Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract Terms

Journal of Consumer Policy

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 337-358

  Faure, Michael G ^a   Luth, Hanneke A ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b Policy Research Corporation   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Behavioural law and economics; Consumer policy; Information disclosure; Standard form contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052057056     PISSN: 01687034     EISSN: 15730700     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10603-011-9162-9     Document Type: Article

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