Private law theory and corrective justice in trade secrecy

Journal of Tort Law

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2011, Pages

  Claeys, Eric R ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 80052612599     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19329148     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1932-9148.1115     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (231)

1. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Cinderella of Intellectual Property Law: Trade Secrets, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 399, 399 (Peter K. Yu ed. 2007).
2. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998).
3. Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon, or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (1999).
4. Todd M. Sloan, Trade Secrets: Real Toads in a Conceptual Garden, 1 W. ST. U. L. REV. 113 (1972-73) (upper-case lettering removed).
5. See, e.g., James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 2 ¶¶ 111-23 (1999).
6. WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 5 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597 (2003) ("To a greater extent than any other area of intellectual property, courts and commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of patent law is utilitarian. ").
8. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Intellectual Property and Corrective Justice, 78 VA. L. REV. 283 (1992) (reviewing Gordon, supra note 8).
10. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U. S. LAW: TORTS 251 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Norse Chem. Corp., 147 N. W.2d 529, 533-34 (Wis. 1967);
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a, at 425-26 (1995);
13. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a, at 2-5 (1939).
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b, at 5 (1939);
15. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4). The distinction between the secret and the product excludes from trade secrecy idea submissions, self-disclosing ideas, and hot news.
16. See Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1986) (idea submissions);
17. Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 30 N. E. 506 (N. Y. 1892) (selfdisclosing ideas);
18. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918) (hot news). The restriction on self-disclosing ideas, however, is often honored in the breach rather than in the observance.
19. See, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953).
20. See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 628 (5th Cir. 1994)
21. E.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1986).
22. E.g., B. C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 414 N. W.2d 48, 52 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
23. E.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4) (i) (making an element of trade secrecy information's "not being generally known to... other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use");
24. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b, at 6 (1939) (making trade secrecy depend on "the extent to which the information is known outside of [the claimant's] business").
25. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4) (i).
26. See also Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996);
27. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1971).
28. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b, at 5 (1939).
29. See also Eric R. Claeys, The Use Requirement at Common Law and Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 583 (2010).
30. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 318 (2008).
31. See 35 U. S. C. § 271 (a) (2010).
32. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1;
33. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a, at 4 (1939).
34. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a, at 4 (1939);
35. accord UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.
36. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a, at 4 (1939).
37. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, at 1-2 (1939).
38. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (ii) (B) (II);
39. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (b), at 2 (1939).
40. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (C);
41. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (d), at 2 (1939).
42. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (i), (ii) (A);
43. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (a), at 2 (1939).
44. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (ii) (B) (I), (III);
45. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (c), at 2 (1939);
46. Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 681 F.2d 161, 164 (3d Cir. 1982).
47. Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1965);
48. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (a).
49. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392-95 (4th Cir. 1971);
50. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3 (a).
51. For example, Roger Milgrim's treatise on trade secrecy devotes four chapters to the creation and protection of trade secrets by contract or in employment relations and only two to litigation. Compare 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS chs. 4-5 (2009), and 2 id. at chs. 6-7, with 4 id. at chs. 14-15.
52. See, e.g., JAMES H. A. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS 228-29 (1989) (providing sample language for a nondisclosure agreement).
53. See MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 4.2 (2010).
54. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100, 102 (1917).
55. See Chiappetta, supra note 3, at 73-74. Accord Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of Intellectual Property: A Comment on Hettinger, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247, 249 (1991).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. b, illus. 2, at 494, cmt. c, illus. 3, at 494-95 (1995).
57. th Cir. 1971)
58. cert. denied, 400 U. S. 1024 (5th Cir. 1971).
59. See, e.g., Note, Theft of Trade Secrets: A Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 385-89 (1971).
60. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 481 (1974).
61. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 20 (Mar. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2010/smith.pdf.
62. See, e.g., Salomon v. Hertz, 2 A. 379 (N. J. Ch. 1886);
63. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868);
64. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 952 (A. E. Randall ed., 1920)
65. See HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 98-102 (1997); Hill, supra note 5, ¶¶ 80-95; cf.
66. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 449 (1992)
67. (reprinted in 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 541 (2003).
68. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1153 n. 148 (2000).
69. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc. 332 N. W.2d 890, 895-96, 901-03 (Minn. 1983).
70. Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1064 (2d Cir. 1985).
71. Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 967-69 (9th Cir. 1996).
