Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 377-391

  Scholl, Almuth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Conditionality; Dynamic contracts; Foreign aid; Limited enforceability; Neoclassical growth

Indexed keywords

EID: 60449098304     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2008.09.005     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Adam C., and O'Connell S. Aid, taxation and development in sub-saharan Africa. Economics and Politics 11 3 (1999) 225-253
2. Alvarez F., and Jermann U.J. Efficiency, equilibria, and asset pricing with risk of default. Econometrica 68 4 (2000) 775-798
3. Arellano C., Bulíř A., Lane T., and Lipschitz L. The dynamic implications of foreign aid and its variability. Journal of Development Economics 88 1 (2009) 87-102
4. Azam J.-P., and Laffont J.-J. Contracting for aid. Journal of Development Economics 70 (2003) 25-58
5. Boone P. Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid. European Economic Review 40 2 (1996) 289-329
6. Burnside C., and Dollar D. Aid policies and growth. The American Economic Review 90 4 (2000) 847-868
7. Burnside, C., Dollar, D., 2004. Aid, policies and growth: Revisiting the evidence. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3251
8. Chatterjee S., Sakoulis G., and Turnovsky S.J. Unilateral capital transfers, public investment and economic growth. European Economic Review 47 6 (2003) 1077-1103
9. Chenery H.B., and Strout A.M. Foreign assistance and economic development. The American Economic Review 56 4 (1966) 679-733
10. Coate, S., Morris, S., 1995. Policy conditionality. Mimeo. University of Pennsylvania
11. Collier P., and Dollar D. Can the world cut poverty in half? How policy reform and effective aid can meet international development goals. World Development 29 11 (2001) 1787-1802
12. Collier P., and Dollar D. Aid allocation and poverty reduction. European Economic Review 46 8 (2002) 1470-1500
13. Cooley T., Marimon R., and Quadrini V. Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability. Journal of Political Economy 112 4 (2004) 817-847
14. Cordella, T., Dell'Ariccia, G., Kletzer, K.M., 2003. Conditional aid, sovereign debt, and debt relief. Mimeo. University of California, Santa Cruz
15. Dalgaard C.-J. Donor policy rules and aid effectiveness. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32 (2008) 1895-1920
16. Dalgaard C.-J., and Hansen H. On aid, growth and good policies. Journal of Development Studies 37 6 (2001) 17-41
17. Dalgaard C.-J., Hansen H., and Tarp F. On the empirics of foreign aid and growth. Economic Journal 114 (2004) 191-216
18. In: Devarajan S., Dollar D., and Holmgren T. (Eds). Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies (2000), World Bank, Washington DC
19. Dollar D., and Svensson J. What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programmes?. The Economic Journal 110 127 (2000) 894-917
20. Easterly W. The Elusive Quest for Growth (2001), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
21. Easterly W. Can foreign aid buy growth?. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 3 (2003) 23-48
22. Easterly W., Levine R., and Roodman D. New data, new doubts: A comment on Burnside and Dollar's 'Aid Policies and Growth (2000)'. The American Economic Review 94 3 (2004) 774-780
23. Federico, G., 2001. Samaritans, rotten kids and policy conditionality. Mimeo. Nuffield College Oxford
24. Giovannetti G., Marcet A., and Marimon R. Growth, capital flows and enforcement constraints. European Economic Review 37 2 (1993) 418-425
25. Gollin D. Getting income shares right. Journal of Political Economy 110 2 (2002) 458-474
26. Gourinchas, P.-O., Jeanne, O., 2008. Capital flows to developing countries: The allocation puzzle. Mimeo. University of California at Berkeley
27. Guillaumont P., and Chauvet L. Aid and performance: A reassessment. Journal of Development Studies 37 6 (2001) 66-92
28. Hagen R.J. Samaritan agents? On the delegation of aid policy. Journal of Development Economics 79 1 (2006) 249-263
29. Hansen H., and Tarp F. Aid effectiveness disputed. Journal of International Development 12 3 (2000) 375-398
30. Hansen H., and Tarp F. Aid and growth regressions. Journal of Development Economics 64 2 (2001) 547-570
31. Kehoe T.J., and Levine D.K. Debt-constrained asset markets. The Review of Economic Studies 60 (1993) 865-888
32. Kehoe T.J., and Levine D.K. Liquidity constrained markets versus debt constrained markets. Econometrica 69 3 (2001) 575-598
33. Kehoe P.J., and Perri F. International business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets. Econometrica 70 3 (2002) 907-928
34. Kletzer, K., 2005. Aid and sanctions. Mimeo. University of California, Santa Cruz
35. Kletzer K., and Wright B.D. Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter. The American Economic Review 90 3 (2000) 621-639
36. Kocherlakota N. Implications of efficient risk sharing without commitment. The Review of Economic Studies 63 4 (1996) 595-609
37. Krüger D., and Perri F. Does income inequality lead to consumption inequality? Evidence and theory. The Review of Economic Studies 73 1 (2006) 163-193
38. Krüger D., and Uhlig H. Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment. Journal of Monetary Economics 53 7 (2006) 1661-1691
39. Lensink R., and White H. Are there negative returns to aid?. Journal of Development Studies 37 6 (2001) 42-65
40. Ligon E., Thomas J.P., and Worrall T. Mutual insurance, individual savings, and limited commitment. Review of Economic Dynamics 3 (2000) 216-246
41. Marcet A., and Marimon R. Communication, commitment, and growth. Journal of Economic Theory 58 (1992) 219-249
42. Marcet, A., Marimon, R., 1998. Recursive contracts. Mimeo. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
43. Mourmoras, A., Rangazas, P., 2006. Foreign aid policy and sources of poverty: A quantitative framework. IMF Working Paper WP/06/014
44. Murshed M., and Sen S. Aid conditionality and military expenditure reduction in developing countries: Models of asymmetric information. Economic Journal 105 (1995) 498-505
45. Pallage S., and Robe M. Foreign aid and the business cycle. Review of International Economics 9 4 (2001) 495-517
46. Pedersen K.R. Aid, investment and incentives. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 98 (1996) 423-438
47. Pedersen K.R. The samaritan's dilemma and the effectiveness of foreign aid. International Tax and Public Finance 8 (2001) 693-703
48. Svensson J. Aid, growth and democracy. Economics and Politics 11 3 (1999) 275-297
49. Svensson J. Foreign aid and rent-seeking. Journal of International Economics 51 2 (2000) 437-461
50. Svensson J. When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality. Journal of Development Economics 61 1 (2000) 61-84
51. Svensson J. Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?. Journal of Development Economics 70 2 (2003) 381-402
52. Trabandt, M., 2007. Optimal pre-announced tax reform. Mimeo. Sveriges Riksbank