2000), 644-647, 646. This is what gave Clark's summary characterization, in Being There, of cognitive systems like us as being 'good at Frisbee, bad at logic' (60), its rhetorical force as cognitive scientists began to catch up with the phenomenology of embodiment.
28. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, 'What Are We Naming?', in The Corporeal Turn (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009), 328-349, [first published 2005]. For an effective critique of the thin and overly metaphorical conceptions of 'embodiment' in recent 'enactivist' philosophy of cognitive science
29. see also Sheets-Johnstone, 'Animation: the fundamental, essential, and properly descriptive concept', Continental Philosophy Review, no. 42(2009), 375-400. While cultural stereotypes often depict the sportsperson or rock musician as inarticulate, both verbal and multimodal communication between expert practitioners can of course be much richer than either journalists or researchers can easily access.
30. See also Sheets-Johnstone, 'On the Challenge of Languaging Experience', in The Corporeal Turn, 362-381.
31. Natalie Sebanz, Harold Bekkering, & Günther Knoblich, 'Joint Action: Bodies and Minds Moving together'. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, no. 10(2006), 70-76;
32. Bruno Galantucci and Natalie Sebanz, 'Joint Action: Current Perspectives', Topics in Cognitive Science, no. 1(2009), 255-259;
33. R. Keith Sawyer, Group Creativity (Brighton: Psychology Press, 2003).
34. On dance, Catherine Stevens et al., 'Choreographic Cognition: The Time-course and Phenomenology of Creating a Dance', Pragmatics and Cognition, no. 11(2003), 299-329
35. and David Kirsh, "Thinking with the Body', Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (2010), http://adrenaline.ucsd. edu/kirsh/articles/interaction/thinkingwithbody.pdf (accessed 6 November 2010);
36. on music, Paul F. Berliner, Thinking in Jazz: The Infinite Art of Improvisation (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994);
37. Ingrid Monson, Saying Something: Jazz Improvisation as Interaction (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996);
38. Harris M. Berger, Metal, Rock, and Jazz: Perception and the Phenomenology of Musical Experience (Middletown, CD: Wesleyan University Press, 1999);
39. on embodied disciplines, Loi'c Wacquant, Body and Soul: Notebooks of an Apprentice Boxer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003);
40. Greg Downey, Learning Capoeira (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005);
41. Jaida Kim Samudra, 'Memory in our Body: Thick Participation and the Translation of Kinesthetic Experience', American Ethnologist, no. 35(2008), 665-681.
42. Charles Goodwin, 'Professional Vision', American Anthropologist, no. 96(1994), 606-633;
43. Jean-Pierre Warnier, 'A Praxeological Approach to Subjectivation in a Material World', Journal of Material Culture, no. 6(2001), 5-24;
44. Christina Grasseni, 'Skilled Vision: An Apprenticeship in Breeding Aesthetics', Social Anthropology, no. 12(2004), 41-55;
45. David Kirsh, 'Distributed Cognition: A Methodological Note', Pragmatics & Cognition, no. 14(2006), 249-262;
46. David de Leon, "The Cognitive Biographies of Things', in A. Costall & O. Dreier (eds.), Doing Things with Things (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006), 113-130;
47. Lambros Malafouris & Colin Renfrew (eds.), The Cognitive Life of Things: Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind (Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 2010);
48. Ed Hutchins and Saeko Nomura, 'Collaborative Construction of Multimodal Utterances', in J. Streeck, C. Goodwin, & C. LeBaron (eds.) Multimodality and Human Activity: Research on Human Behaviour, Action, and Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press).
49. John McDowell, 'Response to Dreyfus', Inquiry, no. 50(2007), 366-370, p. 369;
50. compare Dreyfus, 'Response to McDowell', 376.
51. Carlisle, 'Between Freedom and Necessity', 131;
52. Charles T. Wolfe, 'De-ontologizing the Brain: From the Fictional Self to the Social Brain', C-Theory, no. 30(2007), http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx? id=572 (accessed 10 November 2010).
53. Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, 38.
54. Marjorie Grene, Descartes (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1985), 52. Likewise, laments Jonathan Re'e, Descartes made the body just another object in a world 'not of meaning and love and laughter and tears...but of material particles going about their lonely business'
55. Ree, 'Subjectivity in the Twentieth Century', New Literary History, no. 26(1995), 205-217.
56. René Descartes, L'homme, in C. Adam & P. Tannery (eds), Oeuvres de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1996), vol. xi (abbreviated below as AT);
57. T. S. Hall (trans.), Rent Descartes: Treatise of Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
58. For more detail on this interpretation, and contrast with standard readings, see John Sutton, Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 50-106;
59. Sutton, 'The Body and the Brain', in S. Gaukroger, J. Schuster, & J. Sutton (eds.), Descartes' Natural Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2000), 697-722.