72. See JAGER, supra note 36, § 4.3; Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets As Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007);
73. Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313 (1997); Note, supra note 44, at 388.
74. Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 780 (Pa. 1965).
75. See Lynn C. Tyler, Trade Secrets in Indiana: Property vs. Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 339, 340-41 (1998).
76. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a. at 4 (1939).
77. Accord E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100, 102 (1917).
78. Samuelson, supra note 48. Accord Bone, supra note 2, at 243 (contrasting trade secrets with patents and copyrights, which "confer property rights against the world"); John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L. J. 4, 21 (1962). Commentators also cite in favor of the property view the legal principle that trade secrets are protected under constitutional takings principles.
79. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984);
80. Philip Morris Co. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
81. Compare Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 59-73 (2004)
82. (praising Monsanto and Philip Morris), with Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989) (criticizing Monsanto). Trade secrets deserve to be protected under the Takings Clause if they count as private property, but to cite takings law as proof that they are puts the cart before the horse.
83. See Michael A. Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTEL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (2007). In addition, in practice, takings cases are so often influenced by concerns about public law regulatory programs that they provide unreliable information about private rights as they are understood when such public law schemes do not interfere.
84. See Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and the Tension between Classicaland Modern-Liberal Theories of Property, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (2006);
85. see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 36-38 (2001) (noting similar conceptual differences between the rights assigned in tort accident law and in public risk-regulation law).
86. See JAGER, supra note 36, § 4.1; Thornton Robinson, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law of Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347 (1983).
87. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 293 (1992) (arguing that contract theories generally underlie intellectual property).
88. See Town & Country House & Home Service, Inc. v. Evans, 189 A.2d 390, 392-93 (Conn. 1963);
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. b, at 479-80 (1995).
90. See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 1994);
91. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1953).
92. See, e.g., David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 302 & Table 2 (2010) (reporting that, in trade secrecy misappropriation cases litigated in federal court between 1950 and 2008 and generating a reported opinion, 90% or more of the cases involved an employee, former employee, or a business partner).
93. See, e.g., 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 64-390 (5th ed. 2007).
94. See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L. J. 803, 812 (2001).
95. th Cir. 1971)
96. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f., at 11 (1939))
97. cert. denied, 400 U. S. 1024 (5th Cir. 1971).
98. See B. C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 414 N. W.2d 48 (Wis. App. 1987);
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (b) (4), at 453 (1995);
100. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (ii) (C);
101. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (d), at 2 (1939).
102. See also Samuelson, supra note 48, at 1153 n. 148, 1157 n. 169 (citing UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (ii) (C)).
103. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (ii) (B);
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. d, at 457 (1995).
105. See, e.g., Ralph Andrews Prods., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 271 Cal. Rptr. 797 (Ct. App. 1990).
106. In this respect, there is a trade secrecy/contract interface parallel to the property/contract interface noted by Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). (Pubitemid 33652111)
107. th Cir. 1982).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-88, at 239-44 (2007).
109. See, e.g., Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456, 459 (1958).
110. 19 Pick. 523 (Mass. 1837).
111. Vickery, 19 Pick. at 527.
112. GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 772-73 (S. D. Ohio 1969).
113. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 3 (3d ed. 2000).
114. WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS, at xlvii (2d ed. 2009).
115. Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT LAW (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6-7, on file with author).
116. For more elaborate developments of this point, see Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2011).
117. David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991).
118. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 114-44 (1995);
119. Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L. J. 1233 (1988)
120. (reviewing WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).
121. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 33-34 (1984).
122. J. E. Penner assumes a similar conception of interests without elaboration in THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 49-63 (1997).
123. See Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243 (1970), and especially id. at 255-56.
124. Here, I intend that the terms "interests" and "determined" avoid taking sides in natural law/positivism debates. See Eric R. Claeys, The Private Law and the Crisis in Catholic Scholarship in the American Legal Academy, 7 J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 253, 256-57, 258 n. 12 (2010).
125. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3-33 (2d ed. 2009).
126. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 121-67 (1980);
127. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303-24 (1992).
128. Penner contrasts "property" and "personal" rights. Penner, supra note 105, at 113-14. I am following Blackstone, who classified absolute moral rights into categories for personal security, liberty, and property. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 125-141 (1st ed. 1765-1769). Penner's category for personal rights and my category for "liberty" interests could be specified much more finely than I do so here, to cover one's locomotion, reputation, freedom to marry, choice of work, choice of confidantes, or so forth. That specificity would add clarity in many other contexts, but not here.
