메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 19, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 418-436

Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks

Author keywords

Banking Industry; Corporate Governance; Global Financial Crisis; Loan Quality

Indexed keywords


EID: 80054045626     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00882.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (233)

References (57)
  • 1
    • 0742311570 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies?
    • April
    • Adams, R. & Mehran, H. 2003. Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies? Economic Policy Review, April: 123-142.
    • (2003) Economic Policy Review , pp. 123-142
    • Adams, R.1    Mehran, H.2
  • 2
    • 80054050030 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate performance, board structure, and its determinants in the banking industry. SSRN Working Paper.
    • Adams, R. & Mehran, H. 2005. Corporate performance, board structure, and its determinants in the banking industry. SSRN Working Paper.
    • (2005)
    • Adams, R.1    Mehran, H.2
  • 3
    • 0042740094 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Impact of anti-takeover amendments on corporate performance
    • Akhigbe, A. & Madura, J. 1996. Impact of anti-takeover amendments on corporate performance. Applied Financial Economics, 6: 519-529.
    • (1996) Applied Financial Economics , vol.6 , pp. 519-529
    • Akhigbe, A.1    Madura, J.2
  • 4
    • 55149092762 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors
    • Andres, P. & Vallelado, E. 2008. Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32: 2570-2580.
    • (2008) Journal of Banking & Finance , vol.32 , pp. 2570-2580
    • Andres, P.1    Vallelado, E.2
  • 5
    • 80054036048 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance takes back seat in bailouts
    • Barr, A. 2008. Corporate governance takes back seat in bailouts. Market Watch.
    • (2008) Market Watch
    • Barr, A.1
  • 6
    • 77958406983 scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition
    • Baysinger, B. & Butler, H. 1985. Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1: 101-124.
    • (1985) The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , vol.1 , pp. 101-124
    • Baysinger, B.1    Butler, H.2
  • 7
    • 0030305316 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of directorcomposition and financial statement fraud
    • Beasley, M. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of directorcomposition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 71: 443-465.
    • (1996) The Accounting Review , vol.71 , pp. 443-465
    • Beasley, M.1
  • 9
    • 20444480278 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evidence from Nigeria
    • Beck, T., Cull, R., & Jerome, A. 2005. Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29: 2355-2379.
    • (2005) Journal of Banking and Finance , vol.29 , pp. 2355-2379
    • Beck, T.1    Cull, R.2    Jerome, A.3
  • 10
    • 80054019808 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why did some banks perform better during the credit crisis? A cross-country study of the impact of governance and regulation. Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-012.
    • Beltratti, A. & Stulz, R. 2009. Why did some banks perform better during the credit crisis? A cross-country study of the impact of governance and regulation. Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-012.
    • (2009)
    • Beltratti, A.1    Stulz, R.2
  • 11
    • 0031161387 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks
    • Berger, A. N. & DeYoung, R. 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 21: 849-870.
    • (1997) Journal of Banking and Finance , vol.21 , pp. 849-870
    • Berger, A.N.1    DeYoung, R.2
  • 12
    • 80054021127 scopus 로고
    • The role of capital in financial institutions. Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania Working Paper.
    • Berger, A. N., Herring, R., & Szegö, G. 1995. The role of capital in financial institutions. Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania Working Paper.
    • (1995)
    • Berger, A.N.1    Herring, R.2    Szegö, G.3
  • 13
    • 80054028547 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Where was Lehman's board? Wall Street Journal (online), September 15.
    • Berman, D. K. 2008. Where was Lehman's board? Wall Street Journal (online), September 15.
    • (2008)
    • Berman, D.K.1
  • 14
    • 40349086077 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Audit committee and firm value: Evidence on outside top executives as expert-independent directors
    • Chan, K. & Li, J. 2008. Audit committee and firm value: Evidence on outside top executives as expert-independent directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16: 16-31.
    • (2008) Corporate Governance: An International Review , vol.16 , pp. 16-31
    • Chan, K.1    Li, J.2
  • 15
    • 33644796781 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry
    • Chen, C., Steiner, T., & Whyte, A. 2006. Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, 30: 915-945.
    • (2006) Journal of Banking and Finance , vol.30 , pp. 915-945
    • Chen, C.1    Steiner, T.2    Whyte, A.3
  • 17
    • 0001650996 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
    • Core, J., Holthausen, R., & Larcker, D. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51: 371-406.
    • (1999) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.51 , pp. 371-406
    • Core, J.1    Holthausen, R.2    Larcker, D.3
  • 19
    • 84990587870 scopus 로고
