Forced federalism: States as laboratories of immigration reform

Hastings Law Journal

Volumn 62, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 1673-1727

  Cunningham Parmeter, Keith ^a  

^a WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 80052766955     PISSN: 00178322     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (315)

1. See generally NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2010 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE STATES (2010) (listing immigration-related enactments in forty-four states);
2. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2009 STATE LAWS RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION, JANUARY I-DECEMBER 31, 2009 (2009);
3. Michael W. Savage, 3 Other States Weighing Tough Immigration Bills, WASH. POST, July 8, 2010, at A4 (considering which states will enact tougher immigration laws).
4. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1833-34 (1993) (challenging the assumption that U. S. borders were uncontrolled until the late nineteenth century).
5. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (establishing prohibitions against the immigration of convicted criminals and prostitutes);
6. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 280 (1875) (striking down a California law designed to prevent Chinese immigration);
7. Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259, 274 (1875) (striking down a New York law regulating the importation of foreign passengers).
8. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446 (West Supp. 2011);
9. S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460 (Supp. 2010);
10. UTAH CODE § 76-10-2901 (2011);
11. see also Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act: Blowing off Steam or Setting Wildfires?, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 293, 296-97, 340-43 (2009) (summarizing recent immigration restrictions).
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (8) (Supp. 2010);
13. UTAH CODE § 76-9-1003 (2011) (requiring police officers to verify the immigration status of vehicle passengers when there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle contains unauthorized immigrants).
14. But see United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010)
15. aff'd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (enjoining portions of the Arizona law).
16. S. C. CODE ANN. § 8-30-10 (Supp. 2010);
17. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (issuing preliminary injunction against sections of Arizona's immigration law).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2001) (allowing state police to make arrests for civil immigration violations);
19. Susan N. Herman, Introduction, David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium: Our New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1201, 1222-25 (2004) (examining the constitutional dimensions of state authority to make immigration arrests).
20. See Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) [hereinafter Motomura, Federalism] (describing "immigration federalism" as a system that defines the role subnational actors play in making and implementing immigration law and policy);
21. see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970 (2011) (holding that federal law does not preempt Arizona regulations requiring employers to electronically verify the immigration status of new hires).
22. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 606 (1996) (discussing the popularity of the "states are laboratories" characterization among courts and scholars);
24. see also Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1745-47 (2004) (examining the "experimentation model of federalism" in recent Supreme Court opinions);
25. See, e.g., Emily Bazar, Strict Immigration Law Rattles Oklahoma Businesses, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2008, at A1 (describing Oklahoma as a laboratory in the national debate over immigration);
26. E. J. Montini, Still Doubting Thomas on Immigration?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 18, 2010, at B1 (providing an example of the laboratory characterization);
27. see also Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 847 (2008) (discussing the experimental value of restrictive subnational laws);
28. Matthew Parlow, A Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1070-71 (2007) (arguing in favor of local immigration experimentation).
29. See Motomura, Federalism, supra note 10, at 1361 (introducing the term "immigration federalism" and explaining how it encompasses state attempts to make and enforce immigration law and policy);
30. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1630 (1997) (describing the "extreme contrast in federal-state powers" involved in immigration federalism).
31. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L. J. 1256, 1258 (2008) (explaining how these roles establish "two distinct visions of federal-state relations").
32. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 459, 483 (2008) ("[S]tates are only permitted to act in ways that are in harmony with federal law and consistent with congressional objectives.").
33. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (2009) (prohibiting state police officers from arresting suspects for violating federal immigration laws);
34. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 31 (1989).
35. See Michael J. Wishnie, Essay, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1446-47 (2008) (discussing the core components of comprehensive immigration reform).
36. See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L. J. 557, 557-59 (2000) (arguing that in practice, states typically act more like partners than like autonomous entities in a dual federalist scheme).
37. See Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 397, 417-18 (2008) (discussing competing federalism arrangements in environmental law).
38. Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 919 (1997)
39. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961));
40. see also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004-05 (1995) (describing the "autonomy model" of federalism);
41. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 831-32 (1998) (describing the historical development of dual federalism).
42. Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 714 (1999)
43. (quoting Printz, 521 U. S. at 919-20);
44. see also Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 498 (2002) (explaining how the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence respects the states' sovereign interests).
45. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Can the Government Prohibit Gay Marriage?, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 15, 32-33 (2008) (discussing information generated by local experimentation on marriage issues);
46. Michael C. Dorf, Foreword, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62-63 (1998) (explaining how federal law can interfere with state-based experimentation).
47. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L. J. 1, 8-9 (2006);
48. See Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 66-67 (2007) (describing the role of cooperative federalism within immigration law).
49. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 355 (1976).
50. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
51. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19-20 (1996) (surveying early immigration laws at the state level).
52. Neuman, supra note 2, at 1842 (noting that states enforced these provisions by penalizing persons responsible for transporting convicts, rather than the convicts themselves);
53. see also Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N. C. L. REV. 1557. 1568-69 (2008) (explaining how these measures were utilized to prevent the entry of undesirable outsiders).
54. see also Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 217, 221-22 (1994) (discussing the deference afforded to the states in establishing entry requirements);
55. Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 583, 638-39 (2001) (discussing early efforts in Massachusetts to deport indigent immigrants).
56. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (restricting the immigration of convicted criminals and prostitutes);
57. see Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 939, 953 (1995) (explaining how Congress failed to enact immigration legislation during the early nineteenth century);
58. see also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1908-09 (2000) (discussing the history of banishment in the colonies);
59. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 280 (1875);
60. Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259, 274 (1875);
61. see also Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazletonl "Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. I, 14 n. 82 (2007) (discussing the shift in immigration power that occurred during the late nineteenth century).
62. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893);
63. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581 (1889);
64. see also Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 612-13 (2008) (explaining how the notion of federal exclusivity took hold during the late nineteenth century).
65. see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1261 (CD. Cal. 1997) (enjoining the enforcement of various provisions of the law);
66. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C. D. Cal. 1995) (same).
67. See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1458 (2006) (explaining how the Supreme Court prevented states from engaging in immigration lawmaking during the twentieth century).
68. See Keith Aoki et al., (In) visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and Immigration Regulation, 10 OR. REV. INT'L L. 453, 488 (2008) (explaining how "the balance of power shifted into federal hands" during the late nineteenth century).
69. 8 U. S. C § 1357 (g) (1) (2006).
70. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 196 (2006) (arguing that the power delegated to local police through cooperative agreements is broader than their inherent authority to conduct immigration arrests).
71. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 970-71 (2004) (summarizing the cooperative agreement between Florida and the Department of Justice).
72. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287 (g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U. S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited July 4, 2011).
73. 26 Law Enforcement Officers Trained by ICE to Enforce Immigration Law, U. S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 23, 2010), http://www.ice.gov/news/ releases/1007/100723charleston. htm.
74. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 250 (2005) (discussing the "state-federal partnerships" of cooperative federalism).
75. 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (g) (2) (2006);
76. see also Yule Kim, The Limits of State and Local Immigration Enforcement and Regulation, 3 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 242, 251-52 (2010) (discussing the limited enforcement discretion given to localities under cooperative federalism);
77. 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (g) (3) (2006);
78. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE PERFORMANCE OF 287 (G) AGREEMENTS 23-24 (2010) (discussing allegations of civil rights violations against local agencies involved in cooperative enforcement);
79. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS ABOUT THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM 4-5 (2009) [hereinafter NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SECURE COMMUNITIES] (discussing problems with enforcement decisions undertaken pursuant to cooperative immigration agreements);
80. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., UTAH: GOING DOWN ARIZONA'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL PATH 1 (2011) (arguing that Utah's recent immigration law "promote[s] racial profiling for law enforcement in a wide variety of scenarios").
81. See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 117-18 (2008) (describing the states' limited role in exercising delegated immigration authority).
82. Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N. C. L. REV. 1619, 1633-64 (2008) (comparing early local immigration laws to today's attempts to directly enforce federal immigration law).
83. See, e.g., John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U. S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/ 060502agpreparedremarks.htm (arguing that states have the inherent authority to conduct arrests for civil and criminal immigration violations);
84. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U. S. Dep't of Justice, Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 13 (Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf ("States have inherent power, subject to federal preemption, to make arrests for violation of federal law.");
85. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988-89 (D. Ariz. 2010)
86. aff'd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that Arizona claimed to possess a "compelling interest in the cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws") (internal citations omitted);
87. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 988-89.
88. see also John Schwartz & Randal C. Archibold, A Law Facing a Tough Road Through the Courts, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, at A17 (summarizing Kris Kobach's contention that Arizona's immigration law provides an example of "perfect concurrent enforcement" with federal law).
89. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 225 (1982) ("The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens.... ") (internal citations omitted).
90. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (E) (Supp. 2010) (relying on federal immigration determinations to enforce state law).
91. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (A) (Supp. 2010).
92. But see United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010)
93. aff'd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (enjoining portions of the Arizona law).
94. UTAH CODE § 76-9-1003 (2011).
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-14 (2011);
96. N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 162-62 (a) (West Supp. 2010);
97. See also Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sub-National Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit of Cultural Cohesion, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1444-45 (2009) (discussing recent subnational attempts to deter illegal immigration);
98. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100 (b) (2011) (authorizing police officers to verify the immigration status of any criminal suspect that fails to provide proof of legal residency).
99. MO. REV. STAT. § 577.680 (2010);
100. see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 171.2 (West Supp. 2011) (requiring police to check the immigration status of all people confined to jail for driving under the influence).
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-200 (2011) (creating a state felony for transporting eight or more unauthorized immigrants);
102. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446 (West Supp. 2011);
103. S. C CODE ANN. § 16-9-460 (Supp. 2010);
104. UTAH CODE § 76-10-2901 (2011) (creating a third-degree felony for encouraging or inducing any immigrant to enter or reside in the state illegally);
105. see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-128 (2011) (creating a state felony for transporting eight or more unauthorized immigrants);
106. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (Supp. 2010);
107. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 998-1000 (D. Ariz. 2010)
108. aff'd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (enjoining provision).
109. See Cristina Rodríguez & Muzaffar Chishti, TESTING THE LIMITS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE LEGALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION MEASURES 23 (2007) (discussing local housing regulations related to unauthorized immigrants and noting that California later banned such housing prohibitions);
110. Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 588-89 (2009) (summarizing a housing restriction in Jupiter, Florida);
111. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2010) (enjoining an ordinance that penalized landlords who leased property to unauthorized immigrants);
112. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (N. D. Tex. 2007) (same);
113. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (S. D. Cal. 2006) (same).
114. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (Supp. 2010) (requiring private employers to use the federal electronic verification system to confirm the immigration status of new hires);
115. MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3 (2011) (same);
116. S. C. CODE ANN. § 41-8-20 (Supp. 2010) (same);
117. see also GA. CODE ANN. § 36-60-6 (2011) (requiring employers with ten or more employees to electronically verify the immigration status of new hires);
118. UTAH CODE § 13-47-201 (2011) (requiring private employers with fifteen or more employees to electronically verify the immigration status of new employees);
119. Stephen Yale-Loehr & Ted Chiaparri, Immigration: Cities and States Rush in Where Congress Fears to Tread, in 12 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 341, 341 (2007) (summarizing subnational employment immigration laws);
120. see also Rachel Feller, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Arizona's Improper Legislation in the Field of "Immigration- Related Employment Practices", 84 WASH. L. REV. 289, 289-92 (2009) (critically evaluating state attempts to utilize licensure laws to penalize employers that hire unauthorized immigrants).
121. For example, soon after a federal court enjoined Arizona's immigration law in United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1008, Alabama, Georgia, and Utah passed restrictionist legislation that contained many components of Arizona's law. Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H. B. 56
122. 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011);
123. Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act, H. B. 87, 2011-12 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011);
124. Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, H. B. 497, 2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011).
125. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1007-08.
126. See Jill Keblawi, Comment, Immigration Arrests by Local Police: Inherent Authority or Inherently Preempted?, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 817-18 (2004) (explaining how the Department of Justice's position on inherent authority changed with administrations);
127. * 1-2 (CD. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009).
128. United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999).
129. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474-475 (9th Cir. 1983).
130. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 766-70 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing congressional intent in establishing a voluntary system of electronic verification).
131. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2009)
132. aff'd, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970 (2011).
133. 131 S. Ct. at 1985;
134. Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2010) (enjoining a city's "anti-harboring" ordinance penalizing landlords who leased property to unauthorized immigrants), and
135. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (S. D. Cal. 2006) (same)
136. with United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002-04 (D-Ariz. 2010) (declining to enjoin the section of an Arizona law prohibiting individuals from transporting, concealing, or harboring unauthorized immigrants). Although these state criminal laws differ in many respects, each implicates existing federal prohibitions involving related conduct.