60. For other revisionary work in the same vein, see Desmond Clarke, Descartes' Philosophy of Science (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1982);
61. Richard B. Carter, Descartes' Medical Philosophy: The Organic Solution to the Mind-Body Problem (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1983);
62. T. M. Brown, 'Descartes, Dualism, and Psychosomatic Medicine', in W. F. Bynum, R. Porter, & M. Shepherd (eds.)., The Anatomy of Madness (London: Routledge, 1985), vol. 1, 40-62;
63. Peter Schouls, Descartes and the Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989), 144-172;
64. Amelie Rorty, 'Descartes on Thinking with the Body', in J. Cottingham (ed.), The Cambridge Compananion to Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 371-392;
65. Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). A few other scholars see the depth and ramifications of Descartes' reliance on self-organizing dynamical and non-linear feedback mechanisms in his biological, physiological, and medical psychology, but instead of jettisoning the assumption that he was aiming at a linear biophysics of barren matter, convict him of inconsistency
66. see especially Emily Grosholz, Cartesian Method and the Problem of Reduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991);
67. Steven Shapin, 'Descartes the Doctor: Rationalism and its Therapies', British Journal for the History of Science, no. 33(2000), 131-154;
68. Dennis Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
69. Owen Flanagan, The Science of the Mind, 2nd edition, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 3.
70. Timothy J. Reiss, 'Denying the Body? Memory and the Dilemmas of History in Descartes', Journal of the History of Ideas, no. 57(1996), 587-607, 604;
71. compare Peter Dear, 'A Mechanical Microcosm: Bodily Passions, Good Manners, and Cartesian Mechanism', in C. Lawrence and S. Shapin, (eds.)., Science Incarnate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 51-82.
72. Hall, Rene" Descartes: Treatise of Man, 96, n. 145.
73. Compare Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain ?, 70-72.
74. Sutton, Philosophy and Memory Traces, 74-81.
75. Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), especially 241-256 and 375-377;
76. see Gail Kern Paster, 'Nervous Tension: Networks of Blood and Spirit in the Early Modern Body', in D. Hillman & C. Mazzio (eds.), The Body in Parts (London: Routledge, 1997), 107-125;
77. Paster, Humoring the Body (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004);
78. Sutton, 'Spongy Brains and Material Memories', in M. Floyd-Wilson & G. Sullivan (eds.), Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 14-34.
79. René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, AT xi, 394-5.
80. John Cottingham, 'The Self and the Body: Alienation and Integration in Cartesian Ethics', Seventeenth-Century French Studies, no. 17(1995), 1-13, p. 1 1.
81. Sutton, "The Body and the Brain', 712-714.
82. See Reiss, 'Denying the Body?'.
83. Compare Adam Phillips, 'Minds', in Terrors and Experts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 93-104, p. 99, on the Cartesian soul as 'a kind of enraged bureaucrat, a master of circumstances'.
84. Sutton, "The Body and the Brain'. For something of the subsequent uptake and history of related ideas in British philosophy, see Sutton, 'Carelessness and Inattention: Mind-wandering and the Physiology of Fantasy from Locke to Hume', in C. T. Wolfe & O. Gal (eds), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science (Springer, 2010), 243-263.
85. In arguing recently that we are now fulfilling a 'Cartesian vision' by which our bodies are 'just machines in space' and 'something other than ourselves', Ian Hacking discusses many intriguing cases of the apparent transferability and alienability of body parts, but not a single example of skilful embodied activity: see Hacking, "The Cartesian Vision Fulfilled: Analogue Bodies and Digital Minds', Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, no. 30(2005), 153-166
86. and 'Our Neo-Cartesian Bodies in Parts', Critical Inquiry 34(2007), 78-105. Hacking's neo-Cartesian future, a reader of Malabou might note, is one in which mere flexibility has won out over the richer forms of plasticity which have resistance inbuilt.