129. See Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society", 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). I thank Henry Smith for encouraging me to make this point more explicit.
130. See e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379 (2010).
131. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.4, at 85-87 (Joe Sachs trans. 2002);
132. see also Nicholas J. McBride, On the Conceptual and Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES 219 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
133. See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001);
134. Stephen A. Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES, supra note 124, at 107.
135. See Dennis Klimchuk, The Normative Foundations of Unjust Enrichment, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 81, 82-83 (Robert Chambers et al. eds., 2009);
136. Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147 (2006).
137. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Legal Theory of Rights, 95 YALE L. J. 1335, 1344-46 (1986). More precisely, Kraus and Coleman's article focuses on the role that "property" and "liability rules" play in specifying norms in transactions between parties. Yet those rules implicate the coverage of remedies so much that their observations apply to many choices courts face between damages and injunctions.
138. See, e, g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L. J. 1126, 1165-66 & nn. 175, 180 (2009) (book review) (citing WEINRIB, supra note 102, to illustrate basic principles of corrective justice as applied to copyright); Hill, supra note 5, ¶ 115 (same in relation to trade secrecy).
139. Kantian theory has been described as normatively unsatisfying because it makes "the autonomy of ethics... logically independent of any assertions about human nature", in contrast with theories of ethics that seek "to preserve morality as something psychologically intelligible." Alasdair MacIntyre, Hume on the 'Is' and the 'Ought, ' in AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE AGE 109, 124 (Univ. Notre Dame Press, 2d prtg., 1984) (1971). I agree with that criticism.
140. See Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 897-906 (2009).
141. Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 813 (2008). I thank Shyam Balganesh for encouraging me to clarify the relation between the conceptual approach I restate here and Weinrib's and instrumentalist utilitarian approaches.
142. See, e.g., John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 2 (2011).
143. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759, at 23 (1939).
144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1, at 3-4 (1995).
145. See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 336 (2010).
146. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 1014 (5th ed. 1984).
147. Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages As Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1, 12-17 (2000);
148. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 457-58 (1868).
149. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 298 (1827).
150. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §II.26, at 286 (Peter Laslett ed., 1989).
151. th Cir. 1987);
152. GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 767-72 (S. D. Ohio 1969);
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d, at 481-82 (1995).
154. Graves overlooked Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 415-18 (2003), and since Graves's article was published Michael Risch has expressed some sympathy for a natural-rights labor theory, see supra note 69, at 28-33. Although neither Mossoff nor Risch has written a comprehensive explanation of trade secrecy in terms of labor theory, Mark P. McKenna has propounded such a comprehensive account of early trademark law.
155. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007).
156. LOCKE, supra note 155, § II.26, at 286, §II.28, at 288-89.
157. A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 273 (1992).
158. 2 KENT, supra note 154, at 298-99.
159. Accord Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 30 N. E. 506 (N. Y. 1892).
160. See LOCKE, supra note 155, § II.27, at 288.
161. See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 43, 51-57 (Adam Thierer & Wayn Crews eds. 2002);
162. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138, 147-48 (Stephen R. Munzer ed. 2001).
163. The policies restated in this paragraph are distilled from Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 480, 482-83 (1974);
164. Abbott Labs. v. Norse Chemical Corp., 147 N. W.2d 529, 532-33 (Wis. 1967);
165. Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1965);
166. Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433-34 (Pa. 1960). See Claeys, supra note 18, at 594-97.
167. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
168. See Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 17-28 (2011) (book review).
169. For much of the foregoing, I have relied on James Penner's account of the normative interest in property in J. E. PENNER, supra note 105, at 49-51. On this point, however, Penner overemphasizes the negative liberty in property and underemphasizes the conception of gratification that limits and shapes the liberty. See id. at 50.
170. See Eric R. Claeys, The Right to Exclude in the Shadow of the Cathedral: A Response to Parchomovsky and Stein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 391, 401 (2010).
171. The discussion in text summarizes Eric R. Claeys, Intellectual Usufructs: Trade Secrecy, Hot News, and the Usufructuary Paradigm at Common Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012), http://ssrn. com/abstract=1889231.
172. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 246 (1881). See Mossoff, supra note 164, at 395-97.