137. See 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (1) (A) (2006);
138. Ben Meade, Comment, Interstate Instability: Why Colorado's Alien Smuggling Statute Is Preempted by Federal Immigration Laws, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 237, 278-79 (2008) (discussing similarities between Hazleton, Pennsylvania's anti-harboring ordinance and Colorado's anti-smuggling law).
139. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law's Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 354 (2008) (discussing judicial disagreement over immigration preemption).
140. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 68 (1941) ("Any concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits.... ").
141. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
142. 312 U. S. at 56.
143. 424 U. S. 351, 360-62, 365 (1976) (noting that unlike in Hines, which involved an extensive federal regulatory scheme that conflicted with Pennsylvania's law, federal law at the time had expressed only a "peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants").
144. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970 (2011).
145. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 398 n. 342 (1997) (examining the similarities between policy experimentation and medical research). (Pubitemid 127423564)
146. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1030, 1046 n. 61 (1983);
147. Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L. J. 481, 497 (2004).
148. I use the words "externality" and "spillover" interchangeably. Some economists make small distinctions between the terms. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1355 n. 5 (2006) (employing the same convention).
149. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L. J. 159, 164-65 (2006) (summarizing debates over environmental externalities);
150. Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2375 (1996) (explaining why states have little incentive to enforce pollution controls).
151. See Esty, supra note 12, at 573 (considering whether localities can account for the scientific complexities of regulated industries); Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and the Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1340-41 (1992) (arguing for centralized environmental policies to combat spillover problems).
152. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2414-15 (1996); (Pubitemid 126408782)
153. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1210, 1222 (1992) ("The presence of interstate externalities is a powerful reason for intervention at the federal level.... ");
154. see also Brian H. Bix, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Federalism, 17 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53, 65 (2003) (discussing debates over environmental externalities).
155. See Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765, 768 (1999) (summarizing the argument that outsiders enjoy psychological gains from environmental protections);
156. see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N. Y. U. ENVTL. L. J. 130, 143 (2005) ("[T]he existence of Yellowstone National Park provides benefits to all American citizens for which Wyoming and Montana are not compensated.... ").
157. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1644 (2006);
158. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Essay, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 868 (2009) (discussing spillover problems created by state tort actions).
159. see also Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 80 GEO. L. J. 617, 617 (1992) (explaining how cost-exporting states "make[] all worse off").
160. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L. J. 1333, 1380 (2009) (outlining how positive externalities can inhibit innovation).
161. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2007) (arguing that strong presumptions in favor of preemption undermine congressional accountability).
162. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 342 (2003).
163. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
164. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U. S. 483, 502 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2326 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
166. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 322-23, 326 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. Lopez, 514 U. S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. 545 U. S. 1 (2005).
172. See Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 503, 507 (1987) (arguing that replication occurs when states make "comparative measurements] of the consequences produced by a variety of plausible reforms").
173. See Peter S. Menell, Regulating "Spyware": The Limitations of State "Laboratories" and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1363, 1374 (2005) (describing the ability of state experiments to produce "independent data for assessing alternative policies").
174. See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1120 (1999) (explaining how state and local governments respond to their constituents' preferences). experimentation);
175. see also Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B. U. L. REV. 1113, 1129 (2007) (discussing the concepts of vertical and horizontal replication in the context of local experimentation).
176. See Kuehn, supra note 113, at 2383 (observing that a great deal of federal environmental law is modeled after state legislation);
177. see also Benjamin J. Beaton, Note, Walking the Federalist Tightrope: A National Policy of State Experimentation for Health Information Technology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1670, 1671 n. 5 (2008) (discussing the role of vertical replication in the development of welfare and education policy).
178. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S. 366, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing "the need for... innovations that grow out of diversity");
179. see also Fed. Power Comm'n v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 488-89 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Congress may well have believed that diversity of experimentation in the field of regulation has values which centralization and uniformity destroy.").
180. 539 U. S. 306, 342-43 (2003).
181. Id. at 342 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
182. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2326 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
183. 521 U. S. 702, 737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 59 (1941)
185. (citing 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1806).
186. Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670 § 31 (a), 54 Stat. 670
187. (codified at 8 U. S. C. § 452 (a) (1946)
188. repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414 § 408 (a) (39)
189. Stat. 163 (1952)).
190. Davidowitz v. Hines, 30 F. Supp. 470, 473 (M. D. Pa. 1939).
191. Hines, 312 U. S. at 63
192. (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581, 606 (1889)).
