On the effectiveness of service differentiation based resource-provision incentive mechanisms in dynamic and autonomous P2P networks

Computer Networks

Volumn 55, Issue 17, 2011, Pages 3811-3831

  Wang, Yufeng ^a,b   Nakao, Akihiro ^c   Vasilakos, Athanasios V ^d   Ma, Jianhua ^e  

^a BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS   (China)

^b NANJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS   (China)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^d UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN MACEDONIA   (Greece)

^e HOSEI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Incentive mechanisms; Peer to Peer (P2P); Public goods game; Service differentiation

Indexed keywords

CHEAP PSEUDONYMS; CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIORS; CURRENT BEHAVIORS; DESIGN SERVICES; HIGH-LEVEL SERVICES; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; INCENTIVE SCHEMES; P2P (PEER-TO-PEER) NETWORK; P2P NETWORK; P2P NETWORKING; PEER TO PEER; PUBLIC GOODS; SERVICE DIFFERENTIATION; TRADITIONAL SERVICES;

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; DYNAMICS;

PEER TO PEER NETWORKS;

EID: 80053377698     PISSN: 13891286     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2011.07.011     Document Type: Article

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