Revisiting environmental groups and members' behaviour: Budget, size and (im)pure altruism

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 139-156

  Asproudis, Elias ^a  

^a LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Budget; Environmental groups; Impure altruism; Motivations; Size

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959269610     PISSN: 1432847X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10018-011-0009-z     Document Type: Review

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