Unemployment insurance under moral hazard and limited commitment: Public versus private provision

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 151-181

  Thomas, Jonathan P ^a   Worrall, Tim ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b KEELE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247223686     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00302.x     Document Type: Article

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