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Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 781-798

The incentive and selection roles of sales force compensation contracts

Author keywords

Agency theory; Incentives; Retention; Sales force compensation; Selection; Survey research

Indexed keywords


EID: 80052433089     PISSN: 00222437     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1509/jmkr.48.4.781     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (67)

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