The bundling of similar interests in litigation. The incentives for class action and legal actions taken by associations

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 183-213

  Schaefer, Hans Bernd ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Actions of associations; Bundling of interests; Civil liability; Class action

Indexed keywords

EID: 52849083515     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1018762504159     Document Type: Review

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