173. The same may be said about Merrill's conception of a right to exclude, Smith's conception of exclusion, and Penner's definition of property as a right to exclude others from a thing grounded in an interest in use of the thing. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 740-45 (1999);
174. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 978-79 (2004);
175. PENNER, supra note 105, at 71.
176. See Claeys, supra note 175, at 23-25; cf. Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 321 (2009);
177. Larissa M. Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Theory, 58 U. TORONTO L. J. 275 (2009).
178. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868); see Claeys, supra note 178, at 15-16. Lemley approximates this understanding, supra note 19, at 325, 329-30, although he does so using unhelpful " right to exclude" terminology. The account given in the text resolves problems that Deutsch does not satisfactorily consider in supra note 52, at 325-58.
179. For a helpful enumeration, see Gregory C. Keating, Is Tort a Remedial Institution? 10-24 (USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-10), available at http://paccenter.usc.edu/assets/docs/contribute/C10-11-paper-000.pdf.
180. COLEMAN, supra note 69, at 15. As Coleman defines corrective justice, it does not necessarily require the party responsible for a loss to undo the loss in a proceeding that makes him answerable to the party suffering the loss. Others define corrective justice so that it requires an "integrated unity of doer and sufferer."
181. WEINRIB, supra note 102, at 213.
182. COLEMAN, supra note 69, at xiii. See also id. at 9-10, 36.
183. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 919 (2010).
184. See also John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L. J. 524 (2005);
185. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998).
186. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 10, at, 69.
187. See also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695 (2003).
188. For what it is worth, I agree with the protective/preventive account. As Blackstone explained: "The primary objects of the law are the establishment of rights, and the prohibition of wrongs", with the former "necessarily prior" to the latter. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 114, at 1-2. Remedial approaches put the cart before the horse by putting remedies before rights-specification and wrong-prohibition. See Keating, supra note 188, at 3. Recourse theory answers different questions, about whether the law should vindicate the plaintiff's right in the same proceeding in which it orders the defendant to annul the consequences of his wrong.
189. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 114, at 2 (The law of torts exists "to protect the weak from the insults of the stronger": "[t]he more effectually to accomplish the redress of private injuries", and to restore "infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals.").
190. Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L. J. 381, 406 (1992).
191. COLEMAN, supra note 71, at 34. Accord Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 191, at 975-76; Keating, supra note 188, at 37.
192. Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982).
193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a, at 3 (1995).
194. Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L. J. 349, 377 (1992).
195. Accord GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 10, at 228-31.
196. See, e.g., Francis Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others As a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908) (noting and criticizing the traditional distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance).
197. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.
198. A similar anti-circumvention principle explains some tort doctrines, like some applications of vicarious liability. See COLEMAN, supra note 69, at 36.
199. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (ii) (B).
200. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2009).
201. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970)
202. cert. denied, 400 U. S. 1024 (5th Cir. 1971).
203. To the extent that this Comment criticized Christopher, it did so on the ground that the case's discussion of "improper means" was so vague as to require replacement by trade secrecy statutes. See Note, supra note 42, at 381-85.
204. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43, cmt. c, ill. 3 at 494-95 (1995); see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
205. See Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N. W.2d 720, 725-26 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
206. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 10, at 229.
207. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (2) (ii) (B), (C).
208. See U. C. C. § 2-403 (2005).
209. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 10, at 229-30, 267-68.
210. Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 165, 166 (1974).
211. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1229, 1237 (8th Cir. 1994).
212. See, e.g., id. at 1238 (citing E. I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015
213. cert. denied, 400 U. S. 1024 (1971)).
214. Vickery v. Welch, 19 Pick. 523, 527 (1837).
215. See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 1994);
216. Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985).
217. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996);
218. Moore v. Ford Motor Co. 28 F.2d 529 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
219. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (4th Cir. 1971).
220. Salomon v. Hertz, 2 A. 379, 381 (NJ Ch 1886).
221. See, e.g., Sperry Rand, 447 F.2d at 1392 ("An order to return stolen property cannot be faulted.").
222. See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 1283, at 630-33 (14th ed. 1918) (justifying injunctions primarily to protect confidences).
223. Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Min. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 141 (9th Cir. 1965);
224. see Research Equip. Co. v. Galloway & Scientific Cages, 485 S. W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
225. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1949)
226. (describing and criticizing the rule declared in Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1937)).
227. Winston Research Corp., 350 F.2d at 142.
228. See COLEMAN, supra note 112, at 369-71.
229. 849 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1988).
230. 257 F. Supp. 282 (S. D. Ind. 1966).
231. DAGAN, supra note 47, at 102 (emphases removed).