87. But here is one dramatic statement of intellectualism in practice: 'Sir Isaac Newton laid the foundation for modem skiing with several basic laws of motion. Violations of these laws are the cause of problems. Anyone attempting to thoroughly understand skiing should know these laws and the terms used in their proper, intended meaning', John Howe, Skiing Mechanics (Boulder, CO: Poudre Press, 1982), p. 9
88. as quoted in Sigmund Loland, "The Mechanics and Meaning of Alpine Skiing: Methodological and Epistemological Notes on the Study of Sport Technique', Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, no. 19 [1992], 55-77
89. A particularly effective critique of such views is Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus, 'Making a Mind versus Modelling the Brain', in S. R. Graubard (ed.), The Artificial Intelligence Debate (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1988), 15-41.
90. An influential defence of the priority of 'knowing-mat' over 'knowing-how' in recent analytic philosophy is Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson, 'Knowing How', Journal of Philosophy, no. 98(2001), 411-444
91. for responses see Alva Noe, 'Against Intellectualism', Analysis, no. 65(2005), 278-290
92. and Josefa Toribio, 'How do we know how?' Philosophical Explorations, no. 11(2008), 39-52. It is harder to assess whether more moderate, empiricallyanchored theoretical views in contemporary cognitive psychology remain recognizably intellectualist in these respects. We have previously put such charges to Roger Chaffin's impressive account of memory in music performance
93. see Geeves, Christensen, Sutton, & Mcllwain, 'Critical Review of Practicing Perfection', Empirical Musicology Review, no. 3(2008), 163-172.
94. Likewise, dynamically-oriented sports psychologists charge Anders Ericsson's impressive 'deliberate practice' framework with residual intellectualism: see for example Bruce Abernethy, Damian Farrow, and Jason Berry, 'Constraints and Issues in the Development of a General Theory of Expert Perceptual-Motor Performance', in J. L. Starkes & K. A. Ericsson (eds.), Expert Performance in Sports (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2003).
95. Pollard, 'Explaining Actions with Habits', 58, 67.
96. See also Pollard, 'The Rationality of Habitual Action', Proceedings of the Durham-Bergen Philosophy Conference, no. 1(2005), 39-50.
97. Pollard, 'Explaining Actions with Habits', 67.
98. Brett, 'Human Habits', 365-6.
99. Sheets-Johnstone, 'Kinesthetic Memory', 75;
100. 'Animation', 390-4.
101. Dreyfus, 'Refocusing the Question: can there be skillful coping without propositional representations or brain representations?', Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, no. 1(2002), 413-425.
102. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (New York: Free Press, 1986), 32.
103. Dreyfus, 'Overcoming the Myth of the Mental', Topoi, no. 25(2006), 43-49, 47.
104. Compare Dreyfus, 'A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise and Mastery', in E. Jespersen (ed), Moving Bodies, no. 4(2006), 15-30, especially 20: the genuine expert has gradually learned 'to decompose... situations into subclasses, each of which share the same decision, single action, or tactic. This allows an immediate response to each situation'. In this and other more recent versions of his model of the stages of skill acquisition, Dreyfus does allow for further development beyond expertise, towards 'mastery' and 'practical wisdom', but the key points under discussion here are not affected.
105. Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert L. Dreyfus, Disclosing New Worlds: Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 87. 1
106. owe this quotation to the excellent critical discussion of the Dreyfus model by Evan M. Selinger and Robert P. Crease, 'Dreyfus on Expertise: The Limits of Phenomenological Analysis', Continental Philosophy Review, no. 35(2002), 245-279.
107. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine, 30.
108. Elizabeth Ennen, 'Phenomenological Coping Skills and the Striatal Memory System', Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, no. 2(2003), 299-325.
109. Ennen, 'Phenomenological Coping Skills', p. 314
110. relying especially on Ann Graybiel, 'The Basal Ganglia and Chunking of Action Repertoires', Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, no. 70(1998), 119-136. There are difficult questions about the unity of the category of 'memory', given the unique properties of the procedural memory systems
111. see Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, 'Wittgenstein and the Memory Debate', New Ideas in Psychology, no. 27(2009), 213-227;
112. Kirk Michaelian, 'Is Memory a Natural Kind?', Memory Studies, no. 4 (in press). As we read it, however, recent neuroscientific research increasingly underlines the dynamic interactivity of procedural and declarative memory processes, to such an extent that the distinction might come under some pressure.
113. See Graybiel, "The Basal Ganglia: Learning New Tricks and Loving it', Current Opinion in Neurobiology, no. 15(2005), 638-644;
114. Henry H. Yin & Barbara J. Knowlton, 'The Role of the Basal Ganglia in Habit Formation', Nature Reviews Neuroscience, no. 7(2006), 464-476.
