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Heidegger would hold that neither we nor the cat in McDowell's example normally experience the opening in a barrier as an opening. We just go through it. Yet Heidegger does say that, unlike animals, we always cope with being as beings, Martin Heidegger (1995) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Trans, W. McNeil & N. Walker, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press) 269, That is an ontological claim that tells us that in absorbed coping we always cope with entities that are interrelated and ultimately connect up with our understanding of being. But it is not a phenomenological claim. Indeed, when speaking of the experience of going in and out, Heidegger reminds us that we just respond to the solicitation: [W]hat is first of all given, is the for writing, the for going in and out, for sitting. That is, writing, going-in-and-out, sitting, and the like are what we are a priori involved with.
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Heidegger would hold that neither we nor the cat in McDowell's example normally experience the opening in a barrier as an opening. We just go through it. Yet Heidegger does say that, unlike animals, we always cope with being as beings. [Martin Heidegger (1995) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Trans.) W. McNeil & N. Walker, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press) 269.] That is an ontological claim that tells us that in absorbed coping we always cope with entities that are interrelated and ultimately connect up with our understanding of being. But it is not a phenomenological claim. Indeed, when speaking of the experience of going in and out, Heidegger reminds us that we just respond to the solicitation: [W]hat is first of all "given" ... is the "for writing," the "for going in and out," ... "for sitting". That is, writing, going-in-and-out, sitting, and the like are what we are a priori involved with. What we know when we "know our way around".
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54749150836
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Trans, Thomas Sheehan, Band, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann
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Martin Heidegger (1976) Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe (Trans.) Thomas Sheehan, Band 21 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann) 144.
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(1976)
Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe
, vol.21
, pp. 144
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Heidegger, M.1
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34548311330
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For Merleau-Ponty the first person character of experience needn't mean that there must be a subject having the experience. True, the world is always experienced from a point of view, but, as Merleau-Ponty says, my body is my point of view on the world. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) Phenomenology of Perception (Trans.) Colin Smith, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) 70. What Merleau-Ponty is trying to say is: My lived body is the world from my point of view.
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For Merleau-Ponty the first person character of experience needn't mean that there must be a subject having the experience. True, the world is always experienced from a point of view, but, as Merleau-Ponty says, "my body is my point of view on the world". Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) Phenomenology of Perception (Trans.) Colin Smith, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) 70. What Merleau-Ponty is trying to say is: "My lived body is the world from my point of view."
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Here, I think, McDowell may have Heidegger on his side. When, in Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of everyday on-going coping he speaks of a cognizance of itself such as accompanies all Dasein's way of behaving. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Trans.) J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) 439. I'm. siding with Merleau-Ponty and current neurological models of skilled action, (such as actorcritic reinforcement learning models), which claim that consciousness is only called into action once the brain has detected something going wrong.
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Here, I think, McDowell may have Heidegger on his side. When, in Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of everyday on-going coping he speaks of "a cognizance of itself such as accompanies all Dasein's way of behaving". Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Trans.) J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) 439. I'm. siding with Merleau-Ponty and current neurological models of skilled action, (such as actorcritic reinforcement learning models), which claim that consciousness is only called into action once the brain has detected something going wrong.
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34548365116
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I'm convinced by McDowell's account of how a certain kind of misguided reflection understood as the attempt to turn subsidiary movements into basic actions could account for Knoblauch's dramatically disorganized behavior. But what still concerns me is that normal forms of monitoring one's coping, even awareness that things are going well, are sufficient to break the flow and so produce inferior performance.
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I'm convinced by McDowell's account of how a certain kind of misguided reflection understood as the attempt to turn subsidiary movements into basic actions could account for Knoblauch's dramatically disorganized behavior. But what still concerns me is that normal forms of monitoring one's coping, even awareness that things are going well, are sufficient to break the flow and so produce inferior performance.
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7
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2942697824
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Grasping at Straws: Motor Intentionality and the Cognitive Science of Skillful Action
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See, Mark Wrathall, Jeff Malpas Eds, Cambridge: MIT Press
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See Sean Kelly (2000) "Grasping at Straws: Motor Intentionality and the Cognitive Science of Skillful Action" in Mark Wrathall, Jeff Malpas (Eds.) Heidegger, Coping and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert Dreyfus Vol. II, (Cambridge: MIT Press).
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(2000)
Heidegger, Coping and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert Dreyfus
, vol.2
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Kelly, S.1
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8
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0040789398
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See, Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press
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See Samuel Todes (2001) Body and World (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press).
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(2001)
Body and World
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Todes, S.1
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