Impact of anti-takeover amendments on corporate performance

Applied Financial Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 6, 1996, Pages 519-529

  Akhigbe, Aigbe ^a   Madura, Jeff ^a  

^a FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042740094     PISSN: 09603107     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/096031096333971     Document Type: Article

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