115. quoting Dreyfus. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 3.
116. John Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 150. Searle goes on to say that the rules 'recede into the Background', which is a much harder doctrine to interpret: see especially the discussion of Searle's views on this point by
117. Dreyfus in 'Responses', in M. Wrathall & J. Malpas (eds.), Oeidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 324-6. But Dreyfus there accepts that he and Searle agree on the fact mat the body takes over.
118. Fred Dretske, 'Where is the Mind when the Body Performs?', Stanford Humanities Review, no. 6(1998), URL: http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/6-2/html/ dretske.html (accessed 6 November 2010). Dretske does, however, argue that even though consciousness is withdrawn, 'intelligence' is delegated or dispersed, and that the skilful routines thus delegated to the body 'bear the marks of genuine intelligence'. We think that this last point is spot on, a version of our idea of applying intelligence to the reflexes. Dretske also does allow a range of roles for psychology in attending to higher-order objectives, although from our perspective he retains an unnecessarily hierarchical or managerial picture of the control of skilled action.
119. see Eliot R. Smith and Jamie DeCoster, 'Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems', Personality and Social Psychology Review, no. 4(2000), 108-131, and for an entry into current controversies about dual process theories and social intuitionism in moral psychology
120. see Joshua D. Greene, 'Dual-Process Morality and the Personal/Impersonal Distinction: A Reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, no. 45(2009), 581-584.
121. We don't have space here to make the connections with theories of skilful coping more explicit. There are clear statements and critical evaluations of dual process theories in J. Evans and K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Bbeyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
122. Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking (London: Penguin, 2005), 18-47.
123. see for example Ian Renshaw, Keith Davids, Rick Shuttleworth and Jia Yi Chow, 'Insights from Ecological Psychology and Dynamical Systems Theory Can Underpin a Philosophy of Coaching', International Journal of Sport Psychology, no. 40(2009), 580-602;
124. Renshaw, Davids, and Geert J. P. Savelsbergh (eds.), Motor Learning in Practice: A Constraints-led Approach (London: Routledge, 2010).
125. For musicians' assumptions and pedagogical traditions, see Roger Chaffin, Gabriela Imreh, and Mary Crawford, Practicing Perfection: Memory and Piano Performance (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), especially xii-xiii and 26-65.
126. Erik Rietveld and colleagues argue for an analogous pluralism in understanding embodied cognition and skilful action, with cognitive and abnormal psychology joining theories of affect and dynamical neuroscience to supplement phenomenological and philosophical investigations. While we draw on Rietveld's constructive theoretical proposals below, he does not canvas the kind of work with known groups in the cognitive neuroscience and psychology of dance and sport which we are recommending. On pluralism see Pirn Klaassen, Erik Rietveld, and Julien Topal, 'Inviting Complementary Perspectives on Situated Normativity in Everyday Life', Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, no. 9(2010), 53-73. Dreyfus, however, draws constructively neither on psychological research, stressing instead occasionally the anti-cognitivist neuroscience of Walter Freeman, nor on the sport sciences, which remain an enormous, often conceptually sophisticated, almost entirely untapped resource for philosophical exploration.
127. Michael F. Land & Peter McLeod, 'From Eye Movements to Actions: How Batsmen Hit the Ball', Nature Neuroscience, no. 3(2000), 1340-1345;
128. Land & Benjamin W. Taller, Looking and Acting: Vision and Eye Movements in Natural Behaviour (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 153-160;
129. see Sutton, 'Batting, Habit, and Memory', 770-4.
130. (B. Calvo-Merino, D. E. Glaser, J. Grezes, R. E. Passingham, & P. Haggard, 'Action Observation and Acquired Motor Skills: An fMRI Study with Expert Dancers', Cerebral Cortex, no. 15(2005), 1243-1249). Meanwhile, Sian Beilock and colleagues suggest that expert performance in motor skills requires little attention, operates largely outside of working memory, and is substantially closed to introspection: therefore, they argue, highly-skilled practitioners in movement domains exhibit a surprising 'expertise-induced amnesia', by which their recollections of real-time performance are 'impoverished' compared to novices
131. (Sian L. Beilock & Thomas H. Carr, 'On the Fragility of Skilled Performance: What Governs Choking Under Pressure?', Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, no. 130(2001), 701-725;
132. Sian L. Beilock, Sarah A. Wierenga, & Thomas H. Carr, 'Memory and Expertise: What Do Experienced Athletes Remember?', in Starkes & Ericsson (eds.), Expert Performance in Sports, especially 315-6). We discuss these lines of research and their relation to the phenomenological tradition in future work.
