Jefferson meets coase: Land-use torts, law and economics, and natural property rights

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 85, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1379-1446

  Claeys, Eric R ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 77956365058     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (465)

1. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 53, 57 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
2. Ward Farnsworth & Mark F. Grady, Torts, at xlvii (2d ed. 2009).
3. Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 Va. L. Rev. 287, 357 (2007).
4. Id. at 356-57.
5. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 Geo. L.J. 513, 518 (2003).
6. See id. at 564.
7. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 Val. U. L. Rev. 1221 (2008) (discussing frequent observations about tort law, including its inability to be defined).
8. See infra notes 46-48, 292-98.
9. See Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852, 852-53 (U.K.).
10. See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 341 (1914).
11. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 29-34 (1960).
12. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 751, 759 (1996).
13. Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. Legal Stud. 15, 30, 33 (1988).
14. See, e.g., Robert Eluckson, Order without Law 40 (1991) (calling catde trespass "the subject of Coase's Parable of the Farmer and the Rancher"); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law §§ 3.6, 3.8, at 50-52, 61-63 (7th ed. 2007) (illustrating economic analysis of incompatible use disputes with sparks and smoke nuisance cases);
15. Robert D. Cooter, Coase Theorem, in 1 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 457, 458 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (using train-sparks cases, "which Coase made famous," as the sole example for illustrating the Coase Theorem).
16. Although Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson's personal views on morality were not necessarily representative of American common political morality in all respects. Nevertheless, as drafter of the Declaration, Jefferson intended "[n]ot to find out new principles .. . but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject" and to present "an expression of the American mind." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8,1825), reprinted in 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 342, 343 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899). In this Article, "Jefferson" and "Jeffersonian" refer to that common sense.
17. See infra Parts III-IV.
18. See Coleman, supra note 1, at 53-56.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 3 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
23. Farnsworth & Grady, supra note 2, at xlvii.
24. Coase, supra note 11, at 15.
25. R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Lam, in The Firm, the Market, and the Law 1, 12 (1988).
26. See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 77 (2004) (defining "externality" in the context of a land-use conflict to refer to any action that "influences, or may influence with a probability, the well-being of another person, in comparison to some standard of reference");
27. Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 329, 343 (1995) ("It is more than thirty years since Ronald Coase pointed out the absence of a coherent distinction between courts abating a nuisance on behalf of a neighbor's use and providing an unpaid benefit to that neighbor.").
28. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 11, at 13 ("The judges' contention, [in a case between a man using a fireplace and a man walling off smoke from the chimney over the fireplace,] that it was the man lighting the fires who alone caused the smoke nuisance is true only if we assume that the wall is the given factor.").
29. Coase, supra note 24, at 14 (quoting George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 113 (3d ed. 1966)).
30. A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 14 (3d ed. 2003).
31. Coase, supra note 11, at 15.
32. The phrase "productive efficiency" comes from Cooter & Ulen, supra note 21, at 12;
33. see also Pounsky, supra note 28, at 15 ("[T]he preferred legal rule is the rule that minimizes the effects of transaction costs."); Shavell, supra note 25, at 80-83 (assuming that "the social goal is to maximize the sum of parties' utilities");
34. Coase, supra note 11, at 16 ("One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater value of production than any other.").
35. See Coase, supra note 11, at 1, 28 & n.35 (citing A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 183 (4th ed. 1932)).
36. Coase, supra note 24, at 10.
37. Coase, supra note 11, at 16.
38. See id. at 19-20 & n.16 (citing William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 398-99 (2d ed. 1955) for the proposition that American nuisance law considers among other factors pollution's "utility and the harm which results").
39. See id. at 37.
40. See R.H. Coase, Notes on the Problems of Social Cost, in The Firm, The Market, and the Law, supra note 24, at 157, 174 ("The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave.");
41. accord Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coasean-ism," 99 Yale L.J. 611 (1989).
42. See, e.g., Cooter & Ulen, supra note 21, at 82-98;
43. Posner, supra note 14, at 53 ("[E]fficiency is promoted by assigning the legal right to the party who would buy it ... if it were assigned initially to the other party."); Shavell, supra note 25, at 83-109 (comparing how polluter liability, bargaining, and legally mandated results each might maximize the parties'joint net utility);
44. see also Roy E. Cordato, Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open Ended Universe 95 (1992) ("[M]ore complicated analyses in the law and economics literature are still all, in one form or another, applications of Coase's efficiency criteria.").
45. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (2d ed. 1977).
46. See, e.g., Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Claude Mgnard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005).
47. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 3, at 359.
48. See generally The New Chicago School: Myth or Reality!, 5 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1 (1998).
49. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Torts §§ 1.10, 8.2, 14.1-10, at 22-28, 189-91, 355-78 (1999);
50. Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong with Euclid, 5 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 277 (1996);
51. Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: TheRole of Self-Help in Cyberspace, 1 J. L. Econ. & Pol'y 147, 152-59 (2005).
52. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. Rev. 965 (2004).
