Understanding the emergence and functioning of river committees in a catchment of the Pangani Basin, Tanzania

Water Alternatives

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 197-222

  Komakech, Hans C ^a,b   van der Zaag, Pieter ^a,b  

^a UNESCO IHE INSTITUTE FOR WATER EDUCATION   (Netherlands)

^b DELFT UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Common pool resource; Design principles; Heterogeneity; Institutional bricolage; Pangani river basin; Tanzania; Water conflict; Water institutions; Water rationality

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION; CATCHMENT; COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; DROUGHT; HETEROGENEITY; LOCAL PLANNING; RATIONALIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RESOURCE AVAILABILITY; RIVER BASIN; TRANSACTION COST; WATER DEMAND; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER RESOURCE; WATER USE;

ARUSHA [TANZANIA]; PANGANI BASIN; TANZANIA;

EID: 79959614298     PISSN: 19650175     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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