133. Michael Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 120;
134. Wheeler, 'Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics, and the Frame Problem', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16(2008), 323-349.
135. Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World, 131-2;
136. 'Cognition in Context', 338.
137. see for example Barbara Montero, 'Does Bodily Awareness Interfere with Highly Skilled Movement?', Inquiry, no. 53(2010), 105-122;
138. Jørgen W. Eriksen, 'Mindless Coping in Competitive Sport: Some Implications and Consequences', Sport, Ethics, & Philosophy, no. 4(2010), 66-86. Dreyfus, meanwhile, accuses Wheeler of a 'cognitivist misreading of Heidegger'
139. 'Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Making it More Heideggerian', Philosophical Psychology, no. 20(2007), 247-268,.
140. David Sudnow, Ways of the Hand. A Rewritten Account (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), from whom we borrow and extend the notion of 'instructional nudges'.
141. Juanita Weissensteiner, Bruce Abernethy, and Damian Farrow, 'Towards the Development of a Conceptual Model of Expertise in Cricket Batting', Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, no. 21(2009), 276-292.
142. On self-talk and the non-semantic looping roles of verbal tags and maxims, see Andy Clark, 'Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation', in P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 162-183;
143. Clark, 'Material Symbols', Philosophical Psychology, no. 19(2006), 291-307;
144. Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 129-133.
145. Compare concert pianist Gabriela Imreh's comment, while learning Bach's extraordinarily demanding Italian Concerto (Presto) that 'the practice I needed was in my head': Roger Chaffin & Gabriela Imreh, 'Practicing Perfection: Piano Performance as Expert Memory', Psychological Science 13(2002), 342-349.
146. Elizabeth A. Behnke, 'Edmund Husserl's Contribution to Phenomenology of the Body in Ideas IV, in T. Nenon & L. E. Embree (eds.), Issues in Husserl's Ideas II (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), 135-160, 154. Behnke acknowledges the Sartrean mode of embodied experience which Dreyfus celebrates, the body 'passed over in silence, transcended toward the task, pre-reflectively geared in with the situation,... utterly undisturbed either by the visibility of this comportment to others, or by one's own reflective glance; one is oblivious to oneself, completely caught up in whatever one is doing': but she notes that this mode of bodily 'self-effacement' is for Sartre only one possible ontological dimension of the body, and identifies it as a potential 'locus of crisis in need of a critique of corporeal experience', to be supplemented (if not replaced) with other modes in which distinctive fields of experiential possibility can be accessed.
147. See Behnke, 'The Socially Shaped Body and the Critique of Corporeal Experience', in K. J. Morris (ed.), Sartre on the Body (London: Palgrave, 2010), 231-255.
148. Elizabeth A. Behnke, 'Interkinaesthetic Affectivity: A Phenomenological Approach', Continental Philosophy Review, no. 41(2008), 143-161.
149. Elizabeth A. Behnke, 'Matching', in D. H. Johnson (ed.), Bone, Breath, and Gesture (Berkley, CA.: North Atlantic Books, 1995), 317-337. (First published 1988).
150. Elizabeth A. Behnke, 'Contact Improvisation and the Lived World', in M. Diaconu (ed.), Kunst und Wahrheit (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2003), 39-61.
151. Elizabeth A. Behnke, 'Ghost Gestures: Phenomenological Investigations of Bodily Micromovements and their Intercorporeal Implications', Human Studies, no. 20(1997), 181-201.
152. Erik Rietveld, 'The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions', Theory & Psychology, no. 18(2008), 341-363, especially 350-1.
153. K. Anders Ericsson, 'Development of Elite Performance and Deliberate Practice', in Starkes & Ericsson (eds.), Expert Performance in Sports, 64-65.
154. Jack Reynolds, 'Dreyfus and Deleuze on I'habitude, Coping, and Trauma in Skill Acquisition', International Journal of Philosophical Studies, no. 14(2006), 539-559.
155. Ivar Hagendoorn, 'Cognitive Dance Improvisation: How Study of the Motor System Can Inspire Dance (and vice versa) ', Leonardo, no. 36(2003), 221-7.