    • Boards and company performance: Research challenges the conventional wisdom
    • Donaldson, L. & Davis, J. H. 1994. Boards and company performance: Research challenges the conventional wisdom. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2(3): 151-160.
    • (1994) Corporate Governance: An International Review , vol.2 , Issue.3 , pp. 151-160
    • Donaldson, L.1    Davis, J.H.2
  • 20
    • 78651395117 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The missing link between corporate performance measurement systems and chief executive officer incentive plans
    • Dossi, A., Patelli, L., & Zoni, L. 2010. The missing link between corporate performance measurement systems and chief executive officer incentive plans. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 25: 5311-5558.
    • (2010) Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance , vol.25 , pp. 5311-5558
    • Dossi, A.1    Patelli, L.2    Zoni, L.3
  • 21
    • 80054013131 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Tobin's Q does not measure performance: Theory, empirics, and alternative measures. SSRN Working Paper.
    • Dybvig, P. & Warachka, M. 2010. Tobin's Q does not measure performance: Theory, empirics, and alternative measures. SSRN Working Paper.
    • (2010)
    • Dybvig, P.1    Warachka, M.2
  • 22
    • 38549147867 scopus 로고
    • Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds
    • Fama, E. & French, K. 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Finance Economics, 33: 3-56.
    • (1993) Journal of Finance Economics , vol.33 , pp. 3-56
    • Fama, E.1    French, K.2
  • 23
    • 0142219286 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments
    • Ferris, S., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. 2003. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance, 48: 1087-1111.
    • (2003) The Journal of Finance , vol.48 , pp. 1087-1111
    • Ferris, S.1    Jagannathan, M.2    Pritchard, A.3
  • 24
    • 78649938547 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Are busy boards effective monitors?
    • Fich, E. & Shivadasani, A. 2004. Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance, 61: 681-724.
    • (2004) The Journal of Finance , vol.61 , pp. 681-724
    • Fich, E.1    Shivadasani, A.2
  • 25
    • 77956608650 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board monitoring, regulation, and performance in the banking industry: Evidence from the market for corporate control
    • Hagendorff, J., Collins, M., & Keasey, K. 2010. Board monitoring, regulation, and performance in the banking industry: Evidence from the market for corporate control. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18: 381-395.
    • (2010) Corporate Governance: An International Review , vol.18 , pp. 381-395
    • Hagendorff, J.1    Collins, M.2    Keasey, K.3
  • 27
    • 3142748475 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Too busy to service? An examination of the influenced of overboarded directors
    • Harris, I. & Shimizu, K. 2004. Too busy to service? An examination of the influenced of overboarded directors. Journal of Management Studies, 41: 775-798.
    • (2004) Journal of Management Studies , vol.41 , pp. 775-798
    • Harris, I.1    Shimizu, K.2
  • 28
    • 46549101724 scopus 로고
    • The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
    • Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7: 85-107.
    • (1985) Journal of Accounting and Economics , vol.7 , pp. 85-107
    • Healy, P.M.1
  • 29
    • 0012583968 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature
    • Hermalin, B. & Weisbach, M. 2003. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review, 12: 7-26.
    • (2003) Economic Policy Review , vol.12 , pp. 7-26
    • Hermalin, B.1    Weisbach, M.2
  • 31
    • 84993848601 scopus 로고
    • The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems
    • Jensen, M. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48: 1-80.
    • (1993) Journal of Finance , vol.48 , pp. 1-80
    • Jensen, M.1
  • 32
    • 44649197264 scopus 로고
    • Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure
    • Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
    • (1976) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.3 , pp. 305-360
    • Jensen, M.1    Meckling, W.2
  • 33
    • 70949100713 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis
    • Kirkpatrick, G. 2009. The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis. Financial Market Trends, 4: 1-29.
    • (2009) Financial Market Trends , vol.4 , pp. 1-29
    • Kirkpatrick, G.1
  • 34
    • 0036331491 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
    • Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33: 375-400.
    • (2002) Journal of Accounting and Economics , vol.33 , pp. 375-400
    • Klein, A.1
  • 35
    • 12344333863 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Monitoring and controlling bank risk: Does risky debt serve and purpose
    • Krishnan, C., Ritchken, P., & Thompson, J. 2003. Monitoring and controlling bank risk: Does risky debt serve and purpose. The Journal of Finance, 60: 343-368.
    • (2003) The Journal of Finance , vol.60 , pp. 343-368
    • Krishnan, C.1    Ritchken, P.2    Thompson, J.3
  • 36
    • 34548289334 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and organizational performance
    • Larcker, D., Richardson, S., & Tuna, I. 2007. Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting Review, 82: 963-1008.
    • (2007) The Accounting Review , vol.82 , pp. 963-1008
    • Larcker, D.1    Richardson, S.2    Tuna, I.3
  • 37