53. See supra note 37.
54. See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 13, at 67, 70-71 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser and Keeton].
55. See Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan. 1954);
56. Giddings v. Rogalewski, 158 N.W. 951, 953 (Mich. 1916);
57. Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 371, 371 (1835);
58. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 44, § 13, at 75.
59. Coase, supra note 11, at 1-8.
60. See id. at 2 ("[T]he operation of a pricing system is without cost.").
61. See Ellickson, supra note 14, at 186-87;
62. Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law, 16 J. Leg. Stud. 149, 153-60 (1987).
63. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 Yale L.J. 1400, 1438 (2007).
64. Id. at 1437.
65. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). Prominent property casebooks give Jacque significant treatment.
66. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 87-88 (6th ed. 2006);
67. Joseph William Sincer, Property Law 116 (4th ed. 2006).
68. See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 157.
69. Id. Steenberg Homes' assistant manager instructed employees: "I don't give a-what [Mr. Jacque] said, just get the home in there any way you can."
70. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. On this last possibility, see Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualiz-ing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1823, 1845-49 (2009).
72. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 165-66.
73. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
74. See Fennell, supra note 49, at 1431 & n.91 (citing Jacque to illustrate features of remedy law, without explaining its implications for underlying trespass liability).
75. (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852 (U.K.).
76. See Coase, supra note 11, at 15-19.
77. See, e.g., William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15 J.L. & ECON. 1, 106-13 (1973).
78. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 50-51 (1987) (providing an example of a rejection of the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine and one upholding it);
79. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 639 (2001);
80. Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nuisance," 9 LEGAL STUD. 557, 558-61 (1980).
81. See, e.g., Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 337 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1983).
82. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Vill. of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1975).
83. See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
84. See Coase, supra note 11, at 7-8 & n.6
85. citing Fontainebleu Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1959)
86. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 678-80, 684-85 (2008) (defining the interference in nuisance in reference to physical invasions, without considering that economic-externality analysis applies equally to noninvasive negative externalities);
87. see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 21, at 40-41 (defining and exploring the concept of externalities);
88. Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1310 (1977) (illustrating a general approach to economic nuisance analysis with a fact pattern involving light glares between a race track and a drive-in movie theater).
89. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 728 (1973).
90. Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 703 (Ct. App. 1986);
91. see also Wernke v. Halas, 600 N.E.2d 117, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("It may be the ugliest bird house in Indiana, or it may merely be a toilet seat on a post. The distinction is irrelevant, however; [the defendant's] tasteless decoration is merely an aesthetic annoyance . . . .").
92. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 66, at 681 ("[S]trict liability is desirable only when the external costs of the actor's activity substantially exceed the external benefits associated with the actor's activity." (emphasis omitted)).
93. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 14,§3.8 at 63 ("The standard of reasonableness [in private nuisance] involves comparing the cost to the polluter of abating the pollution with the lower of the cost to the victim of either tolerating the pollution or eliminating it himself.");
94. Rabin, supra note 66, at 1316-31
95. See, e.g., Hans-Bemd Scḧfer & Andreas SchSnenberger, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 597, 607 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000);
96. John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973);
97. see also POUNSKY, supra note 28, at 107-12 (applying this framework to pollution cases).
98. See, e.g., Burns Philip Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Cont'l Freight, Inc., 135 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1998);
99. Brown v. Dellinger, 355 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962);
100. Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485, 488 (D.C. 1960);
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§158(a) (1977) (defining intent in trespass to cover intent to enter land in the possession of the plaintiff);
102. JOHN C. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW 776-77 (2008).
103. See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(b).
105. See id.§822 cmt. b.
106. E.g., Pestey v. Cushman, 788 A.2d 496, 508 (Conn. 2002). To be fair, when economists suggest that nuisance incorporates balancing, they are describing in large part the way in which courts determine whether to enter an injunction abating the nuisance.
107. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 66, at 686-87 discussing Boomer v. Atl.
108. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). Nuisance does balance interests more than trespass at the remedy stage-but not at the liability stage.
109. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1985);
110. Grady, supra note 13, at 33-41.
111. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in Tort Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 35 & n.20 (1989).
112. Rose-Ackerman attributes this view to Horace Wood's Law of Nuisance. " 'A party is not bound to expend a dollar or do any act to secure for himself the exercise or enjoyment of a legal right of which he is deprived by reason of the wrongful act of another.'" Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 25 (quoting HORACE WOOD, LAW OF NUISANCE ? 435 (3d ed. 1893)).
113. LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 349 (1914).
114. 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974).
115. Id. at 260-61.
116. Id. at 257.
117. Id. at 260.
118. See Gibson v. Beaver, 226 A.2d 273, 276 (Md. 1967).
119. Grady, supra note 13, at 30-33.
120. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS pt. III, ch. 2, at 167-69 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1726).
121. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 70 (1992).
122. Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective fustice, 67 IND. LJ. 381, 382 (1992).
123. See Steven Walt, Eliminating Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2006).
124. Jules L. Coleman, Some Reflections on Richard Brooks's "Efficient Performance" Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 416, 421 (2007);
125. see id. at 421-22.
126. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 374-75 (1992) [hereinafter COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS];
127. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 13-63 (2001);
128. ERNEST P. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 22-83 (1995).
129. Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck, 2 J. ETHICS & Soc. PHIL. 1, 11 (2006);
130. see also Goldberg, supra note 7, at 1256 ("[T]he remedial tail is wagging the substantive dog.").
131. Here and elsewhere, I use "interest" as it is used when referring to an "interest- based theory of rights." Specifically, I use the term to refer to a moral justification for an owner's having practical discretion in relation to a sphere of his life and using it to make choices for his own flourishing in that sphere. So understood, an "interest" confers on the bearer: a stake in having the discretion as an ingredient of his well-being; a psychological motivation and a moral responsibility to use the discretion for his own well-being; a moral right to be free from and power to repel interferences with his discretion; and a responsibility and duty not to exercise the discretion in situations when the underlying justification ceases to apply. By the same token, the interest's justification imposes correlative duties and liabilities on others and its limits confer rights on them.
132. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 33-35 (1984). I assume context will adequately warn readers when I use "interest" in other senses.
133. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 69 (referring to utilitarian "interest balancing").
134. See Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1168 & n.56 (2006).
135. Legal philosophers debate where to situate the field of practical moral reasoning that declares and specifies the normative interests whose invasions tort rectifies. One view holds that this field belongs to corrective justice.
136. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 91, at 70-73. On another view, this field belongs to distributive justice.
137. Seejohn Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective fustice (Univ. of Oxford, Legal Research Paper No. 1/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538 342.
138. I suspect but cannot prove here that the field sounds in a category of justice separate from and lexically prior to the fields of distributive and corrective justice. The precise categorization of this field of practical morality is too tangential to this Article to be settled here. Readers only need to agree that the core remedial functions corrective justice assigns to tort cannot explain or justify the differences between different property interests; they may assign the norm-declaring functions of tort into whichever field of justice they deem most appropriate.
139. Keating, supra note 92, at 11;
140. cf. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective fustice, 91 GEO. LJ. 695, 733-38 (2003) (suggesting that private rights of action are prior in tort to corrective duties of repair).
141. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 91, at 338.
142. Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice & Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 124, 133 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994).
143. See supra note 87.
144. For critiques of Lockean property theory, see, for example, G.A. COHEN, SELF- OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 175-94 (1995) (arguing that self-ownership cannot deliver the freedom it claims political society should secure);
145. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254-91 (1990) (criticizing labor theory enough to reduce it to being only one of several components of a pluralist justification for property);
146. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 137-252 (1988) (concluding that labor- desert theory can provide a specific but not a general right to property).
147. Richard Craswell, In that Case, What Is the Question?Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 906 (2003);
148. see also id. at 906 (describing this type of argument as "necessarily contingent").
149. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 520.
150. See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 49, 50-53 (1979).
151. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 36, at 190-91 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., Legal Classics Library 1994) (1698) [hereinafter LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE].
152. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (CCD. Pa. 1795).
153. Id. at 310.
154. LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 40, at 195.
155. Id. Shortly after, Locke ups the fraction again, to 999/1000.
156. See id. § 43, at 197.
157. JAMES WILSON, Of Man as a Member of Society, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 283, 307 (Bird Wilson ed., Bronson & Chauncey 1804);
158. see LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 48, at 200-01;
159. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45, 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
160. See Genesis 1:1,1:26-28, 2:7-9, 3:16-22;
161. MICHAEL NOVAK, ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 35 (2002).
162. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. 3, at 96-97 (Christopher Rowe trans., 2002).
163. JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 645 (Peter H. Nid-ditch ed., 1975) (1700) (emphases and upper-case lettering removed).
164. Id. at 550;
165. see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 at 192,196 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (stressing a "necessity of moderating . . . our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity" in political science, because there "obscurity arises as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated").
166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 109, at 46.
167. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328,1330-31 (1994) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)).
168. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 265 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., O. Halsted 1987) (1827).
169. I thank Nestor Davidson for encouraging me to consider this objection.
170. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 14 (6th ed. 2006) (introducing labor-desert theory and suggesting several respects in which it is deficient).
171. A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 275 (1992).
172. LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 27, at 185, quoted in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 118, at 14.
173. LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 27, at 185;
174. see also JOHN LOCKE, The First Treatise of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 104, § 86 [hereinafter LOCKE'S FIRST TREATISE] (arguing that God "directed [man] by his senses and reason ... to the use of those things, which were serviceable for his subsistence, and given him as means of his preservation" and gave man a "right... to make use of those things that were necessary or useful to his being" (emphasis omitted));
175. LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104 § 46, at 198 ("The measure of property, nature has well set, by the extent of mens labour, and the conveniency of life
176. id. at 198 ("Man ... had still in himself. . . that which made up the great part of what he applyed to the Support or Comfort of his being ....").
