Public goods or political pandering: Evidence from IMF programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 787-816

  Pop Eleches, Grigore ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEBT CRISIS; DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; IMF; LENDING BEHAVIOR;

EASTERN EUROPE; EURASIA; EUROPE; LATIN AMERICA;

EID: 70349969893     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: 14682478     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00556.x     Document Type: Article

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