Shareholder activism among portfolio managers: Rational decisions or 15 minutes of fame?

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 375-391

  Nordén, Lars ^a   Strand, Therese ^b  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Institutional shareholder activism; Institutional theory; Target firms

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051864866     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-009-9114-9     Document Type: Article

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