177. SIMMONS, supra note 119, at 273;
178. see also PETER C. MYERS, OUR ONLY STAR AND COMPASS 129 (1999) (defining labor, "broadly conceived," as "the essential means whereby we take responsibility for our lives");
179. Adam Mossoff, Locke's Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 160 (2002) ("[T]he phrase 'mixing labor' is a . . . metaphor for productive activities.");
180. A. John Simmons, Makers' Rights 1 (Feb. 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1344432 (evaluating interpretations of Locke's theory "that labor is the original source of exclusive property rights").
181. See LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 6, at 168-69.
182. See id. § 4, at 167.
183. See id. §§ 124, 134, at 261-62, 267. But see infra note 245.
184. JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1996) (defining property rights in terms of a "right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things" (emphasis omitted));
185. see also J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 13, 141-42 (1996) (defining property as including interests protected by trespassory protections).
186. See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 278 (2008) (arguing that the exclusion-based approach fails to capture an owner's agenda setting goal);
187. Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 377 (2003) (describing the "right to exclude" theory as "essential but insufficient").
188. See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617 (2009) (book review).
189. Penner uses a variation on the phrase in the text ("the interest in exclusively determining the use of things") to describe the normative interest underlying property.
190. See PENNER, supra note 126, at 49. Law and social norms, he argues, then cash this right out into a right to exclude non-owners from things. See id. at 71. For reasons too complicated to develop here, I suspect Penner is creating a distinction between normative interest and social/legal rights that does not exist in practice.
191. See Claeys, supra note 128, at 631 n.67.
192. 19 THE AMERICAN AND ENGUSH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 284 (John Houston Merrill ed., 1892).
193. Accord LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 26, at 185 ("[N]o body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind ....").
194. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
195. See, e.g., WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY 624 (Frank D. Moore ed., 3d ed. 1940) (defining jus utendi?as "[t]he right to use property without destroying its substance").
196. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at *14;
197. JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES WATER LAW 35-43 (2009).
198. See SHUMAKER & LONGSDORF, supra note 133, at 618 (defining jus abutendi as "the right to abuse property, or having full dominion over property").
199. SIMMONS, supra note 119, at 275.
200. Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (1703) (opinion of Holt, C.J.).
201. Here and throughout, I abstract from qualifications imposed by private moral-nuisance law, public-nuisance law, the law of private servitudes, and other issues not directly implicated by a simple property-on-property dispute, sounding in private trespass, between two generally legitimate and productive uses of land.
202. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-38 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 2000) (1919).
203. See id. at 38.
204. See id. at 73-74.
205. See id. at 38-39.
206. See id. at 39. Although Hohfeld assumed that there is "no single term available to express the . . . conception" of the absence of a claim right, id., I assume that "exposure" is adequate as such a term.
207. See, e.g., Antonio Nicita et al., Towards an Incomplete Theory of Property Rights 16 (May 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 067466.
208. BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at *209.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Giddings v. Rogalewski, 158 N.W. 951, 953 (Mich. 1916);
212. see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 64 (Rothman & Co. 1993) (1880) (justifying trespass's rights-based structure because a "pecuniary injury requirement" would allow "the rights invaded no protection" for "many of the most vexatious" trespasses).
213. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997).
214. Id. at 159.
215. Id. at.
216. (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Lamoreux, 89 N.W. 880, 886 (Wis. 1902)).
217. 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (1814).
218. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 159 (quoting Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (1814) (opinion of Gibbs, C.J.)).
219. Id.
220. See Claeys, supra note 128, at 640-41;
221. Katz, supra note 127, at 302-03.
222. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 159.
223. See id. at 160-61.
224. Cf. LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, §§ 7-8, 87-88, at 169-70, 239-40 (justifying civil society on the ground that a commonwealth executes the laws of nature more effectively than individuals can in the state of nature).
225. The Jacque court could have cited respectable "social norm" scholarship as partial corroboration for such a view.
226. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 14, at 40-81 (documenting how rural neighbors voluntarily resolve cattle-trespass disputes to protect the victims of trespasses, regardless of whether legal entidements are assigned to the trespass victims or the ranchers).
227. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 44, § 86, at 616.
228. See Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 220-21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (suggesting that nuisance and not trespass is the proper doctrinal harbor for indirect, intangible invasions);
229. SINGER, supra note 51, at 271.
230. 63 N.Y. 568 (1876).
231. Id. at 584.
232. Kellogg v. Vill. of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Wis. 1975).
233. Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Mich. 1948).
234. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 165 (1973) (quoting Coase, supra note 11, at 2). Note that Epstein has receded from this position and now holds that language cannot provide a focused account of legal rights without a thorough utilitarian justification for the substance of such rights.
235. See Richard A. Epstein, Causation-In Context: An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 657-58, 664-66 (1987).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1977).
237. See generally, e.g., Tenn v. 889 Assocs., Ltd., 500 A.2d 366 (N.H. 1985);
238. Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982).
239. Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 704 (Ct. App. 1986).
240. Green v. Casde Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973).
241. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
242. Mohr v. Midas Realty Corp., 431 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Iowa 1988)
243. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (1876).
