Network formation in the presence of contagious risk

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-10

  Blume, Larry ^a,b,c   Easley, David ^a   Kleinberg, Jon ^a   Kleinberg, Robert ^a   Tardos, Eva ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES   (Austria)

^c SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

algorithmic game theory; financial contagion; random graphs; social contagion; strategic network formation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY; FINANCIAL CONTAGION; RANDOM GRAPHS; SOCIAL CONTAGION; STRATEGIC NETWORK FORMATION;

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; PHASE TRANSITIONS;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 79959610483     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993574.1993576     Document Type: Conference Paper

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