Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 76, Issue 4, 2001, Pages

  Epstein, Richard A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0345881750     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (142)

1. See Peter J.W. Elstrom, Intellectual Law Is Hot Property: Firms Bolster Staff, Starting Pay, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUS., July 9, 1990, at 3.
2. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CENTURY OF AMERICAN INVENTION: A PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 6 (1999), a variable at http://www.uspto. gov/web/offices/com/annual/1999/99patents.pdf.
3. Press Release, PR Newswire, Intellectual Property Expected to Be 'Practice of the Decade' According to New Survey: Attorneys See IP Dominating Legal Landscape (June 15, 2000).
4. EDWARD F. O'CONNOR, A PRIMER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INCLUDING PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, GENERAL BUSINESS LITIGATION AND INSURANCE, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON PATENTS AND PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGY, at v-vi (1996).
5. DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1B (1992).
6. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
7. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (2001), available at http://www. uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/grb0104.pdf.
8. See id.
9. RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.7 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975).
10. See, e.g., JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 94-113 (1998).
11. See, e.g., Krystilyn Corbett, The Rise of Private Property Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum, 46 DUKE L.J. 611 (1996).
12. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 555-58 (2001).
13. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 18.
14. Id. Note that this position is wrong on point of detail, for it does not account for the undisputed fact that riparians have limited rights to remove water for various forms of personal use. For an account of the early development, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 849, at 209 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. For a discussion of the functional reasons why riparian systems adopted rules that allowed for limited appropriation, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 261-65 (1998).
15. Id. Note that this position is wrong on point of detail, for it does not account for the undisputed fact that riparians have limited rights to remove water for various forms of personal use. For an account of the early development, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 849, at 209 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. For a discussion of the functional reasons why riparian systems adopted rules that allowed for limited appropriation, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 261-65 (1998).
16. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *2.
17. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 254.
18. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *8 ("Necessity begat property....").
19. For a further critique, see EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 9-39.
20. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *2.
21. Id. at *8.
22. Id. at *2.
23. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 25-31.
24. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *8 (emphasis in original). Note that this passage comes after a more functional explanation that holds that private ownership is necessary to create the incentives to encourage cultivation. Id. at *7-8. What is so extraordinary about Blackstone is how he veers, often within a single paragraph or sentence, from an astute functional to an empty formal explanation of the same phenomenon. See, e.g., id. The agreement to which Blackstone refers leads into a discussion of the source of this right. Id. at *8-9. Grotius and Puffendorf believe that private ownership comes from tacit consent. Id. at *8. Barbeyrac, Titius, and Locke think that "the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labor, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title." Id. No explanation is, however, offered as to why we should accept either of these views.
25. For a sampling, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS (C.B. MacPhearson ed., 1978); RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951). The idea also has its modern defenders, who see it as a bulwark against tyranny. See generally RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999).
26. For a sampling, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS (C.B. MacPhearson ed., 1978); RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951). The idea also has its modern defenders, who see it as a bulwark against tyranny. See generally RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999).
27. For a sampling, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS (C.B. MacPhearson ed., 1978); RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951). The idea also has its modern defenders, who see it as a bulwark against tyranny. See generally RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999).
28. For a sampling, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS (C.B. MacPhearson ed., 1978); RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951). The idea also has its modern defenders, who see it as a bulwark against tyranny. See generally RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999).
29. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 3-63 (3d ed. 1993);
30. see also EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 25-31.
31. See, e.g., G. INST. 2.66 (S.P. Scott trans.).
32. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 25-31, 254.
33. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *7. Blackstone states: And the art of agriculture, by a regular connection and consequence, introduced and established the idea of a more permanent property in the soil than had hitherto been received and adopted. It was clear that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities without the assistance of tillage; but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art, and labor? Id. Note that the reference to "art" shows how ownership of land is one way to protect various forms of "know-how," which later receive separate protection as a form of intellectual property.
34. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 225.
35. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *8.
36. 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 207 (15th ed. 1998).
37. Sherry M. Thompson, The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of Gaming in the United States and Canada, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 521, 521 (1994).
38. R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. & ECON. 679 (2000).
39. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *1-19.
40. Id. at *18.
41. Id. at *18n.17.
42. See id. at *3.
43. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 1967, at 347, 350-53.
44. Id. at 351-52.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 351-53.
47. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-72 (1972) (declaring that a mathematical formula for binary conversion of data is not protectable); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129-32 (1948) (holding that the compatibility of certain Rhizobia bacteria is an example of a nonpatentable general law).
48. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-93 (1981) (holding that an algorithm used in rubber processing was patentable).
49. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652C.
50. See supra text accompanying note 20.
51. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834-37 (6th Cir. 1983).
52. See White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
53. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
54. See id. at 447-48.
55. Id. at 443.
56. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES (12th release 2000) (discussing the system of water rights that have developed in the United States).
57. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.2d 68, 72-74 (Ga. 1905); cf. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-45 (1918).
58. N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (McKinney 1992) (recognizing the right in cases where the name or likeness is used for "advertising purposes").
59. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 443.
60. For a nice account of the argument, see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-93 (1974).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
62. Id. § 41.
63. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476 (citing Nat'l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 70 N.E. 1127 (Ohio 1903)). If he keeps secret the fact that he has broken someone else's secret, then we have parallel trade secrets. Id. 60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 57, §41 cmt. d.
64. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1153-55 (2000). But see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1035- 46 (2000) (denying that the First Amendment insulates from liability persons who knowingly publish the trade secrets of others).
65. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1153-55 (2000). But see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1035-46 (2000) (denying that the First Amendment insulates from liability persons who knowingly publish the trade secrets of others).
66. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
67. See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995).
68. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1994).
70. Id. § 411(a).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
72. Id.; see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1966).
73. See, e.g., Brenner, 383 U.S. at 528-36.
74. Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1994).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (providing statutory conditions for specification and enablement).
76. Id. § 103. For the leading exposition of the nonobviousness test, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
77. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 25, at 3-15 (reprinting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (discussing the first-possession rule for occupation of land)).
78. Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin, MEDIA L. & POL'Y, Fall 2000, at 19.
79. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 313 (1998).
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g).
81. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). This question is the constant theme of the book.
82. For a more elaborate discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 60-65 (1979).
83. See id. at 85-90.
84. See id. at 90-94.
85. See id. at 75.
86. See Epstein, supra note 78, at 82 (quoting Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex. 1862) (Baron Bramwell)).
87. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 231-32 (1985).
88. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43-51 (5th ed. 1998).
89. See id. at 301-05; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patients and the Process of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1038-39 (1989).
90. See id. at 301-05; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patients and the Process of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1038-39 (1989).
91. See POSNER, supra note 84, at 301.
92. See id. at 306-08.
93. See id. at 43; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266, 269-70 (1977).
94. See id. at 43; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266, 269-70 (1977).
95. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *135. Blackstone wrote: So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without the consent of the owner. ... In this, and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. Id. Clearly, it is the risk of holdouts that drives Blackstone to acknowledge the use of the eminent domain power.
96. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
97. See id. at 1061.
98. See id. at 1061-62.
99. See id. at 1062.
100. See id. 95. See id. at 1065-66.
101. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 123-41 (1999).
102. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 n.2.
103. See id. at 1064-65.
104. See id. at 1066.
105. See id. at 1071.
106. See generally Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (arguing that intellectual-property-rights licensing should be voluntarily negotiated, not subject to statutory compulsory licensing).
107. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 83, at 123-27.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 45-55.
109. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). For a more detailed discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS §§ 2.14-15 (1999).
110. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 197 cmt. j.
111. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 84, at 47-48 (discussing the fair-use doctrine as it applies to copyright law).
112. See id. 108. See id. at 82-84.
113. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
114. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-156 (1994).
115. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
116. See Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 1024.
117. See id. at 1022-23.
118. See POSNER, supra note 84, at 43-47.
119. See Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 1025.
120. See POSNER, supra note 84, at 43-44.
121. See Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 1025.
122. See POSNER, supra note 84, at 304-05.
123. 36 U.S. 420 (1837). For discussion of the economics of these transactions, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 (1991); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse Economics, in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988) (discussing government-granted franchises in the context of lighthouses).
124. 36 U.S. 420 (1837). For discussion of the economics of these transactions, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 (1991); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse Economics, in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988) (discussing government-granted franchises in the context of lighthouses).
125. 36 U.S. 420 (1837). For discussion of the economics of these transactions, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 (1991); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse Economics, in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988) (discussing government-granted franchises in the context of lighthouses).
126. Charles River Bridge Co., 36 U.S. at 430.
127. Id. 122. Id. at 549.
128. Id. at 646-47 (Story, J., dissenting).
129. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 119, at 113-14.
130. See id. at 111.
131. See id. at 111.
132. See Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 1025-26.
133. See id. at 1038-46.
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
135. See id. §§ 154-56.
136. See Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 1023.
137. See POSNER, supra note 84, at 43-47.
138. See, e.g., Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (requiring due diligence in completing an invention).
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. V 1999).
140. See POSNER, supra note 84, at 45-46.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 49-50.