244. Vogel, supra note 48, at 152.
245. Kan. Pac. Ry. v. Brady, 17 Kan. 380, 386 (1877) (emphasis added).
246. LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 348 (1914) (emphasis added).
247. For a more recent case, see Zimmer v. Stephenson, 403 P.2d 343, 346 (Wash. 1965).
248. This explanation differs from George Fletcher's in that the present analysis requires reciprocity in risks to rights.
249. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540-41 (1972)
250. Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485, 488 (D.C. 1960).
251. Pennoyer v. Allen, 14 N.W. 609, 613 (Wis. 1883) (emphasis added).
252. See, e.g., Fletcherv. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 741-42 (Ex. 1865), affd, 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (1866).
253. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-27 (1973);
254. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 85-108 (1977). I am grateful to Peter Wiedenbeck and Richard Epstein for encouraging me to consider the objection discussed in this paragraph.
255. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873) ("By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender by every other man of the same rights, and the security, advantage and protection which the laws give me. So, too, the general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed use and possession of my real estate, and that I must so use my real estate as not to injure my neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of the social state.").
256. See WEINRIB, supra note 91, at 178-83 (approving of the rule of negligence applied in Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Comm. PI. 1837)).
257. Id. at 179.
258. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 91, at 361.
259. WEINRIB, supra note 91, at 190 (emphasis added).
260. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 91, at 233. On this basis Ripstein correctly explains why Rylands v. Fletcher is a case about fault even though it imposes a legal regime of strict liability.
261. See Arthur Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, 1 J. TORT LAW, 1, 26-29 (2007). Ripstein, however, does not distinguish enough between fault in doctrine, fault as conceived in corrective justice, and fault as prescribed by the prevailing common political morality explaining the content of rights and duties.
262. 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (1866).
263. See Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 741-42 (Ex. 1865)
264. affd, 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (1866);
265. Jed H. Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE LJ. 333, 342-46, 362-68 (2000);
266. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Disasters, Elected Judges, and American Tort Law 10-14 (Harv. Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 25, 2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1027&context=harvard-faculty.
267. See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 340 (1914);
268. Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. 182, 187 (1876).
269. See, e.g., St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute R.R. Co. v. Funk, 85 111. 460, 461 (1877);
270. Ruffner v. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton R.R., 34 Ohio St. 96, 97 (1877);
271. Burlington & Mo. R.R. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268, 272 (1876).
272. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 123-25 & nn.37-39 (2001) (citing nineteenth-century Michigan and Massachusetts legislative acts establishing strict liability).
273. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1, 26 (1897);
274. see ELY, supra note 191, at 124.
275. Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. 1974).
276. LeRoy Fibre Co., 232 U.S. at 349.
277. Id. at 354 (Holmes, J., concurring).
278. Id. at 350 (majority opinion).
279. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at *134 (explaining how natural principles of property justify specific "modifications" in local positive law for "translating it from man to man").
280. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
281. See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that trespass requires physical invasion); Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 388 (Mass. 1930) (same).
282. J.E. Penner suggests that substantial pollution nuisances are tantamount to dispossessions.
283. See J.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Character of the Neighbourhood, 5 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 21-22 (1993). American natural-rights morality conceives of the harm slighdy differendy. American natural-rights morality emphasizes, as Penner does not, prop erty in "use." The former therefore conceives of the injury as a taking of use, distinct from a dispossession of control but still severe enough to parallel such a dispossession.
284. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827, 828 (1977).
285. The relative hardships are appropriately relevant after courts establish liability and proceed to consider whether to enjoin a nuisance. See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 206 & nn.93-97 (1990); supra note 76.
286. 788 A.2d 496 (Conn. 2002).
287. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
288. See, e.g., id. (describing unreasonableness in terms of whether "the interference is beyond that which the plaintiff should bear, under all of the circumstances of the particular case, without being compensated").
289. Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1382 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982).
290. Compare, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 753-73 (2009) (promoting fine-grained virtue-based approaches to property law)
291. and Eduardo Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 860-86 (2009) (same), with Claeys, supra note 238, at 916-22 (challenging such approaches and preferring private ordering instead)
292. and Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 963-80 (2009) (same).
293. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 5, at 519.
294. See FA. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520 (1945).
295. Id.
296. See., e.g, C. EDWARD MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 307 (1924) (describing an emerging consensus in which "the individualistic ideas of the 'natural right' school of political theory, indorsed in the Revolution, are discredited and repudiated");
297. accord FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION (1914);
298. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 201 (1887), reprinted in WOODROW WILSON: THE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL WRITINGS 231 (Ronald J. Pestritto ed., 2005) [hereinafter WOODROW WILSON].
299. See, e.g., GOODNOW, supra note 255, at 17-19, 88-91;
300. WOODROW WILSON, supra note 255, at 240-45.
301. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 486-88 (1989).
302. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 61, at 4 & nn.9-11 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94-96 (1881));
303. James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908);
304. Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915)).