193. Id. at 64 (citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 279 (1875)).
194. Davidowitz, 30 F. Supp. at 471-72 (summarizing Pennsylvania's registration requirements).
195. Hines, 312 U. S. at 70-71.
196. Id. at 65 (citing Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U. S. 449, 454-55 (1930)).
197. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (1971), repealed by Stats. 1988, ch. 946, § 1 (1988).
198. De Canas v. Bica, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446-47 (Ct. App. 1974).
199. 424 U. S. 351, 365 (1976).
200. See Brief of Respondents, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1975) (No. 74-882)
201. * 9 (arguing that California's law "could expel masses of aliens not entitled to lawful residence to other states and across international borders").
202. De Canas, 424 U. S. at 360-62.
203. De Cartas, 424 U. S. at 357;
204. Brief of Petitioners, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976) (No. 74-882).
205. * 7 ("[T]he federal government's apparent ineffective control of illegal entry by aliens makes the employment of illegal aliens a legitimate concern of the state.").
206. De Canas, 424 U. S. at 357.
207. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51k (2011) (originally enacted in 1972);
208. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4409 (2011) (originally enacted in 1973)
209. repealed by 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 136.
210. De Canas, 424 U. S. at 360 n. 9 (emphasis added).
211. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (1) (A) (2006);
212. Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 193 n. 2 (summarizing early state attempts to regulate the employment of unauthorized immigrants).
213. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975-76 (2011)
214. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211, 23-212, 23-212.01 (Supp. 2010)).
215. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-211, 23-212, 23-214 (Supp. 2010).
216. 131 S. Ct. at 1970.
217. Id. at 1990 (citing GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 3, 37, 80 (1990)).
218. Id. at 1989 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing H. R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 56 (1986)).
219. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 360, 360 n. 9 (1976) (emphasis added).
220. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147 (2002)
221. (citing INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U. S. 183, 194 & n. 8 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1970.
223. Hoffman, 535 U. S. at 147.
224. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1971 (comparing the definitions contained in the INA with those contained in the Legal Arizona Workers Act).
225. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211 (11) (Supp. 2010)).
226. See, e.g., DORIS MEISSNER & MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE NEXT GENERATION OF E-VERIFY: GETTING EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION RIGHT 2 (2009) (recommending that Congress adopt voluntary pilot programs that employ biometric testing).
227. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Remark, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 2007 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2008) ("Without question, the most significant force driving action at the state and local level is a fiscal one.");
228. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 07, 654-55 (1985) (emphasizing the need to compare spillovers caused by different regulatory approaches).
229. See Swati Agrawal, Trusts Betrayed: The Absent Federal Partner in Immigration Policy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 755, 757-58 n. 3 (1996) (summarizing restrictionist arguments on the fiscal harm caused by illegal immigration).
230. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2009).
231. PEW HISPANIC CTR., HISPANICS AND ARIZONA'S NEW IMMIGRATION LAW 2 (2010);
232. Peter H. Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration, in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES 197 (Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Hollifield eds., 1st ed. 2000).
233. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 154 (2009) (discussing the economic impact of illegal immigration).
234. See Gulasekaram, supra note 83, at 1472-73 (explaining how illegal immigration contributes to national economic growth);
235. Shayana Kadidal, "Federalizing" Immigration Law: International Law as a Limitation on Congress's Power to Legislate in the Field of Immigration, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 01, 501-02 (2008) (summarizing several recent studies pointing to net economic gains generated by immigration);
236. Tamar Jacoby, Immigration Nation, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 58 (2006) (attributing $700 billion growth in U. S. gross domestic product to immigration).
237. Kadidal, supra note 227, at 502 (discussing the economic impact of illegal immigration on industrialized countries);
238. Alexander T. Tabarrok, Economic and Moral Factors in Favor of Open Immigration, THE INDEP. INST. (Sept. 14, 2000), http://www.independent.org/ issues/article.asp?id=486 (arguing that economists generally agree on immigration's wealth-enhancing effects).
239. RANDY CAPPS & MICHAEL FIX, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: MYTHS AND REALITY 1 (2005);
240. see also Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security with Billions, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, at A1 (describing the Social Security Administration's annual revenue from illegal immigration).
241. Compare Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 7 n. 30 (2006) (discussing positive contributions of unauthorized immigrants to federal revenue)
242. with STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE HIGH COST OF CHEAP LABOR: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 5 (2004) (arguing that illegal immigration causes net harm to the federal budget).
