A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 127-136

  Feldman, Michal ^a   Lai, Kevin ^b   Zhang, Li ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b HEWLETT PACKARD LABORATORIES   (United States)

Author keywords

Fairness; Nash equilibrium; Price of anarchy; Price anticipating mechanism; Resource allocation

Indexed keywords

NASH EQUILIBRIUM; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRICE-ANTICIPATING MECHANISM;

BUDGET CONTROL; COST EFFECTIVENESS; SOCIAL ASPECTS; USER INTERFACES;

RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 26444573422     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1064009.1064023     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (29)

1. http://planet-lab.org.
2. A. AuYoung, B. N. Chun, A. C. Snoeren, and A. Vahdat. Resource Allocation in Federated Distributed Computing Infrastructures. In Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Operating System and Architectural Support for the On-demand IT Infrastructure, 2004.
3. B. Chun, C. Ng, J. Albrecht, D. C. Parkes, and A. Vahdat. Computational Resource Exchanges for Distributed Resource Allocation. 2004.
4. B. N. Chun and D. E. Culler. Market-based Proportional Resource Sharing for Clusters. Technical Report CSD-1092, University of California at Berkeley, Computer Science Division, January 2000.
5. M. Feldman, K. Lai, and L. Zhang. A Price-anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters. Technical report, arXiv, 2005. http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.DC/0502019.
6. D. Ferguson, Y. Yemimi, and C. Nikolaou. Microeconomic Algorithms for Load Balancing in Distributed Computer Systems. In International Conference on Distributed Computer Systems, pages 491-499, 1988.
7. I. Foster and C. Kesselman. Globus: A Metacomputing Infrastructure Toolkit, The International Journal of Supercomputer Applications and High Performance Computing, 11(2):115-128, Summer 1997.
8. M. L. Fredman and R. E. Tarjan. Fibonacci Heaps and Their Uses in Improved Network Optimization Algorithms. Journal of the ACM, 34(3):596-615, 1987.
9. H. N. Gabow. Data Structures for Weighted Matching and Nearest Common Ancestors with Linking, In Proceedings of 1st Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 434-443, 1990.
10. B. Hajek and S. Yang. Strategic Buyers in a Sum Bid Game for Flat Networks, Manuscript, http://tesla.csl.uiuc.edu/~hajek/Papers/HajekYang.pdf, 2004.
11. R. Johari and J. N. Tsitsiklis. Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2004.
12. F. P. Kelly. Charging and Rate Control for Elastic Traffic. European Transactions on Telecommunications, 8:33-37, 1997.
13. F. P. Kelly and A. K. Maulloo. Rate Control in Communication Networks: Shadow Prices, Proportional Fairness and Stability. Operational Research Society, 49:237-252, 1998.
14. H. W. Kuhn. The Hungarian Method for the Assignment Problem. Naval Res. Logis. Quart., 2:83-97, 1955.
15. K. Lai, L. Rasmusson, S. Sorkin, L. Zhang, and B. A. Huberman. Tycoon: an Implemention of a Distributed Market-Based Resource Allocation System. Manuscript, http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/tycoon/papers_and_presentations, 2004.
16. I. Milchtaich, Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions. Games and Economic Behavior, 13:111-124, 1996.
17. D. Monderer and L. S. Sharpley, Potential Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:124-143, 1996.
18. C. Papadimitriou. Algorithms, Games, and the Internet, In Proceedings of 33rd STOC, 2001.
19. C. H. Papadimitriou and K. Steiglitz. Combinatorial Optimization. Dover Publications, Inc., 1982.
20. M. Pinedo. Scheduling. Prentice Hall, 2002.
21. O. Regev and N. Nisan. The Popcorn Market: Online Markets for Computational Resources. In Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Information and Computation Economies, pages 148-157, 1998.
22. R. W. Rosenthal. A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria. Internation Journal of Game Theory, 2:65-67, 1973.
23. S. Sanghavi and B. Hajek. Optimal Allocation of a Divisible Good to Strategic Buyers, Manuscript, http://tesla.csl.uiuc.edu/~hajek/Papers/ OptDivisible.pdf, 2004.
24. I. Stoica, H. Abdel-Wahab, and A. Pothen. A Microeconomic Scheduler for Parallel Computers. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Job Scheduling Strategies for Parallel Processing, pages 122-135, April 1995.
25. H. R. Varian. Equity, Envy, and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory, 9:63-91, 1974.
26. C. A. Waldspurger, T. Hogg, B. A. Huberman, J. O. Kephart, and S. Stornetta. Spawn: A Distributed Computational Economy. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 18(2):103-117, February 1992.
27. M. P. Wellman, W. E. Walsh, P. R. Wurman, and J. K. MacKie-Mason. Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling. Games and Economic Behavior, 35:271-303, 2001.
28. A. Wierman and M. Harchol-Balter, Classifying Scheduling Policies with respect to Unfairness in an M/GI/1. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS 2003 Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, 2003.
29. L. Zhang. On the Efficiency and Fairness of a Fixed Budget Resource Allocation Game. Manuscript, 2004.