305. For one contemporaneous attempt by a Realist to explain the core tenets of Realism
306. see Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
307. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
308. 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 107 (1914);
309. see also Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 21 (1927) ("[B]ecause law has become more interested in defending property against attacks by socialists, the doctrine of natural rights has remained in the negative state and has never developed into a doctrine of the positive contents of rights.").
310. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1977) (contrasting "lay" and "scientific" understandings and suggesting it would be better "to purge the legal language of all attempts to identify any particular person as 'the' owner of a piece of property").
311. See, e.g., Walton H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 528 (1937) (defining property as "a euphonious collocation of letters which serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the commonwealth").
312. JOHN LEWS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 55, at 43 (1888) ("The dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights."). On the earliest reference to the bundle metaphor
313. see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 455 n.40 (1997).
314. See HOHFELD, supra note 139, at 65, 74-82.
315. Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 214 (1922).
316. LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 353-54 (1914) (Holmes, J., concurring).
317. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OFTORTS§§ 826-28 (1934);
318. see also Lewin, supra note 202, at 210-12 (explaining the reasons for and implications of the Restatement determining reasonableness by focusing on "utilitarian criteria aimed at promoting the public good").
319. Coase, supra note 11, at 44.
320. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 21, at 74.
321. See also Penner, supra note 200, at 17 (concluding, after canvassing
322. Bounded, of course, by correlative in rem duties not to make unjustified boundary invasions on neighbors' property.
323. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, Ill YALE LJ. 357, 363-65 (2001) (tracing the genesis of bundle of rights theory);
324. id. at 366-75 (documenting how Coase assumed bundle of rights theory as his working conception of property);
325. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996);
326. Emily Sherwin, Two-and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1078-80 (1996).
327. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at 394 (describing land rights as a "right to exclude a range of intrusions");
328. id. at 395-96 (describing trespass and some aspects of nuisance law as taking an "exclusionary" approach).
329. See Cohen, supra note 261, at 12 ("The law does not guarantee me the physical or social ability of actually using what it calls mine .... But the law of property helps me directly only to exclude others from using the things which it assigns to me.");
330. see also Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370 (1954) (concluding that "ownership is a particular kind of legal relation in which the owner has a right to exclude the non-owner from something or other").
331. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at 362-64 & nn.13, 14, 19, 20, 27, 28 (treating the substantive theories of property as understood by Blackstone and Adam Smith as functionally interchangeable with the right to exclude view adopted by Realists Ely, Morris Cohen, and Felix Cohen).
332. For more comprehensive diagnoses of the limitations of right to exclude theory, see Claeys, supra note 128, at 631-49;
333. Mossoff, supra note 127, at 375-76, 408 & n.150.
334. See supra Part III.B.2, F.3.
335. See supra Part III.F.2.
336. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at 391-94 (criticizing law and economics' "causal agnosticism").
337. Among many other complications, some of the issues discussed below bleed into remedy questions that exceed the scope of this Article.
338. The foundational treatment remains Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07 (1972);
339. for different applications of Calabresi's and Melamed's foundations, see Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YAI.F. LJ. 2091 (1997);
340. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980).
341. See, e.g., CORDATO, supra note 37, at 4 (stating that first, "market activity should be analyzed as a dynamic, disequilibrium process," second, "the concepts of value and utility are strictly subjective and therefore unobservable and unmeasurable (radical subjectivism)," and third, "knowledge of market phenomena ... is always imperfect"). In theory, Cordato's second proposition makes personal value more subjective than most sources in the American natural-rights tradition would probably allow. In practice, the two approaches are quite close. American natural-rights morality presumes that individual uses and needs vary too much to allow for party-specific regulation, and reverses that presumption only when land uses strongly suggest otherwise as explained supra Part III.F.
342. See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 642 (1980) (suggesting that standard law and economic claims for common law efficiency make "information requirements . . . well beyond the capacity of the courts or anyone else").
343. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 78, at 31-33 & tbl.l;
344. see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 61, at 38 & tbl.2.2 (assuming railroad profits and fanner damages in a sparks case depending on whether the farmer leaves a firebreak).
345. See POUNSKY, supra note 28, at 18;
346. Steven Shavell, Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J.L. & ECON. 589, 592-98 (1983).
347. See supra note 71.
348. Compare LANDES & POSNER, supra note 61, at 90 (suggesting, on the facts of a sparks case, that the farmer should not be forced to take precautions except when the railroad's sparks are "very conspicuous"), with Grady, supra note 13, at 19-25 & tbl.l (suggesting that sparks cases be sorted by the extent to which different parties fall into each of six different precaution traps).
349. See James M. Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 255, 260-61.
350. See Cozse, supra note ll, at31-33;
351. see also POUNSKY, supra note 28, at 17 & tbl.l (presenting hypothetical data about party profits and damages in a pollution-nuisance case).
352. See Hayek, supra note 253, at 521-22 (suggesting that economic methodology undervalues "the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place").
353. E.C. Pasour, Jr., Monopoly Theory and Practice-Some Subjectivist Implications: Comment on O'Driscoll, in METHOD, PROCESS, AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 215, 218 (Israel M. Kirzner ed., 1982).
354. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 11, at 18, 30.
355. See id. at 41.
356. See, e.g., CORDATO, supra note 37, at 6-7, 58, 97;
357. 2 FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION & LIBERTY 113 (1976);
358. D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealthls Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 269 (1986).
359. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 281, at 2093.
360. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1982).
361. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 28, at 21-23.
362. Ellickson, supra note 36, at 614-16.
363. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 281, at 1115-19;
364. Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991).
365. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at 394-97.
366. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 21, at 86.
367. See, e.g., id. at 1382;
368. Jewett v. Deerhom Enters., Inc., 575 P.2d 164,166-68 (Or. 1978);
369. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827(d), 828(b) (1977).
370. Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448, 452-53 (1871).
371. Id. at 454.
372. Although space prevents a full explanation, similar principles also explain why nuisance law protects owners only against what the land user of ordinary sensibilities deems pollution-not what the eggshell plaintiff deems pollution.
373. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 44, § 88, at 628.
374. Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (1862) (opinion of Bramwell, J.) (emphasis added). Similar principles explain why land-use negligence suits follow the harm-based and not the trespass-based approach.
375. See Claeys, supra note 128, at 644.
376. See, e.g., Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218, 221-22 (W. Va. 1982)
377. see also 2 C.J.S. Adjoining Landowners § 9 (West 2009) (discussing obligations of adjoining landowners to provide lateral support).
378. Winn v. Abeles, 10 P. 443, 447 (Kan. 1886).
379. See Hullinger v. Prahl, 233 N.W.2d 584, 585 (S.D. 1975);
380. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners § 111 (2005).
381. Whidock v. Uhle, 53 A. 891, 892 (Conn. 1903) (emphasis added).
382. Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 838, 842 (Mich. 1888) (emphasis added);
383. see also Sundowner v. King, 509 P.2d 785, 786 (Idaho 1973) (describing Burke as representing "clearly the prevailing modern view").
384. Sanders v. State Highway Comm'n, 508 P.2d 981, 987 (Kan. 1973)
385. (quoting 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 415, at 640 (1961));
386. id. at 990;
387. see also Walker v. Stros-nider, 67 S.E. 1087, 1091 (W.Va. 1910) (identifying property rights in restraints on adjacent landowner conduct).
388. See Walker, 67 S.E. at 1090-91.
389. See, e.g., Griffin v. Martin, 7 Barb. 297 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1849);
390. Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass. 33 (1819);
391. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 21 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005);
392. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 44, §76, at 539 & nn.8-13.
393. See, e.g., Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81, 85 (1894);
394. Monroe v. Cannon, 61 P. 863, 864-65 (Mont 1900).
395. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997).
396. See, e.g., Garcia v. Sumrall, 121 P.2d 640, 644 (Ariz. 1942);
397. Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, 15 P.3d 1205, 1213 (Mont. 2000);
398. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 21 cmt. c.
399. See, e.g., Griffin, 7 Barb, at 304 ("In agricultural districts, and especially in new countries, the public benefit resulting from permitting cattle, horses and sheep to run at large, in highways, probably overbalances the increased expense of acquiring a title to the road.");
400. see also Myers v. Dodd, 9 Ind. 290, 291 (1857) (justifying a fence-out regulation "as a kind of police regulation in respect to catde, founded on their well known propensity to rove").
401. But see Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165, 171 (1859) (declaring a similar law to inflict a regulatory taking and distinguishing Griffin on the ground that the right-of-way condemnation at issue in Griffin clearly dedicated grazing rights to the public).
402. Smith v. Bivens, 56 F. 352, 356 (C.C.D.S.C. 1893)
403. (quoting Fort v. Goodwin, 15 S.E. 723, 726 (S.C. 1892)) (declaring a new state fencing-out statute unconstitutional as a regulatory taking).
404. In Smith, the fence-out law was especially objectionable because it seems to have been passed largely at the prompting of a small number of cattle ranchers who wanted continued cheap access to one owner's pasturage.
405. See id. at 353.
406. Nevertheless, the court's reasoning does not rely on the special-interest politics. The court begins by protecting the pasture owner's "complete possession and use of his own land,"
407. id., and then examines whether the law secures him a reciprocity of advantage
408. see id. at 356-57.
409. See id. at 356.
410. 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930);
411. see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 194 (1934) (stating that an entry over a person's land by another in an aircraft is privileged if it is for a legitimate purpose and done in a reasonable manner). Smith uses state and federal altitude regulations to abrogate owners' claims in trespass, and then uses substantive due process "reciprocity of advantage" principles to determine whether and at what altitudes those regulations regulate or take property rights.
412. Smith, 170 N.E. at 388.
413. Id. at 389.
414. Id. at 393.
415. Coase, supra note 11, at 26-28. While Coase cites and treats other over flight cases, Smith justifies the case law's preferences in closest alignment with American natural-rights morality.
