How do we know how?

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 39-52

  Toribio, Josefa ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Expertise; Knowing how; Proposition; Proprioceptive awareness; Visual agnosia

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749122586     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790701599044     Document Type: Article

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