Growth in the shadow of expropriation

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 126, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 651-697

  Aguiar, Mark ^a   Amador, Manuel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONVERGENCE; DEBT; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ECONOMIC THEORY; GROWTH MODELING; NEOCLASSICAL THEORY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 80052941221     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjr015     Document Type: Article

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