Sanctioning violence: The effect of third-party economic coercion on militarized conflict

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 580-605

  Peterson, Timothy M ^a   Drury, A Cooper ^b  

^a OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

dyadic conflict; third parties; trade sanctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051809344     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002710393915     Document Type: Article

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