Time-Consistent public policy

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 789-808

  Klein, Paul ^a   Krusell, Per ^b   Ríos Rull, José Víctor ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EULERIAN ANALYSIS; EXPENDITURE; GAME THEORY; GOVERNMENT; INCOME; MARKOV CHAIN; POLICY ANALYSIS; TAX SYSTEM; TRADE-OFF;

EID: 45249104005     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00491.x     Document Type: Article

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