416. See, e.g., Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (1862) (opinion of Bram-well, J.) ("[W]henever a thing is for the public benefit, properly understood, . . . the loss to the individuals of the public who lose will bear compensation out of the gains of those who gain. It is for the public benefit there should be railways, but it would not be unless the gain of having the railway was sufficient to compensate the loss occasioned by the use of the land required for its site ....").
417. See Robert Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1985) (contrasting "absolute" and "social and relational" rights).
418. Compare Eaton v. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 512 (1872) ("Then, he had an unlimited right; now, he has only a limited right. His absolute ownership has been reduced to a qualified ownership.")
419. with Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., 54 N.H. 545, 551 (1874) ("Property in land must be considered, for many purposes, not as an absolute, unrestricted dominion, but as an aggregation of qualified privileges ....").
420. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at * 119-24;
421. 2 KENT, supra note 116, at 1 (defining "absolute" as "being such as belong to individuals in a single unconnected state" and "relative" as "being those which arise from the civil and domestic relations");
422. id. at 10-12, 33 (providing examples).
423. I am grateful to Larry May and Dennis Tuchler for encouraging me to consider the objection in this section, and to Michael Shapiro and Dennis Klimchuk for help in fashioning my response.
424. Epstein, supra note 103, at 75.
425. See id. at 57-58, 90-91.
426. Eric R. Claeys, Virtue Ethics and Rights Politics in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 897-901 (2009).
427. The coverage in that article, however, did not consider enough how "deontology" is used in John Rawls's political philosophy, as is considered here infra text accompanying notes 242-244.
428. See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52-81 (2002).
429. Barbara Herman identifies at least six different prominent definitions of "deontology" in different scholarly quarters.
430. See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 209-10 & nn. 1, 5 (1993). Her list is not exhaustive; it does not cover all the definitions I discuss here in the text.
431. Larry Alexander, Is Morality Like the Tax Code*, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1839, 1845 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
432. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1974).
433. Samuel Freeman, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 313, 323 (1994);
434. see also RAWLS, supra note 242, at 30-32 (equating "the good" with the good as understood in conventional act utilitarianism).
435. See, e.g., 1 WILSON, supra note 109, at 302 (describing "[t]he wisest and most benign constitution of a rational and moral system" as one in which "the degree of private affection, most useful to the individual, is, at the same time, consistent with the greatest interest of the system" and vice versa). This characteristic is sometimes called "compossibility. "
436. See Fred D. Miller, Jr., Virtue and Rights in Aristotle's Best Regime, in VALUES AND VIRTUES 67, 88 (Timothy Chappell ed., 2006).
437. There are limits to the statement in the text. For example, for practical purposes, Locke conceives of the common good as the aggregation of the individual interests of all citizens, but stricdy speaking the interests of individuals are part of the common good only "as far as will consist with the publick good." LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE, supra note 104, § 134, at 267-68.
438. For example, the sovereign acts in accord with the common good if it tears down the house of an innocent owner to stop an oncoming fire.
439. See id. § 159, at 291-92. So if Rawls's deontology/teleology distinction states a dichotomy, Locke is a teleologist; if it states a continuum, Locke inclines far closer to the deontological end than the teleological end.
440. See, e.g., ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 1 (1999);
441. Lawrence C. Becker, The Neglect of Virtue, 85 ETHICS 110, 110-11 & n.l (1975).
442. See, e.g., 1 WILSON, supra note 109, at 114-25.
443. See, e.g., 2 KENT, supra note 116, at 256;
444. see also Claeys, supra note 238, at 910-16, 928-33 (reviewing the merits of virtue-based theories).
445. RAWLS, supra note 242, at 30;
446. see also Freeman, supra note 243, at 348 ("No significant position has ever held consequences do not matter in ascertaining what is right to do.").
447. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
448. See Baxter & Altree, supra note 60, at 17-28;
449. Wittman, supra note 61, at 560-61.
450. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 61, at 632.
451. See Rohan Pitchford & Christopher M. Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective, 19 J.L. ECON. & Org. 491, 494-97 (2003).
452. Ellickson, supra note 67, at 689.
453. See Cooter, supra note 296, at 14-27.
454. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 41, § 13.1, at 336.
455. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 88-89 (1986).
456. POSNER, supra note 14, § 3.1, at 32, 34.
457. See Hayek, supra note 253, at 524 ("If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know direcdy of the rele vant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them.").
458. I assume here that the theoretical differences between negligence and strict liability, discussed supra Part III.C, do not matter practically. If negligence law focuses entirely on the railroad's conduct, the focus of the inquiry and the burden-shifting presumptions available in negligence will tend to make the railroad liable in cases where the railroad cannot prove it took reasonable precautions.
459. This security cannot be complete without the right remedial rules, a full discussion of which (again, see supra note 281) exceeds the scope of this Article.
460. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
461. I am grateful to Lloyd Cohen for suggesting this phrase.
462. See supra Parts IV. C-D.
463. See Eric R. Claeys, The Right to Exclude in the Shadow of the Cathedral: A Response to Parchomovsky and Stein, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 262 (2010), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2010/4/index.html.
464. Smith, supra note 42, at 1049.
465. Coase, supra note 11, at 43.