    • 33749039960 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The inter-association between managerial ownership and board structure
    • Lasfer, M. 2006. The inter-association between managerial ownership and board structure. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 33: 1006-1033.
    • (2006) Journal of Business Finance and Accounting , vol.33 , pp. 1006-1033
    • Lasfer, M.1
  • 38
    • 80054042526 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The corporate governance of banks: A concise discussion of concepts and evidence. University of Minnesota Working Paper.
    • Levine, R. 2004. The corporate governance of banks: A concise discussion of concepts and evidence. University of Minnesota Working Paper.
    • (2004)
    • Levine, R.1
  • 41
    • 21144476502 scopus 로고
    • Executive incentive plans, corporate control, and capital structure
    • Mehran, H. 1992. Executive incentive plans, corporate control, and capital structure. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27: 539-560.
    • (1992) Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , vol.27 , pp. 539-560
    • Mehran, H.1
  • 42
    • 0037290740 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Disciplinary constraints on the advancement of knowledge: The case of organizational incentive systems
    • Merchant, K., Van der Stede, W., & Zheng, L. 2003. Disciplinary constraints on the advancement of knowledge: The case of organizational incentive systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28: 251-286.
    • (2003) Accounting, Organizations and Society , vol.28 , pp. 251-286
    • Merchant, K.1    Van der Stede, W.2    Zheng, L.3
  • 43
    • 25144499191 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance in an international context: Legal systems, financing patterns, and cultural variables
    • Mintz, S. 2005. Corporate governance in an international context: Legal systems, financing patterns, and cultural variables. Corporate Governance, 13: 528-597.
    • (2005) Corporate Governance , vol.13 , pp. 528-597
    • Mintz, S.1
  • 45
    • 0039488602 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rating banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry
    • Morgan, D. 2002. Rating banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry. American Economic Review, 92: 874-888.
    • (2002) American Economic Review , vol.92 , pp. 874-888
    • Morgan, D.1
  • 46
    • 80054014729 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance of banks after the financial crisis: Theory, evidence, reforms (April). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 130/2009.
    • Mülbert, P. 2010. Corporate governance of banks after the financial crisis: Theory, evidence, reforms (April). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 130/2009.
    • (2010)
    • Mülbert, P.1
  • 47
    • 0033476716 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practices?
    • Newman, H. & Mozes, H. 1999. Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practices? Financial Management, 28: 41-56.
    • (1999) Financial Management , vol.28 , pp. 41-56
    • Newman, H.1    Mozes, H.2
  • 48
    • 44849110073 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Executive pay and shareholder litigation
    • Peng, L. & Röell, A. 2008. Executive pay and shareholder litigation. Review of Finance, 12: 141-181.
    • (2008) Review of Finance , vol.12 , pp. 141-181
    • Peng, L.1    Röell, A.2
  • 49
  • 50
  • 51
    • 80054038258 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance and bank performance. SSRN Working Paper.
    • Spong, S. & Sullivan, M. 2007. Corporate governance and bank performance. SSRN Working Paper.
    • (2007)
    • Spong, S.1    Sullivan, M.2
  • 52
    • 80054035627 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Financial crisis blame game. Business Week (online version), Oct 18.
    • Steverman, B. & Bogoslaw, D. 2008. Financial crisis blame game. Business Week (online version), Oct 18.
    • (2008)
    • Steverman, B.1    Bogoslaw, D.2
  • 53
    • 62249204393 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance
    • Sun, J. & Cahan, S. 2009. The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 193-207.
    • (2009) Corporate Governance: An International Review , vol.17 , pp. 193-207
    • Sun, J.1    Cahan, S.2
  • 54
    • 80054020717 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Banks: Regulation and corporate governance framework
    • Ungureanu, M. 2008. Banks: Regulation and corporate governance framework. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5: 1-19.
    • (2008) Corporate Ownership & Control , vol.5 , pp. 1-19
    • Ungureanu, M.1
  • 55
    • 0001155473 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Board meeting frequency and firm performance
    • Vafeas, N. 1999. Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53: 113-142.
    • (1999) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.53 , pp. 113-142
    • Vafeas, N.1
  • 56
    • 0030078208 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
    • Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40: 185-211.
    • (1996) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.40 , pp. 185-211
    • Yermack, D.1
  • 57
    • 80054039312 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Audit committee, board characteristics and earnings management by commercial banks. SUNY at Binghampton Working Paper.
    • Zhou, J. & Chen, K. 2004. Audit committee, board characteristics and earnings management by commercial banks. SUNY at Binghampton Working Paper.
    • (2004)
    • Zhou, J.1    Chen, K.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.