243. U. S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1-2 (2007).
244. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF TEX., UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN TEXAS: A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT TO THE STATE BUDGET AND ECONOMY 1 (2006) (concluding that the Texas budget benefits from illegal immigration).
245. See Randal C. Archibold & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Serious Concern Among Americans About Immigration, N. Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A15 (summarizing poll results showing strong support for immigration reform).
246. See Peter H. Schuck, Some Federal-State Developments in Immigration Law, 58 N. Y. U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 387, 390 (2002) (arguing that illegal immigration generates very little tax revenue for states).
247. See Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A1.
248. see also Jill P. Capuzzo, Immigrants Hated Law, and Now It's Repealed, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at B2;
249. See H. B. 1804, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 2-3 (Okla. 2007);
250. see also Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742, 750 (10th Cir. 2010) (enjoining provisions of the Oklahoma law).
251. See ECON. IMPACT GROUP, A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (CGE) ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE OKLAHOMA TAXPAYER AND CITIZEN PROTECTION ACT OF 2007, at 17 (2008) (concluding that the drop in gross state product would "likely remain in the system for many years").
252. See Eve Conant, Raising Arizona, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 2010, at 34-35 (discussing division between conservative business groups and restrictionist groups in Arizona);
253. see also Julia Preston, Latino Groups Urge Boycott of Arizona over New Law, N. Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A16 (explaining how critics obtained pledges from businesses to stop doing business with Arizona).
254. See Conant, supra note 255, at 35; Tamar Jacoby, An Immigration Standoff, L. A. TIMES, June 21, 2010, at A15;
255. Who Is Boycotting Arizona?, AZ CENTRAL (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.azcentral.com/business/articles/2010/05/13/20400513immigration- boycotts-list.html (describing boycott activity).
256. See Randal C. Archibold, Phoenix Counts Big Boycott Cost, N. Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A15 (noting that several civil rights groups have urged travelers to avoid Arizona).
257. Michael W. Savage, Utah Straddling a New Line on Illegal Residents, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2010, at A1 (discussing fears in Utah about the negative economic impact caused by state immigration legislation);
258. Ernie Suggs, Illegal Immigration: City Council Seeks Veto of State Bill, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 20, 2011, at B1 (describing potential boycotts and canceled conventions in Atlanta that might result from new restrictionist legislation modeled after Arizona's immigration law).
259. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Essay, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2045-46 (2008) (summarizing debates over the value of local enforcement).
260. see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the Fifth Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 27, 44 (2008) (explaining that many unauthorized immigrants live in "mixed status" families).
261. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1104 (2004) (same).
262. 8 U. S. C. § 1226 (d) (1) (A) (2006);
263. 8 U. S. C. § 1373 (c) (2006) (emphasis added).
264. Decl. of David C. Palmatier ¶ 17, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB).
265. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 996 n. 7 (D. Ariz. 2010)
266. aff'd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining how state immigration laws burden federal resources).
267. See Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155, 156-57 (2008) (arguing that current staffing levels do not allow for effective immigration enforcement);
268. See Decl. of Daniel H. Ragsdale ¶ 45, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB) (discussing historical distrust between some law enforcement agencies and federal immigration agents);
269. see also Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 35-36 (arguing that subnational enforcement undermines national immigration goals).
270. See Rick Su, Notes on the Multiple Facets of Immigration Federalism, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 199-200 (2008) (discussing federal primacy over immigration enforcement and the secondary consequences created by state control).
271. Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L. J. 777, 814-15 (2008) (discussing states and localities that have experienced a reduction in immigrant populations since enacting restrictive measures).
272. Daniel González, Questions over Drop in Migrant Population, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/ articles/2010/02/21/20100221undocop. html (reporting that in 2008, Arizona's immigrant population declined more than any other state);
273. see also Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1126 (2009) (describing an immigrant exodus from Arizona).
274. See Doris Meissner & James W. Ziglar, Why Arizona Had to Be Challenged, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at A19 (discussing the unintended consequences of heightened border enforcement).
275. See DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & AARON TERRAZAS, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRANTS AND THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS: RESEARCH EVIDENCE, POLICY CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS 11 (2009) (discussing the effect of state restrictions and selective enforcement policies on migration patterns).
276. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
277. See Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11161, 11164-65 (2009) (describing localities as goods that citizens can select);
278. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 1, 3 (2005), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/ pdfs/446.pdf (discussing the connection between Tiebout's theory and state experimentation);
279. Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18 (2003);
280. see also ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 127-29 (2000) (explaining how competitive federalism leads to population sorting).
281. Spiro, supra note 14, at 1640 ("[T]he prospect of a race to the bottom is slight.");
282. see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 173-74 (1994) (discussing the benefits of immigration-related sorting) [hereinafter Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties].
283. See NBC Nightly News: A Nation Divided (television broadcast May 26, 2010) (reporting results of an MSNBC-Telemundo poll);
284. see also Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Law Is Stoking Unease Among Latinos, N. Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A11 (discussing immigration enforcement and allegations of racial profiling).
285. See Arizona's Immigration Crackdown: The Backlash Begins, ECONOMIST, May 8, 2010, at 31-32 (discussing racial and ethnic divisions over Arizona's immigration law).
286. See Howard Fineman, Showdown in Arizona: Obama Must Pursue Immigration Reform, NEWSWEEK, June 14, 2010, at 18;
287. see also PEW HISPANIC CTR., supra note 219, at 3-4 (discussing reports of discrimination against Latinos).
288. See Archibold, supra note 297, at An (summarizing training materials given to local law enforcement agencies engaged in cooperative immigration enforcement); Amanda Lee Myers, Lawsuit Targets Arizona Police Training: The Seventh Challenge to Immigration Law Takes a New Tack, HOUS. CHRON., July 11, 2010, at A8 (discussing critiques of police training materials).
289. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 69, at 5 (discussing evidence of racial profiling by local police engaged in cooperative immigration enforcement);
290. Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAUF. L. REV. 373, 401 (2004) (discussing expressive injuries that citizens experience because of racial discrimination).
291. 312 U. S. 52, 74 (1941).
292. See Motomura, Federalism, supra note 10, at 1374 (explaining why the self-definitional aspect of immigration law provides a strong rationale for federal exclusivity);
293. Hiroshi Motomura, Book Review, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567, 1583-84 (1997) (arguing for a broad definition of national membership).
294. see also Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1395, 1397-98 (1997) (discussing the role the U. S. border plays in defining membership);
295. Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1944-45 (1996) (discussing the self-definitional components of immigration law).
296. See Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 296, at 151-52 (arguing that state enforcement is consistent with existing definitions of the national community).
297. See generally LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 74 (2006) (discussing different legal regimes governing the discriminatory treatment of noncitizens).
298. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 210 (1982) (striking down a state law that prevented unauthorized immigrants from attending public schools);
299. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 237-38 (1896) (extending due process rights to unauthorized immigrants).
300. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1047, 1055-56 (1994) (discussing popular attitudes toward illegal immigration).
301. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N. Y. U. L. REV. 493, 553 (2001) (arguing that welfare discrimination against immigrants undermines the goal of national inclusiveness).
302. KARST, supra note 19, at 31 (1989);
303. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 823 (1992) (explaining how political and social actions create communities).
304. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1404 (2006) ("If successful, the laws would serve as models for other local governments.... ").
305. See NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CIR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U. S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, 1-20 (2008);
306. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L. J. 480, 514-15 (2008) (discussing incentives for encouraging experiments with high-variance outcomes).
307. see also James A. Gardner, The "States-as-Laboratories" Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 484 (1996) (arguing that innovation depends on state discretion).
308. DEP'I OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 69, at 23-24 (summarizing allegations of racial profiling and acknowledging the need to evaluate the civil rights records of cooperating local agencies);
309. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 69, at 4-5 (discussing allegations of racial profiling made against police engaged in cooperative enforcement);
310. see also Kati L. Griffith, A Supreme Stretch: The Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 127, 127-28 (2008) (arguing that recent proposals for immigration reform fail to adequately address the rights of unauthorized immigrants).
311. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1996 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Social Security records "are prone to error").
312. See Stephanie E. Tanger, Enforcing Corporate Responsibility for Violations of Workplace Immigration Laws: The Case of Meatpacking, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 59, 60, 61 n. 11 (2006) (summarizing federal immigration reform proposals that include provisions for tamperproof identification cards).
313. See John S. Baker Jr., A Letter to Lou Dobbs: How to Reverse Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 373, 381 (2008) (explaining why the federal government lacks the resources to arrest and deport most of the unauthorized population).
314. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
315. See Hills, supra note 125, at 10 (citing Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 342 (1990)).